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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Finance and strategy are closely interrelated both in theory and in the practice of 
management. Finance research suggests that a firm’s financial condition may constrain its 
ability to undertake and maintain strategic discretionary investments, such as those in R&D 
or innovation, which are fundamental to compete in today’s economy (Hall, 1990; Jensen, 
1986; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Accordingly, financial policies should be aligned with 
firm’s strategic plans in order to obtain a competitive advantage (O’Brien, 2003; Kochhar, 
1996; Simerly and Li, 2000).  
While this seems a rather theoretical argument, its implications are clearly evident in most 
businesses’ everyday life. For example, the dramatic consequences of the recent global 
financial crisis have made the interconnection between the sphere of strategy and finance 
painfully salient. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 caused a wave of fear in financial 
markets, which rapidly spread over the globe. Banks refused to lend and raised the cost of 
corporate borrowings, while consumers drastically reduced their demands for products and 
services. Projects that had seemed attractive before the crisis suddenly were deemed 
excessively risky, while large capital investments were canceled or shelved. These effects 
have been further magnified by the globalized nature of today’s competition, which has 
made inter-firm networking a widespread phenomenon. Indeed, firms in financial troubles 
also experienced problems in honoring the claims of their customer, supplier and alliance 
partners, with further costs imposed on these stakeholders. All these factors generated a 
domino effect, which in turn caused probably the worse economic recession of the modern 
era. 
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Although integrating financial and strategic decisions seems such a relevant and important 
task, this topic is yet to receive adequate attention by extant research. Indeed, finance and 
strategy literature have, buy and large, developed independently from each other and with 
little cross-contamination even in important topics that have received much attention in both 
fields, such as inter-firm relationships. Finance needs strategy in order to better understand 
aspects of financial decisions that cannot be explained exclusively through financial theory. 
At the same time, strategy scholars needs finance in order to understand how functional 
decisions contribute to the overall achievement of the firm’s long-term objectives. For these 
reasons, several scholars called for a thorough integration of the two fields although their 
reciprocal influence has been still insufficient (Bettis, 1983; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; 
Barton and Gordon,1988; Barton and Gordon,1987; Bromiley, 1990; Kochhar, 1996; 
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; Parsons and Titman, 2007). 
This thesis answers to this general call and investigates the interconnection between finance 
and strategy in the important strategic context of inter-firm relationships. While strategic 
alliances have been studied both by strategy and finance scholars, there is a lack of research 
explicitly integrating the insights provided by both streams of literature. This research does 
precisely so and shows that important aspects of alliances can be better understood when 
partnering firms financing policies are taken into consideration. The insights provided 
enhance our understanding of the financial implications of inter-firm collaborations and 
contribute in many ways to extant finance and strategy research. The results have also 
important implications for managers and corporate business professionals involved in 
alliance management. 
 
1.2. Research context and motivation 
Strategic alliances have become an ubiquitous phenomenon in today’s global economy. 
Extant literature defines an alliance as “any voluntary initiated agreement between firms that 
involves exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners 
of capital, technology or firm specific assets” (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b). This broad definitions 
includes different forms of collaborations, such as joint ventures, equity investments, R&D 
partnerships, technology licensing or transfer agreement, some forms of long-term buyer-
supplier relationships, procurement and manufacturing agreements, marketing and 
promotion collaborations, among others.  
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In 1996 Peter Drucker, who was called the father of modern management theory, stated that 
“the greatest change in corporate culture, and the way business is being conducted, may be 
the accelerating growth of relationships based not on ownership, but on partnership'' 
(Drucker, 1996). Following trends in alliance formation provided large support for Drucker’s 
farsighted prediction and the importance and diffusion of these forms of corporate 
development is now comparable to other established practices such as M&As. Booz-Allen 
and Hamilton (1997) report that during the nineties the number of strategic alliances almost 
doubled, with more than 20,000 alliances formed worldwide between 1998 and 1999 
(Harbison and Pekar, 1997; Farris, 1999). During the same years, in the US alone the 
number of alliances has grown by 25 percent each year since 1987 (Farris, 1999). This 
upward trend has steadily continued over the last decade and it is not expected to change in 
the future. For instance, results from a corporate development survey conducted in 2012 by 
Deloitte suggest that more 50 percent of the managers interviewed expected the volume of 
strategic partnerships to grow over the next two years, and this percentage rises to over 60 
percent for young firms. Moreover, this trend is expected not only for high-tech firms where 
alliances have traditionally be very common, but also for those operating in traditional 
manufacturing sectors (Deloitte, 2012). 
The rapid surge in the number of inter-firm alliances has been generally viewed by academic 
research as the result of the shift experienced by most businesses today towards a hyper-
competitive environment. This new environment puts pressure on firms to constantly deliver 
new products while keeping up with rapidly changing technological developments and 
customer demands. Furthermore, with the process of globalization geographic and economic 
barriers to commerce have been removed. This created new opportunities for firms to expand 
into new markets but also exposed them to fierce international competition. These challenges 
highlighted firms’ internal resource inadequacy and the urgent need to resort more and more 
often to external expertise and resources in order to preserve competitive advantage. 
Strategic alliances have emerged as an organizational response to endure these pressures.  
Extant research has traditionally analyzed alliances from the perspective of the resources and 
capabilities possessed by partnering firms (Das and Teng, 2000). Accordingly, this stream of 
literature has suggested these forms of collaboration provide firms with many advantages. 
Several studies show that by forming collaborations firms can gain access to new or 
emerging markets (Kogut, 1991), improve their market power (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1994), or enhance their status and legitimacy among other business partners (Podolny, 1994; 
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Baum and Oliver, 1991). Moreover, alliances have also been found to be a means of 
acquiring the technical know-how needed to master new technologies or of sharing the risks 
and costs of developing and bringing to the market innovative products (Pisano, 1990; 
Pisano and Teece, 1989; Teece, 1986, Berg and Friedman, 1981; Mowery et al., 1996; 
Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006). However, these benefits come at a cost, as these forms of 
collaborations are inherently unstable and they can be problematic to manage. Indeed, when 
an alliance is formed a firm becomes exposed to various ex-post risks that can potentially 
impede the realization of synergies (Das and Teng, 1998a; 1998b; Arino et al. 2008). In this 
regard an important concern is the risk of unplanned termination (Pangarkar, 2009), that is, 
the risk of one partner unilaterally withdrawing from the relationship before its objectives 
have been achieved (Sadowski and Duysters 2008, Reuer and Arino 2002, Reuer and Zollo 
2005). The costs associated with such unanticipated termination can be substantial because 
the efforts devoted to the alliance and the resources developed within it (such as joint 
technologies or marketing knowhow) are often sunk, idiosyncratic, and cannot be fully 
recovered if the relationship is prematurely terminated (Pangarkar, 2009). As a result, an 
important challenge for both managers and academic researchers has been to better 
understand what firms should do in order to preserve the long-run stability of an alliance, 
while facilitating the realization of synergies by pooling resources together. 
Extant research suggests that the chances of alliance unwanted termination and instability 
can be magnified by a firm’s financial condition. If one alliance partner encounters financial 
difficulties and is facing growing bankruptcy concerns, out of either desperation or necessity 
it may unilaterally withdraw from the relationship, with substantial costs imposed on the 
firm. Similarly, a firm may decide to walk away from a weakened alliance partner, as 
continuing the relationship would imply very limited returns in terms of synergies. In this 
respect, a telling example of the costs stemming from partners financial health is the alliance 
between two of the most important players in the airline industry, namely Alitalia and Air-
France. This collaboration has been recently put under pressure by Alitalia weak financial 
condition, which required a capital injection of 300 million euros in order to avoid financial 
distress. Although Air-France was initially willing to judiciously invest in its partner under 
to condition of a change in financial policy, it finally withdrew its offer and wrote-off the 
value of its equity position in Alitalia. This decision also had strong repercussions on the 
Italian carrier, as it was forced to turn to alternative partners with dubious complementary 
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resources or capabilities in the airline business1.  Recent empirical evidence provides further 
support for similar costs imposed by financially weak firms on their alliance partners. For 
instance, Boone and Ivanov (2012) find that firms experience a significant negative stock 
price reaction when an alliance partner files for bankruptcy. Moreover, they also find that 
non-bankrupt alliance partners experienced a significant drop in profitability and investment 
levels in the subsequent two years. More generally, other studies document that a firm 
financial difficulties can generate strong and broader wealth effects that rapidly extend, 
through a sort of ‘contagion’, also to its customers, suppliers and even competitors. For 
instance, Hertzel et al. (2008) find that customer and suppliers of distressed firms experience 
negative stock price reactions around the event of their partner filing for bankruptcy. 
Similarly, other scholars suggest that a firm financial distress can have negative 
repercussions even for industry rivals, who may experience not only declining stock prices 
(Lang and Stultz, 1992) but also increased spread terms on new or renegotiated corporate 
bank loans (Hertzel and Officer, 2012).  
The existence of costs stemming from partners financial condition suggests that financial 
health is at least as important as resource considerations in the context of an alliance. In 
other words, firms forming alliances should be concerned not only about the resources 
possessed by prospective partners, but they should also pay close attention to their financial 
policies as these directly influence the risks they are exposed to in the collaboration. 
However, while partners’ financial health seems to play such a relevant role, this aspect is 
yet to receive adequate attention by existing literature. Indeed, alliance scholars have 
traditionally looked at firm financial condition exclusively through the perspective of 
resources.  Based on this perspective, firm-level financial policies have been shown to be 
important only to the extent that they determine the availability of financial resources within 
a firm. For instance, Lerner et al. (2003) show that the need for additional funds prompt 
many firms to enter into alliances. Similarly, Patzelt et al. (2008) suggest that financial 
resources influence a firm’s ability to develop and acquire the capabilities made available 
through alliances. While this body of works confirms the importance of financial resources 
in alliance formation, it completely overlooks to consider the broader implications that 
partners financial condition have in terms of risk. In particular, very little is known as to 
whether and how the risks implied by firm-level financial decisions (such distress-driven 
                                                
1 Indeed, after refusing alliance offers from long-standing competitors, such as Ryanair, Alitalia 
finally resorted to Poste Italiane, the major provider of postal services in Italy, who participated with 
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unplanned termination) influence the various aspects of its alliance activity. Similarly, still 
unanswered questions remain about whether alliance partners concerns of instability are 
relevant enough to affect the financial policies adopted by firms.  
This lack of knowledge about the implications of firm financial condition suggest that our 
understanding about alliance related risks and how firms deal with them could be greatly 
enhanced by a consistent effort to integrate insights from both alliance and finance research. 
The general goal of this thesis is to explicitly fill this void by proposing partners’ financial 
health as another relevant dimension to better understand several aspects involved in 
alliances. Indeed, while extant research has mainly looked at the importance of resources, I 
take a different angle and complement this perspective by suggesting that resource 
considerations should be traded off with considerations about risks stemming from a 
prospective partners financial health. Accordingly, partnering firms should have incentives 
to consider each other financing policies and take them into consideration when structuring 
their alliances. In particular, in this thesis I focus on one of the most important aspects of a 
firm’s corporate financial policy, that is capital structure, and investigate its interconnection 
with the firm’s overall alliance strategy.  
Financial research has shown that capital structure critically influences a firm’s ability to 
deal with external stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, and employees. These 
stakeholders often in invest in assets that are relation-specific (R-S) in the sense that their 
value is preserved as long as contractual parties transact with each other (Parsons and 
Titman, 2007; Williamson, 1985). If financial distress resulted in a firm’s liquidation, these 
relationships would terminate and the value of these assets would decrease substantially. As 
liquidation risks increase with the amount of debt in a firm capital structure, these 
stakeholders are either reluctant to deal with highly leveraged firms, or they require risk-
adjusted prices in order to do so (Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Accordingly, 
firms should carefully devise their capital structure whenever they want to  stabilize their 
relationship with external partners, while preserving the latters’ incentives to invest (Titman, 
and Wessels, 1984, Banerjee et al., 2008). However, while the ramifications of the above 
argument have been explored with respect to different kinds of stakeholders, this logic has 
never been applied to alliance partners. In the following chapters, we extend this intuition to 
the context of strategic alliance, where the costs associated with instability and unplanned 
termination make firms’ financial condition particularly relevant. Accordingly, the general 
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research purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether and how capital structure decisions 
affect and are affect by a firm’s alliance activity.  
In analyzing this reciprocal relationship I show that, in light of the risk of unplanned 
termination, a firms’ capital structure and the associated potential for bankruptcy and 
financial distress have a profound impact on external partners willingness to collaborate with 
the firm and undertake alliance-specific investments. Moreover, I also suggest that capital 
structure exacerbates various hazards involved in alliances even when financial distress is 
still remote and bankruptcy is not an immediate chance. These risks are shown to have very 
important consequences for managers’ decision-making. In particular, by explicitly 
integrating insights from both capital structure and alliance literature, I am able to enhance 
our understanding in two key research areas of interest to both fields. On the one hand, I 
contribute to finance research by analyzing how a firm’s alliance activity influences its 
capital structure decision. In this respect my analysis supports the idea that alliance partners’ 
concerns about bankruptcy and other related risks are relevant enough to significantly 
influence a firm’s decision in terms of debt and equity financing. On the other hand, I also 
contribute to alliance research by investigating the reverse causal link, that is, how capital 
structure decisions, once adopted, impact various aspects of a firm’s alliance strategy. In this 
regard, the analysis clearly corroborates the view that the risks implied by firm’s capital 
structure have a critical impact on its perceived attractiveness as an alliance partner, and thus 
on the characteristics of the partners it is able to attract in the market for inter-firm 
collaboration. Similarly, firms appear to adopt specific governance forms (such as equity 
joint ventures) in response to the instability brought about by a partner’s financial condition 
with the ultimate goal of protecting the value of their R-S investments. Finally, I also derive 
the performance implications of the proposed theoretical framework and investigate whether 
firms that adopt capital structure decisions consistent with their alliance strategy indeed 
enjoy higher financial performance. 
 
1.3. Research methodology and thesis outline 
The general goal of my thesis is to integrate insights form both alliance and capital structure 
literature in order to enhance our understanding in several key aspects of managers decision 
making. In order to pursue this objective I adopt both a theoretical as well as an empirical 
research approach. Accordingly, four distinct phases of the research emerge which are 
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individually addressed by each of the following chapters. In each phase, I develop a set of 
theoretical arguments and test them empirically with suitable datasets.  
The first part of the thesis (Chapter II) starts off with an extensive discussion of relevant 
studies in both alliance as well as capital structure literature. This review shows that while 
alliances have been a central topic of interest for both strategy and finance scholars, these 
two streams of literature have surprisingly developed independently from each other. 
Accordingly, important research gaps and promising areas of integration of the two fields are 
first introduced.   
In the second phase (Chapter III) I explicitly address the gaps existing in capital structure 
research. In this respect, I build on stakeholders’ theories of capital structure (Banerjee et al., 
2008; Titman, 1984) and derive arguments linking the characteristics of a firm’s alliance 
activity to its decision in terms of debt and equity financing. These predictions are then 
tested through two empirical analyses. In particular, in the first analysis I focus on a sample 
of firms operating in the biotech industry, where the recourse to inter-firm collaboration has 
been of paramount importance. In the second analysis, I extend the validity of previous 
results and focus on a large multi-industry sample of firms. Both analyses are based on 
archival data collected from multiple databases (Orbis, Compustat, SDC Platinum). These 
data sources and the related datasets collected are also consistently used during the following 
research phases.  
In the third phase (Chapter IV) I change perspective and explore the implications of a firm’s 
capital structure for various aspects involved in alliance formation. In this part of the 
analysis I suggest that, once a firm has adopted a given capital structure, the implied risks are 
relevant enough to be reflected in the transaction-level characteristics of the alliance it forms. 
In this respect, my theoretical arguments propose that a firm’s capital structure impacts its 
attractiveness as an alliance partner, and thus it has relevant implications in terms of partner 
selection. Similarly, the risks implied by capital structure will be reflected in the choice of 
appropriate governance forms that effectively mitigate concerns arising from partners’ weak 
financial condition. An empirical analysis conducted on a large sample of alliances from 
multiple industries provides support for these predictions and it shows that a firm’s capital 
structure is systematically related to the characteristics of the partner it is able to attract as 
well of the alliances it forms. 
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In the fourth phase (Chapter V) I derive the performance implications of the proposed 
theoretical framework. Given the profound consequences that a firm’s financial condition 
can have in terms of the risks involved in alliances, firms should carefully devise their 
capital structure or otherwise they may experience serious problems.  Accordingly, in this 
last part of my analysis I propose that firms failing to consistently align capital structure with 
their overall alliance strategy should find themselves at a competitive disadvantage and thus 
experience a decline in performance (Kochhar, 1996). To explore these points I adopt a 
broader perspective and investigate the importance of a firm’s financial condition in the 
context of alliance portfolio management, that is, the management of a firm’s collection of 
ongoing relations with alliance partners. This level of analysis is particularly suited to my 
purposes as the contribution of individual alliance to firm’s outcomes is difficult to isolate 
(Lavie, 2007). Moreover, since capital structure is a firm-level construct it is also 
conceptually meaningful to analyze its impact at the level of the overall alliance portfolio, 
rather than only at the level of individual dyads. In order to test this argument I conduct a 
third empirical analysis on a sample of firms operating in the automobile industry and find 
that a firm’s alliance strategy and capital structure decision critically interact in order to 
determine its financial performance. 
Finally, the last important methodological consideration is related to econometric issues 
involved in my study. This thesis shows that a firm’s financial condition and its alliance 
activity are intimately related by a reciprocal relationship. A firm’s financial condition 
impacts its alliance strategy and vice-versa. As a result, both a firm’s capital structure and 
the characteristics of the alliances it forms could be jointly determined and represent 
endogenous variables in the study. This situation is known as reverse causality and it is 
typically of studies linking corporate financing decisions with corporate strategy ones 
(Parson and Titman, 2007). Accordingly, in Chapter 3 an instrumental variables approach is 
adopted. Similarly, further endogeneity may arise from the fact that firms’ decision to enter 
alliances could be self-selected with respect to their financial condition, as for example firms 
characterized by excessive financial risks may find systematic problems in finding partners 
to ally with. In this respect, both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I control for the effects for self-
selection with appropriate statistical techniques (such as the Heckman’s procedure). 
 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FIRM’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
 15 
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Research on strategic alliances 
Although the literature on alliances is vast and multi-form, most alliance research can be 
thought of as be directed towards understanding the generic strategic alliance making 
process. This process is known to be complex and lead many scholars to divide it into 
several phases (Das & Teng, 1997; Devlin & Bleackley, 1988; Parkhe, 1993). While many 
classifications are provided in literature, most studies agree that the alliance process can be 
conceptualized along three main and subsequent phases: the decision to enter an alliance, the 
choice of an alliance partner and the planned management and coordination of the 
relationship (Devlin & Bleackley, 1988). Studies analyzing the first phase focus their 
attention on the antecedents of alliance formation, trying to isolate those firm-specific factors 
and environmental conditions that prompt firms to collaborate with other entities (Stuart, 
1998; Gulati, 1999; Colombo, 2006; Patzelt et al., 2008). Once a firm has established the 
need to collaborate, the next step is deciding whom to ally with. Indeed, not all opportunities 
to collaborate actually materialize as alliances (Gulati, 1995b). Accordingly, research in this 
stream has traditionally looked at various partner characteristics – such as technological 
overlap (Mowery et al., 1998), organizational fit (Zaheer et al., 1998; Lavie et al., 2012), 
resource complementarity (Chung et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 2000; Li et al., 2008), and so on– 
and has analyzed how they impact the process of partner selection. Finally, a third stream of 
literature analyzes the issues related to alliance implementation and has developed around 
two main themes. A first body of works focuses on the problem of choosing an appropriate 
governance structure for the alliance and studied the different mechanisms employed by 
firms to facilitate coordination, curb opportunism, and deal with other transaction-level 
hazards (Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Santoro and McGill, 2005). On the other 
hand, a second body of works deals with the performance implications of alliances and 
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concentrates on analyzing those factors helping a firm improve its alliance management 
capabilities (Sampson, 2004; Kale et al., 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007; Sarkar et al., 2001).  
In a related vein, extant literature can also be classified according to the unit of analysis 
adopted in approaching alliance-related issues. Most studies focus on the single dyad as their 
main unit of analysis and study the antecedents, structure and performance of individual 
alliances (Kale et al., 2002). Others studies adopt the firm as their unit of analysis and focus 
on alliance portfolios, defined as a firm’s collection of immediate relationships with alliance 
partners (Lavie, 2007). These scholars stress the need to study alliances within the strategic 
context in which they are embedded and they investigate the implications of portfolio 
characteristics for firm outcomes. Still others embrace even a broader view and look at the 
implications of structural characteristics of the network of relationship in which the firm is 
embedded through alliances (Gulati, 1999). 
In this research we focus on several key aspects involved in the alliance process across 
different units of analysis, such as partner selection, governance choice and alliance portfolio 
management. Each of these aspects has been previously analyzed by adopting a variety of 
perspectives and theoretical lens including – transaction cost economic (Williamson, 1985), 
resource based theory (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996), game theory (Parkhe, 1993), 
real option theory (Kogut, 1991), exchange theory (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b), and the list may 
be further extended. Thus, for the sake of clarity and parsimony, the approach adopted is to 
focus the review of literature mainly on studies that either built on the transaction cost view 
or resourced based view of alliances. These theories represent the two most popular 
approaches in the study of alliances, and they have been consistently applied to study most 
of the aspects involved in the alliance making process (Yasuda, 2005). As a result, a focused 
review of these two streams of research is necessary in order to identify relevant gaps and 
motivate any effort to integrate insights from alliance and capital structure research, which is 
the general purpose of this thesis. Moreover, considering these theories is also important in 
order to reconcile the proposed arguments, based mostly on finance research, with the 
general findings of traditional alliance research. Accordingly, in the present chapter I focus 
the review of literature on extant studies that built on either the transaction cost economics or 
the resource based theory of strategic alliances. In addition, I further integrate into each of 
the following chapters of the analysis an extensive discussion of the relevant literature 
regarding the specific issues covered (i.e. partner selection, governance choice and alliance 
portfolio management) in order to highlight more clearly the contributions.  
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The resource-based view of strategic alliances 
The essence of strategic management is to understand those factors that determine a firm 
level of profitability. Accordingly, strategy scholars have long analyzed the question of why 
firms possess different levels of profitability and how they should be managed in order to 
obtain a competitive advantage over their competitors (i.e. higher than normal levels of 
profitability). Traditional strategy research based on the work of Porter (1990), posits that a 
firm’s performance can be better understood by looking at the structural characteristics of 
the industry in which it operates (bargaining power, barriers to entry, etc.). Thus, strategic 
choices are just a matter of selecting those industries which are most attractive, that is, 
whose structural properties are more favorable to the firm (and all its competitors). However, 
while the inherent simplicity makes such an approach appealing, its predictive and normative 
power is limited as it does not directly explain why firms operating in the same industry 
show marked differences in performance, although being subject to the same industry and 
market forces. For this reason many scholars suggested that firm performance and behavior 
can be better understood by looking at firm resources and prompted a resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm. 
According to the resource based view firms can be viewed as bundles of resources tied- 
semi-permanently to the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). These firm-specific assets possess the 
greatest value when employed within firm boundaries and usually cannot be traded under 
secondary markets. Moreover, as they are rare and both difficult to copy by competitors and 
to transfer to other firms, these resources are the source of firm competitive advantage, that 
is above-normal returns (Barney, 1991). Firm-specific resources include both tangible assets 
– such as plants, production equipment, financial resources etc. – as well as intangible assets 
– such as the knowledge and capabilities embedded in a firm’s workers, access to valuable 
information, etc. (Das and Teng, 2000). The central point is that, whatever the nature of the 
resource considered, only those possessing the above characteristics can be considered as 
strategic, and thus provide the firm with a competitive advantage which is sustainable in the 
long-term. 
Several scholars extended this general framework to the context of inter-firm collaborations 
and developed a resource-based view of strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2000; Das and 
Teng, 1998a; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Eisenhardt et al., 1996). In essence, this research stream 
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conceptualizes alliances as a means to access resources held by others, yet which are 
fundamental to develop a competitive advantage over their competitors. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) suggest that a firm’s critical resources may span its boundaries and may be embedded 
in inter-firm routines and processes. By forming ties with other entities the firm can access 
these resources and combine them with its internal resources to create sources of relational 
rents. Therefore, successful alliances are those that help firms combining assets that are 
complementary, thus creating synergies that would not be realized if they operated 
separately.  
Eisenhardt et al. (1996) argue that firms resort to alliances when they are in weak strategic 
positions, that is, in urgent need for additional resources, a situation that can be triggered by 
both market conditions and firm strategy.  For instance, higher levels of competition reduce 
margins and make product differentiation more difficult, thus weakening a firm’s strategic 
position. By forming alliances the firm can access prominent or emergent technologies of 
cutting-edge partners and embody them in its products in order to differentiate from 
competitors. Similarly, firms pursuing a strategy of innovation must develop technical 
competence and know-how, which is usually a very resource-consuming, long-term oriented 
and uncertain activity (O’Brien, 2003). In this context, if an alliance involves joint 
development or research activities it helps the firm sharing the risk and costs of its 
investments. Also, a firm pioneering a new technology may improve its strategic position by 
leveraging its partners in order to establish a new technology standard (Eisenhardt et al., 
1996). In any of these instances the underlying logic is need, and the focus is on the 
resources delivered by each partner.  
The RBV has also been employed to point out the importance of social aspects involved in 
alliances. Specifically, it has been argued that firms collaborate not only when they need 
more resources, but also when they are in a strong social position (Chung et al., 2000; 
Eisenhardt et al., 1996; Gulati, 1995b). A firm enjoys a strong social position when it can 
capitalize on advantages such as contacts, reputation or status (Eisenhardt et al., 1996). 
Firms whose managers are well connected through personal networks of business and 
professional contacts are facilitated in reaching out potential alliance opportunities or to be 
offered new ones. Moreover, extensive contacts also help establishing reputation, which is 
fundamental when negotiating an alliance deal. Accordingly, this body of works has shown 
that alliances emerge not only as a result of strategic pressures, but also when firms want to 
capitalize on strong social assets or when low status partners want to associate with higher-
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status ones characterized by a strong reputation (of quality, of technical competency, etc.) 
(Podolny,1994).  
Taken together, these streams of literature suggest that most of the issues involving alliances 
can be better understood by focusing on partnering firms’ resources. In particular, firms 
appear to join alliances both when their weak strategic position prompts the need for more 
resources, and when they find themselves in a strong social position (which itself can be 
though of as an intangible resource). Thus, according to the resource-based view, the 
inherent irony underlying the strategic alliance process is that firm “must possess resources 
in order to get resources” (Eisenhardt et al., 1996). This logic has been applied to study 
many aspects of the strategic alliance making process.  
Extant literature corroborates the view that resource characteristics represent probably the 
most important antecedent of a firm decision to enter alliances (Das and Teng, 2000; 
Yasuda, 2005).  Several studies have further explored this point by analyzing the process of 
partner selection and shown that the decision of whom to ally with can be largely explained 
by looking at complementarities between firm capabilities and resources. For instance, 
Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) show that complementarities arising from non-overlapping 
market niches, or the combination of upstream and downstream competences in the value-
chain, largely explain alliance formation decisions between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms. Similarly, Chung et al. (2000) find that complementary capabilities 
increase the likelihood of alliance formation between US investment banks and firms during 
corporate stock offerings. Other studies confirm the importance of the social capital arising 
from both direct and indirect ties with other firms. For instance, Gulati (1995a; 1995b) 
suggests these ties represent valuable means to share partner-related information and to 
establish reputation and reliability. Accordingly, he finds that the existence of prior ties 
between semi-conductor firms affects the chances of alliance formation. 
The resource-based view has also been used to predict firm choices in term of governance. 
This stream of research builds on the assumption that the typology of resources contributed 
by partners critically impacts the way in which an alliance is structured. Das and Teng 
(2000) argue that the mechanisms through which resources are to be shared in the alliance 
are largely determined by whether these resources are property-based or knowledge-based. 
In particular, they show that resource profiles determine structural preferences in terms of 
four types of alliances, i.e. equity joint venture, minority equity alliance, bilateral and 
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unilateral contract-based alliances. Similarly, Chen and Chen (2003) analyze how partners’ 
resource profiles influence a firm’s decision between exchange alliances – much more 
similar to outsourcing contracts – and integration alliances – where partner firms explicitly 
integrate each other’s resources and activities in a separate entity.  Mayer and Salomon 
(2006) find that firm technological capabilities help reducing the costs of governing outside 
transactions, thus increasing the likelihood that a firm will chose sub-contracting over 
vertical integration in the presence of specific hazards. More recently, Dunne et al. (2009) 
focused on pharma-biotech alliances and showed that the financial, technical and social 
resources of the biotech firm impact the governance of such alliances and the extent of 
control that it is willing to give up in the relation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Finally, the role of resources has also been explored to understand the performance 
implication of alliances. This body of research has analyzed the impact of partner 
characteristics on alliance success (Sarkar et al. 2001, Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and 
Borza 2000; Saxton 1997). For instance, Sarkar et al. (2001) analyze the influence of 
resource complementary and capability as well as of relationship capital on alliance 
performance. Their findings suggest that value creation in alliances is enhanced when 
partners possess complementary resources yet share similar social institutions. On the other 
hand, other scholars have analyzed how alliances contribute to the overall performance of 
the firm and proposed that, since alliances represent access relationships, the advantages a 
firm derives from collaborating largely depend on both the firm and its partners resource 
profiles. For example, Stuart (2000) studies alliances in the semiconductor industry and finds 
that organizations with large and innovative partners perform better in terms of sales growth 
and innovation rate as compared to firms lacking such associates. These benefits are also 
greater for younger than for older firms consistently with a signaling and status based 
explanation of alliances. In a related vein, Kale et al. (2002) find that firms with greater 
alliance experience and established alliance management capabilities enjoy higher abnormal 
stock returns after alliance announcement. Finally, other studies adopt a broader view, and 
analyze the performance implications of alliance portfolios. These studies stress the fact that 
firms often access resources through multiple alliances simultaneously and that it is often 
difficult to isolate the contribution of individual alliances on firm’s outcomes. As a result, 
the impact of alliances is better understood by studying the resource profile of the entire 
alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2007; Lavie, 2008; Mouri et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2010). For 
example, some scholars proposed that alliance portfolios characterized by greater diversity in 
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terms of partner resources enhance firm performance by providing access to non-redundant 
information and to a broader pool of assets (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010).  
 
The TCE view of strategic alliances 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) originated from the work of Coase (1937) and was 
developed as a theory to explain why firms exist and what factors set the limits to their 
boundaries. More specifically, this theory accepts the dichotomy between two stereotype 
economic institutions, namely market and hierarchies (vertical integration), and analyzes 
what factors push economic actors towards organizing their transactions according to one of 
them (Oxley, 1997). When exchanges happen via market or spot contracts, the identities of 
buyer and seller are trivial and activities can be coordinated simply defining the price and 
quantities of the exchange. On the other hand, in vertical integration a firm performs the 
transaction internally, and achieves coordination through formal authority (Williamson, 
1985).  
The central idea behind TCE is that both vertical integration and the market provide the firm 
with alternative mechanisms to minimize the transaction costs incurred during exchanges. 
Transaction costs are “the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems” (Williamson, 
1985:19). They include not only the direct costs to produce and deliver the goods/services 
involved, but also the costs arising from writing and enforcing the contract, coordinating 
activities, safeguarding the interests of transacting parties, while inducing appropriate 
adjustments to unfolding contingencies. These costs arise out of bounded rationality coupled 
with pervasive behavioral uncertainty, which makes complete contracts too costly or even 
impossible to write, thus leaving room for opportunistic behavior to take place. Under these 
circumstances standard market contracts are not efficient and firms must resort to the formal 
authority provided by hierarchies in order to govern the exchange and minimize transaction 
hazards. 
TCE focuses on contractual hazards arising from two main features of transactions, namely 
assets specificity and uncertainty. Relation-specific assets are not easily redeployable 
because their value is maximized as long as contractual parties transact with each other. This 
creates the so called small numbers bargaining, where the firm undertaking the investment 
faces high switching costs, while being subject to hold-up by the counter-part which may try 
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to extract more favorable conditions (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). Similarly, high 
levels of uncertainty about outcomes or activities to be performed make coordinating and 
monitoring more difficult, as it becomes unfeasible and too costly to contractually specify 
and enforce parties’ behavior (Oxley, 1997). As a result, as the level of relation-specific 
investments and uncertainty increases, market contracts become too costly and exchanges 
should take place within the firm, where formal authority and greater information 
availability help reducing opportunistic behavior and fostering adaptation to unforeseen 
contingencies. 
The transaction cost paradigm has been fruitfully employed as a theoretical lens to 
understand several aspects of alliances. In particular, scholars have conceptualized alliances 
as hybrid governance forms situated in the midway between market and hierarchies and 
sharing governance features of both institutions. Accordingly, this research stream suggests 
that the main rationale behind alliance formation is the minimization of transaction costs and 
studies the circumstances under which transactions are best executed via alliances, as 
opposed to being finalized through the market or performed internally within the firm (Chen 
and Chen, 2003; Yasuda, 2005).  In particular, alliances tend to occur when transaction costs 
are high enough to discourage the use of market-contracts, yet not so severe to justify 
complete vertical integration. 
Besides explaining the emergence of collaborations, the TCE paradigm has been mainly 
employed in alliance literature in order to explain why firms decide to structure their inter-
firm relationships in a variety of ways (Oxley, 1997; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Pisano, 
1990; Yasuda, 2005). In this respect, scholars characterized alliances along a continuum of 
governance forms between market and hierarchies, with some alliances including more 
hierarchical control (such as JV or equity-based alliances) and others resembling the 
characteristics of market exchanges (contractual alliances). These studies focus on alliance 
characteristics that may indicate the presence of high transaction costs, and analyze their 
impact on the choice of particular typologies of alliances. Governance forms must be aligned 
with alliance characteristics in order to minimize overall transaction costs, in such a way that 
greater transaction costs induce more hierarchical alliance forms.  
Most scholars have focused on the distinction between equity and non-equity arrangements. 
Equity-based alliances usually take the form of joint ventures (JVs) and are most preferable 
when appropriability or coordination concerns are high (Pisano, 1989; Pisano, Russo and 
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Teece, 1988; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997). These collaborations are more similar to 
vertical integration since they represent legally independent entities that provide formal 
coordination and control mechanisms over the collaboration. Moreover, the fact that they 
involve common ownership by partners creates a mutual hostage situation, which helps to 
align incentives and reduce opportunism (Klein et al. 1978; Pisano 1990). On the other hand, 
non-equity alliances represent hybrid contractual arrangements more similar to market 
contracts because they lack dedicated administrative structures and they are more preferable 
when contractual hazards are limited. Empirical evidence is consistent with this idea and 
shows that firms tend to adopt equity alliances when transaction costs are higher.  For 
example, Santoro and McGill (2005) find that the presence of co-specialized assets increases 
the likelihood of hierarchical governance in alliance formed by biotech firms, and that 
partner and task uncertainty further strengthen this effect.  Van de Vrande et al. (2009) 
analyzes technology sourcing agreements and finds that corporate venture capital 
investments are preferred over non-equity alliances when there is greater technological 
distance between the partners. In a related vein, Oxley (1997) shows that hierarchical 
alliances are also chosen when opportunism is high because the technology is difficult to 
specify or alliance activities are wider in scope. 
Finally, although its implicit focus is on governance aspects, the TCE framework has also 
been extended in order to understand the performance consequences of alliances. According 
to TCE, firms should align transaction characteristics and governance forms in a cost 
minimizing way (Williamson, 1991a). Building on this assumption, several scholars analyze 
the performance implications of eventual misalignments between alliance characteristics and 
firm governance choices.  For example, Sampson (2004) analyzes a sample of R&D 
alliances in the telecom equipment industry and shows that a misalignment between alliance 
characteristics and governance may result in excessive bureaucracy and reduce collaborative 
benefits. In a related vein, Hoetker and Mellewigt (2009) analyze how the choice between 
formal and relational governance is influenced by the typology of resource exchanged, and 
show that firms that fail to correctly match governance forms with asset types experience 
reduced alliance performance. Nelsen (2010) shows that different governance mechanisms 
mediate and moderate the relationship between condition for alliance formation and 
outcomes. Finally, few studies adopted a broader view and applied the transaction cost logic 
to study the consequence of alliances on overall firm performance. For instance, Goerzen 
and Beamish (2005) analyze alliance portfolios and suggest that greater levels of resource 
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diversity among alliance partners cause a loss of corporate focus and increase transaction 
costs by making the management of the portfolio more complex and unwieldy. 
 
2.2. Research on capital structure 
In corporate finance capital structure refers to the particular mix of financial liabilities that a 
firm uses to finance its assets. Although financial markets allow firms to issue a broad 
portfolio of securities, there are two general forms of capital: equity capital and debt capital. 
Each of these securities is associated with different level of risks, benefits and control over 
the firm’s operations and strategies. Debtholders exert lower control but collect a fixed and 
relatively secure stream of cash flows that is determined ex-ante by contractual obligations. 
Shareholders can exercise tighter control on the firm’s activity through the board of directors 
but they bear most of the risks since they are residual claimants. Thus, broadly speaking, the 
term capital structure indicates the amount of debt and equity capital displayed on the right 
side of a firm’s balance sheet and borrowed from the two most important financial 
stakeholders, bondholders and shareholders, respectively. 
The importance of capital structure decisions goes beyond their mere financial implications 
and lies in the way they can influence the overall business of a company. On the one hand, 
capital structure determines the average cost of a firm’s capital and has a direct impact on its 
ability to stay profitable in the long term2. On the other hand, the level of financial leverage, 
i.e. the ratio of total debt to total liabilities, determines the distribution of the economic rents 
among the suppliers of finance and, thus, the control they can exert over its valuable assets 
and activities. Since these stakeholders differ in term of risk-adversity and goals, the relative 
importance of their claims has a direct impact on how a firm shapes its corporate strategies, 
investments and, in general, on the way a business is ran.  
The modern theory in capital structure literature starts with Modigliani and Miller’s famous 
work (1958) that explains how in perfect capital markets corporate financing decisions 
                                                
2 When a firm’s return on invested capital (ROI) is steadily smaller than its WACC (Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital), then the company is not able to run its business in a profitable way since it 
earns less than it owes. 
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should be “irrelevant”3. Indeed, adopting the discounted-cash-flows approach (DCF), the 
value of a company is determined by the net present value of the cash flows generated by its 
assets and their economic use. Since financial leverage (or “gearing”) determines exclusively 
how such cash flows are sliced up and offered to investors, it is not possible to increase the 
value of a firm through financial alchemy. This result easily extends to all the types and mix 
of securities a firm can issue (long or short-term debt, straight or convertible bonds, etc.) and 
implies that a firm’s “hurdle rate”, i.e. the expected rate of return on the market value of its 
assets, remains constant regardless of the debt ratio. 
In later studies, Modigliani and Miller (1963) acknowledged the importance of taxes and 
their impact on capital structure and the value of the firm. In several countries interests paid 
on debt are tax-deductible and generate interests tax shields by reducing the overall amount 
of taxes owed to the government. Accordingly, a firm’s market value is made up of two 
parts: the value of the firm if it was all-equity financed and the value of interests tax 
deductions. The former is the present value of all cash flows generated by the unlevered 
firm, while the latter is the present value of tax-deductions discounted at the appropriate rate 
of return. Since it is always possible to increase the value of tax benefits by issuing more 
debt, then a value-maximizing firm should be completely financed through debt.  
Modigliani and Miller’s (M&M) seminal works started-off the debate on capital structure 
and inspired a huge amount of research. Although their underlying assumptions are quite 
unrealistic, M&M’s propositions on both leverage-irrelevance or interest-tax shields are not 
end results, but instead they can be considered as the starting point for the debate on the 
importance of corporate financing decisions and the benchmark for every theory or 
prediction concerning capital structure. Subsequent research tried to relax the underlying 
assumptions of perfect capital markets and to identify significant market frictions that make 
financing strategies important. This body of works has developed over more than fifty years 
of research and it is naturally vast and heterogeneous. Therefore, a focused review strategy is 
needed in order to grasp those strains of literature significant for our research purposes. The 
proposed approach is based on the analysis of few prominent literature reviews (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001; Parson and Titman, 2007; Graham and Leary, 2011) and it is 
guided by the general focus of this thesis towards the strategic aspects of capital structure.  
                                                
3  M&M theorem assumes the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and asymmetric 
information. Moreover, capital markets are assumed to be efficient and prices of assets and securities 
embed all the information available on their past and future value. 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FIRM’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
 26 
In particular, I suggest that extant literature can be filtered according to the source of 
frictions considered and the different facets of capital structure analyzed. Accordingly, two 
main research lines can be identified: 
(i) theories of capital structure developed within the conversation of finance; 
(ii) theories of capital structure developed from an integration of finance and corporate 
strategy research. 
The first stream of literature analyzes capital structure according to finance theory and 
concentrates on issues such as the determinants of observed debt ratios, the decision to issue 
or repurchase securities, and the existence of an optimal capital structure.  The second stream 
focuses not only on capital structure determinants but also on how capital structure decisions 
interact with the firm’s environments and strategies in order to determine performance. In 
the next sections, we review both these macro-research lines and synthetize the most 
influential theories and the related empirical predictions. 
 
Capital structure in finance research 
 
Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory is one of the most influent theories in capital structure literature. The 
main reason of its success among finance researchers is that, in contrast to previous models, 
it is the first approach that predicts moderate borrowing. Previous works by Modigliani and 
Miller came up with the unrealistic result that leverage is “irrelevant”. Even after accounting 
for the effect of taxes the authors concluded that a value maximizing firms ought to be 100% 
debt financed in order to take full advantage of interest tax deductions. However, empirical 
research never ran into such type of firms; rather it is not rare to find industries in which 
firms prosper with no debt at all (since firms are mainly equity financed). Thus, there is 
something wrong with these approaches and the trade-off theory provides two possible 
explanations. First, the value of interest tax shields may be reduced under different 
circumstances, since tax deductions do depend on the ability of the firm to steadily generate 
economic rents that are higher than the cost of debt. Second, there are costs associated with 
excessive borrowing that may offset the benefits of tax deductions, i.e. financial distress 
costs do exist (Myers, 2002). Financial distress costs arise when a firm struggles to keep the 
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promises made to creditors and the cash flows generated by economic activities are not 
sufficient to cover the costs and to adequately remunerate the capital invested. This situation 
is different from bankruptcy, which is the legal process through which creditors step in and 
take over the firm’s assets from shareholders. Sometimes financial distress leads to 
bankruptcy and in turn to the liquidation of the firm’s assets; most often, it just indicates that 
the business has ran into difficulties. Both circumstances generate costs that can be classified 
as direct or indirect.  
Direct costs include administrative and legal costs, the cost of shutting down operations, and 
other distress-driven losses such as the losses taken during “fire sales”. Indirect costs of 
financial distress are defined as costs caused by the many obstacles that occur when trying to 
manage a firm that has ran into financial trouble. Unlike direct costs, indirect costs are 
incurred before financial distress is declared and when the mere threat of default can 
determine opportunistic behaviors among stakeholders. The majority of such costs are 
mostly due to agency problems between bondholders and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Myers 1977), as the latters can gain at the expense of creditors when default is a 
chance by undertaking actions that reduce the value of existing debt (for instance by 
investing in riskier projects that might fail and further reduce the firm’s value). Otherwise, 
they could give up valuable investment opportunities because part of the value generated 
would go to existing creditors and would increase the market value of debt. Other indirect 
costs of financial distress could arise from the relationships a firm establishes with non-
financial stakeholders (i.e. customers, suppliers, employees, etc.) as a weak financial 
position may force the firm to default on their claims (such as the provision of spare parts or 
other after-sales services) (Titman, 1984). 
Hence, given the costs and benefits of debt financing, the value of the firm can be expressed 
as the sum of three parts: 
(4) Firm Value = Value if unlevered + PV of interest tax shield - PV of distress costs   
When debt level goes up the present value of interest tax deductions increases first, then the 
marginal benefit associated with further borrowing drops off, since it is very unlike that the 
firms will be able to generate sufficient profits to steadily cover huge interest costs in the 
long term. In contrast, the more the debt, the more the present value of the associated distress 
costs. When the firm increases its borrowings, distress costs are trivial first, then they 
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suddenly pick up because excessive debt threatens the firm’s long-term survival4. As 
consequence, financial managers can adopt financing strategies where the benefits and the 
costs associated with debt are equal at the margin: by adopting such “optimal” debt ratio 
firms maximize their market values. Building on this logic, scholars suggested that firms 
facing higher business risks, with valuable growth opportunities and intangible assets should 
borrow less, since they are more exposed to distress costs. Instead, more profitable firms 
generate higher cash flows and can afford higher levels of debt and interests expenses.  
 
Pecking Order theory 
Unlike tradeoff models, in the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) we do not 
have firms seeking optimal debt ratios.  Rather, firms seem to follow a mechanistic order in 
the choice of funds and observed leverage is the results of accumulated financial deficits 
over time. The theory draws from empirical evidence and aims at explaining why equity 
issues are relatively rare when compared to debt issues. 
The model assumes perfect financial markets, except for the existence of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of the firm. Outsider investors have less 
information about the real investments outlays of the firm, and thus they cannot adequately 
value its assets in place and growth opportunities. Every time a firm decides to issue 
(repurchase) securities it transfers information to investors, and financial markets adjust the 
value of the firm accordingly. The announcement of a stock issue could be good news if it 
reveals growth opportunities with a positive net present value, but it could be also bad news 
because managers with poor prospects may want to delay leakages of information and try to 
sell overvalued shares. As a result, Myers and Majluf derive an equilibrium in which firms 
can issue share, but only at a market-down price (Myers, 2001). This intuition is based on 
extended empirical evidences that confirm how the announcement of stock issues drives 
prices down. For instance, Asquith and Mullins (1986) computed an average price drop of 
roughly 3% of the pre-issue market value of the firm, that is not much if compared to the 
overall value of the firm, but it is a much larger fraction of the amount issued. Furthermore, 
such price reductions depend on the relative importance of growth opportunities and assets 
                                                
4 During bad times a firm may experience a reduction in cash flows and fail to meet its financial 
obligations. If such difficulties are severe, then debtholders might step in and take over the firm’s 
assets by declaring bankruptcy.  
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in place. Myers and Majluf stress the fact that investors’ worries concentrate on the value of 
assets in place and that firms with large growth opportunities should be credible equity 
issuers. Empirical studies seem to confirm that price reductions are less severe for such 
companies (Pilotte, 1992; Jung, Kim and Stulz, 1996). Of course, there are good firms with 
undervalued shares but, in general, they will not issue large amounts of equity, because the 
price drop acts like a wealth-transfer mechanism from existing shareholders to new ones. 
After all, why should managers with good prospects issue undervalued shares and make new 
stockholders better off? For all these reasons, the existence of asymmetric information ends 
up increasing the cost of external capital and determines a pecking order among the sources 
of finance, according to which firms always prefer internal over external financial resources 
to fund new investments. Moreover, when internal funds are exhausted firms first issue less 
risky securities (such as debt, bonds etc.) and finally they raise equity, as a last resort. When 
a firm issues debt, price reactions are negligible because manager’s superior information is 
minimized. Indeed, managers with promising future prospects will immediately exploit the 
chance to issue new debt, as they think that firm’s earnings will be sufficient to cover higher 
interest expenses. Only pessimistic managers prefer to issue equity, because they think that 
higher interests would only create further problems, and that the new shares could be 
overvalued. As a consequence, investors will interpret every new stock issue as an attempt to 
sell something that is not good to buy. On the other hand, equity issues are credible when 
debt is too costly because the firm is at an already dangerous debt level or when the firm 
possesses large intangible growth opportunities. The pecking order explains why new stock 
issues are infrequent and why the bulk of external financing used by public corporations 
comes from debt issues. It also finds a rationale behind the negative relation between 
leverage and profitability: more profitable firms borrow less because they have more internal 
funds. Less profitable firms (whose internal financing is limited) will issue debt only when 
accumulated financial deficit exceeds available internal funds. 
 
Capital structure and Corporate Strategy 
The main problem with traditional financial theories of capital structure is the lack of clear 
empirical evidence (Graham and Leary, 2011). Despite several common predictions, the two 
most influent financial models–i.e. tradeoff models and the pecking order theory- provide 
different explanations to observed financing patterns (Fama and French, 2002). Moreover, 
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neither of them can be considered as a general framework to analyze financing strategies, 
since each theory works better in particular contexts and thus, they are conditional rather 
than general theories (Myers, 2001). In order to overcome such difficulties, several capital 
structure researchers adopted a slightly different point of view and pointed out whether a 
strategic perspective could fill in the gaps of previous literature.  
Even though strategic and finance research are based on very different paradigms, both fields 
have reciprocally benefited from a closer analysis of market imperfections and firm 
heterogeneity (Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Researchers point out different areas of controversy 
between finance and strategy as research fields. First, finance assumes that firms’ ultimate 
goal is to maximize shareholders wealth and that firms act efficiently in order to achieve this 
unique objective. Then, such simplistic model of the firm is employed in broader 
frameworks whose main focus is on the behavior of markets (Simerly and Li, 2000). On the 
opposite, strategic management states that a firm has multiple goals and that it may be 
impossible to simultaneously achieve all objectives. Individual managers must maintain 
control over the business and balance conflicting claims from shareholders, bondholders and 
several external stakeholders, while dealing with uncertain and dynamic environments 
(Simerly and Li, 2000). As a result, strategic research adopts a more complex model of the 
firm in the study of financing choices. The second area of conflict is concerned with the 
importance of firm-specific risk management. Strategy researchers investigate the 
importance of firm-specific risks and attributes, while financial theories overlook these 
effects since they assume away the fact that investors possess diversified portfolios and that 
unsystematic risk can be eliminated (Bettis, 1983). A third conflict arises when dealing with 
the importance of information management (Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Financial assets pricing 
models assume symmetric distribution of all relevant information among investors in order 
to adequately evaluate assets and liabilities. Thus, managers should make public any good 
news related to the firm’s long-term survival and growth. However, the disclosure of 
information on new product development, innovations, forthcoming alliances etc., may 
severely damage the ability of a firm to achieve a competitive advantage over its competitors 
(Bettis, 1983). On the opposite, strategic research recognizes that market imperfections can 
be a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and accepts that managers have 
cognitive limits in gathering and processing information. In this vein, Simerly and Li (2000) 
state that strategic management focuses on decision-making in a context of uncertainty and 
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limited information, and suggest that financial decisions (such as capital structure) must be 
assessed from this perspective.  
These areas of conflict fundamentally arise from the different focus of finance and strategy 
as research fields. Financial research is interested in studying the behavior of investors and 
capital markets, while strategic research analyzes the behavior of firms and their 
characteristics. Successful theories developed on the common ground of finance, 
organizational economics and strategic management helped to integrate both perspectives 
and to reconcile the points of controversy. As far as capital structure literature is concerned, 
researchers revisited the conflicts related to the “irrelevance” of firm-specific risks and 
information management by adopting theoretical approaches typical of industrial 
organization models. Indeed, the analysis of capital structure decisions from the standpoint 
of theories such as transaction cost economics (TCE), resource-based view (RBV) and 
agency theory (AT) provides useful insight into the importance of firm heterogeneity, firm-
specific risks and assets (Jensen, 1986, Williamson 1988; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Oviatt 
(1984) suggests that TCE and AT help integrating financial and strategic management as 
research fields and that researchers should concentrate on the complementary elements 
rather than stressing the differences in their predictions. As a result, these theoretical 
frameworks have represented the starting point for the integration of a strategic perspective 
in capital structure literature (Barton and Gordon, 1987; Barton and Gordon 1988). Their 
implementation first helped researchers to better understand the link between financing and 
investments decisions (Jensen, 1976; Myers, 1977; Williamson, 1988). Then, on the basis of 
these insights, subsequent works extended the range of factors related to capital structure and 
further elaborated on the link between financing decisions and firms’ competitive behavior 
(Kochar and Hitt, 1998; O’Brien, 2003), the importance of its relationships with external 
stakeholders (Parsons and Titman, 2007), and factors related to the external environment 
(Simerly and Li, 2000).  
In this section I analyze these more recent lines of research and review theoretical and 
empirical works that analyze capital structure from the perspective of ATs, TCE and RBV. 
Next, I discuss those works that employed these theories to develop the link between capital 
structure and a broad range of competitive strategies. Finally, I conclude by examining 
research that has looked at how capital structure decisions impact firms’ behavior in 
input/product markets and the relationships established with employees, customers, suppliers 
and competitors. 
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Agency theory 
Capital structure decisions determine how the value generated by the firm is sliced up and 
offered to its major financial stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, bondholders and managers. 
Since such stakeholders have very different characteristics and goals, the potential conflict of 
interest between their claims has a strong impact on how strategic plans are devised, which 
in turn could lead to inefficient managerial decisions and suboptimal investment choices. 
Agency-based models traditionally focus on the latter point and describe in detail the relation 
between financing strategies and investment decisions. The general idea behind AT is that 
conflict of interests among financial investors may cause agency costs and investment 
distortions that could hurt the firm’s value.  Capital structure can be used as a strong 
corporate governance tool to ease such problems. Indeed, by adopting “optimal” capital 
structures firms are able to set up corporate governance mechanisms that alleviate agency 
conflicts and prevent investment distortions from hurting value-maximizing strategies.  
Several studies concentrate on the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, 
which arises from the separation between ownership and control. Since managers usually 
own an irrelevant fraction of the firm, they can capture a small part of the economic rents 
from profit-enhancing activities, but they bear most of the associated costs. For this reason, 
managerial discretion over the firm’s resources generates investment distortions that may 
induce managers to overinvest in order to increase their private welfare and not the value of 
the firm. Overinvestment thus indicates a situation in which the firm invests beyond the level 
that maximizes its value. When a firm has limited growth opportunities and excessive cash 
its managers may have strong incentives to use those resources to invest in “perquisites” 
(such as private use of company jets, bigger offices, etc.) or to increase manager’s salaries, 
power, prestige and self-esteem (empire building phenomenon) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986). These free cash flows, i.e. the cash resources left after the firm has undertaken 
all positive NPV projects, should be paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends, but 
selfish managers may use them to invest even in projects with negative NPV. Jensen (1986) 
suggests that debt (i.e. capital structure) can be employed as a corporate governance tool to 
discipline managers and reduce these costs. By increasing the level of debt the firm forces its 
managers to pay out cash to bondholders and reduces free cash flows available to 
overinvestment. Moreover, the stringent conditions associated with debt payments and the 
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implied risk of bankruptcy impose more discipline in that they stimulate managers to 
improve short-term payoffs while ensuring the firm’s short-term viability. 
Another important research stream suggests that overinvestment could also be related to the 
conflict that exists between shareholders and bondholders. This conflict relates to the 
different claims of these investors on the firm’s cash flows, which in turn depend on the 
characteristic of the financial contracts that coordinate such transactions. Shareholders are 
residual claimants and their claims can be satisfied only after the firm has met its financial 
obligations towards external investors. Moreover, they have the chance to default when the 
company does not meet its financial obligations, in which case debtholders step in and 
appropriate the remaining value5. These features create investment distortions related to 
shareholders’ preference towards certain types of inefficient investment. On the one hand, 
shareholders could prefer riskier projects because they would capture most of the value in 
case of success, but would not bear the related costs in case of failure6. Accordingly, the firm 
may end up overinvesting in projects riskier than bondholders would prefer, giving rise to 
the so-called asset substitution problem (Myers, 1977). On the other hand, shareholders 
could be more risk-adverse in the presence of debt because they could lose control of the 
firm in case of bankruptcy. Under these circumstances, they could even dismiss profitable 
investments since bondholders may appropriate most of the value generated from growth 
opportunities7. Regardless of the typology of inefficiency considered, the main point is that 
the asymmetric distribution of pay-offs among financial stakeholders gives rise to agency 
costs and “suboptimal” managerial decisions. 
 
Transaction cost economics 
Transaction costs economic is mainly concerned with the optimal governance of transactions 
between the firm and each of its internal and external constituencies. Market contracts and 
vertical integration are the two main governance mechanisms that help firms minimizing 
transaction costs that fundamentally arise out of incomplete contracts, bounded rationality, 
potential hold-up and uncertainty about the outcomes of the transaction (Williamson, 1985; 
                                                
5 Trade-off theory provides an extensive discussion of the costs that arise from financial distress. Such 
costs are generally borne by bondholders. 
6 Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that asymmetric distribution of payoffs among financial 
stakeholders may cause the “asset substitution problem”, which is further discussed in section 3.2.3  
7 See Myers (1977) 
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Williamson, 1991a, 1991b). This dichotomy has been applied in the context of a firm’s 
decision between debt and equity financing. 
As for real transactions, debt and equity can be seen as two alternative governance structures 
to reduce the overall costs associated with transactions between the firm and suppliers of 
finance (Williamson, 1988). Debtholders have the right to a fixed amount of cash flows that 
is determined ex-ante in a contract. Furthermore, they exert limited control over business 
activities, since they normally have an arm’s length arrangement with the firm and become 
intrusive only when it fails to meet its financial obligation (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; 
Simerly and Li, 2000; Berglof, 1994). As a result, debt is more similar to the market contract 
(Williamson, 1988). On the opposite, equity financing is more similar to vertical integration 
because it gives shareholders the status of residual claimants. Indeed, shareholders can 
appropriate economic rents generated from the business only after the preemptive claims of 
bondholders are completely satisfied and, thus, they do not benefit from a steady stream of 
cash flows. However, since they bear most of the risks associated with the business, 
shareholders can exert a tighter control over economic activities through the direct 
monitoring of the board of directors (Kochhar, 1996). 
The choice between the two governance mechanisms depends on the nature of the assets 
involved in the transaction - namely their level of asset specificity - which in turn depends on 
the strategy pursued by the firm (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; O’Brien, 2003). Specificity is 
related to the concept of redeployability and refers to the characteristics of assets whose 
value is maximized in particular uses. In other words, firm-specific assets lose most of their 
value if employed in alternative uses or by another firm. For example, assets such as bricks 
and mortars can be employed in several tasks without reducing their own value once the 
original purpose has been fulfilled. On the other hand, firm-specific assets, such as 
specialized production equipment, cannot be as easily redeployed because they are tailored 
to the firm’s particular needs. For general purpose assets there is complete knowledge about 
their present and future value and this reduces the risk of any associated financial 
transaction. As a consequence, highly redeployable assets should be better financed through 
debt contracts in order to minimize overall transaction costs. When uncertainty is limited 
transaction costs arising from bounded rationality and hold-up behaviors are limited. A 
governance mechanism that is more similar to the market helps minimizing the cost of 
external capital. On the other hand, for firm-specific assets such as R&D, advertising, 
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patents or marketing expenses, there is very limited knowledge available with respect to their 
present and future value. Such increased uncertainty leads to higher transaction costs and 
makes debt an unattractive form of governance. Indeed, when dealing with non-redeployable 
investments, it would be extremely difficult for the firm to assess and negotiate ex-ante the 
preemptive claims from bondholders. Moreover, these investors may require additional 
compensation for the risks associated with the transaction in the form of higher cost of 
capital as these assets represent poor collaterals. On the opposite, when using equity 
financing, the responsibility for control and enforcement shifts from external capital markets 
to the board of directors, whose duty is to protect the interests of residual claimants (Simerly 
and Li, 2000). As an insider, the board is assumed to have more complete knowledge about 
the future prospects of firm-specific assets. Moreover, since their contract runs for the entire 
life of the firm, shareholders have a long-term orientation and are less concerned about 
temporary difficulties or lack of available cash flows to reimburse capital. As a result, when 
firm-specific assets are involved, equity provides a more flexible governance mechanism for 
financial transactions without putting at risk the firm’s long-term growth (Williamson, 1988; 
Kochhar, 1996; O’Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  
Empirical evidence provides some support for these predictions. For example, Balakrishan 
and Fox (1993) examine the influence on capital structure of firm-specific attributes as 
opposed to industry characteristic. Their results show that measures related to intangible 
capital (such as R&D and advertising expenses) contribute significantly to variation in 
leverage. Because investments in intangible assets are likely to depend upon the firm’s 
strategic behavior, such result confirms that strategy and other firm-specific drivers help 
explaining capital structure decisions. Another interesting finding from this study is that 
investments in specific assets (advertising expenses) are associated with higher leverage 
when they signal to capital markets the ability of a firm to convert intangible resources into 
economic rents or when they signal the commitment towards an aggressive behavior in 
product market.  Furthermore, by employing a variance component model the authors find 
that firm heterogeneity (i.e. firm fixed effect) accounts for over 52% of the overall variance 
in capital structure, while industry and time effects are of relatively little importance. 
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Resource-based view 
The resource based view of the firm states that our understanding of strategy and competitive 
advantage is improved when we take into account the distinctive and idiosyncrastic 
characteristics of firms’ resource endowments. Firms earn extraordinary profits when they 
posses strategic resources which are rare, specific, hard to imitate and heterogeneously 
distributed (Barney, 1991). However, supporters of this view often neglect to take into 
consideration the various ex-ante and ex-post restrictions imposed by strategic assets. More 
specifically, scholars approaching capital structure issues from an RBV perspective propose 
the existence of financial market frictions associated with different types of firm’s resources. 
For example, Vicente-Lorente (2001) explores the financial implication of a “resource-
driven strategy” and develops a general framework relating the imperfections of markets for 
strategic resources to the behavior of firms in capital markets. The study confirms that highly 
specific and opaque investments, such as specialized human capital or internally developed 
R&D, are associated with lower debt, while less opaque investments, such as external R&D 
(R&D acquired from external partners), do not influence leverage.  
While this approach reinforces the predictions of TCE about the differences between debt 
and equity financing, works adopting an RBV perspective further suggest that capital 
structure decisions should be considered as one of the functional capabilities necessary to 
realize the full value embedded in strategic resources (Kochhar, 1996). Indeed, firms must 
pursue different strategies in order to serve different business segments and this strategic 
orientation determines the firm’s investments in intangible and idiosincrastic resources, such 
as advertising, R&D etc. (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; O’Brien 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 
2001). As a result, since investments and financing decisions typically interact (Jensen, 
1976; Williamson; 1988) it is reasonable to think that different capital structures best serve 
the needs of different competitive strategies (Kochhar, 1996, O’Brien 2003). Indeed, while 
there is a general consensus on the characteristic that an asset should have to be considered 
strategic, there is less agreement on the real sources of competitive advantage and scholars 
need to consider the role of capabilities present in functional areas in extracting the value 
contained in idiosyncratic assets (Kochhar, 1996). From this perspective strategic resources 
stocks can be considered a necessary but not sufficient condition to realize the full value of a 
firm. Firms must also devise appropriate financing policies to sustain their investments and 
strategic goals in the long-term. As a result, in case of two firms possessing identical 
resources but different financial management capabilities, the RBV approach predicts 
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different performance, as if a firm undertakes poor capital structure decisions it will suffer a 
loss in the value extracted from its resources and thus a competitive disadvantage.  
 
Capital structure and competitive strategy 
The upshot from the theoretical frameworks discussed above is that there is a reciprocal 
interdependence between capital structure and strategic decisions. On the one hand, strategic 
considerations are fundamental in order to enhance our understanding of how resource 
requirements of different strategies impact a firm’s choices in terms of debt and equity 
financing. On the other hand, it is also important to understand how firm financing policies, 
once adopted, influence the ability of a firm to pursue a given strategy. For these reasons, 
recent research spanning the boundaries of strategy and finance has focused on firm 
heterogeneity as a relevant dimension in the study of capital structure and has focused on the 
link between capital structure and a wide range of competitive strategies.  These lines of 
research not only enhance our understanding of capital structure decisions, but also help 
explaining how capital structure influences firm strategic behavior. In addition, they have 
strong managerial implications since they predict a decline in performance for firms failing 
to align financial and competitive strategy (Kochhar, 1996; O’Brien, 2003; Simerly and Li, 
2000).  
Scholars linking insights from capital structure and strategy research have traditionally 
focused on two main issues. First, great attention has been devoted to the importance of 
industry characteristics and other environmental factors with respect to capital structure 
determination. For instance, Simerly and Li (2000) study the importance of environmental 
dynamism as a driver of capital structure decisions, and suggest that excessive debt levels 
may constrain a firm’s ability to undertake strategic actions in dynamic contexts and in areas 
such as research and development. Second, another important aspect that has been 
investigated is the impact of different strategic orientations on corporate financing decisions. 
These works build on the idea that different strategies require unique bundle of resources, 
whose characteristics in turn determine the optimal financing strategy. Kochhar and Hitt 
(1998) document a reciprocal and dynamic relationship between capital structure and 
corporate diversification strategies. Ngah-Kiing Lim et al. (2009) focus on the impact of 
related and unrelated diversification strategies on the level of debt carried considering the 
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moderating effect of environmental dynamism. Andersen (2005) demonstrates how effective 
risk-management strategies can reduce business risk and are suitable to support higher levels 
of debt. Moreover, he shows that some degree of financial slack (i.e. low financial leverage) 
can improve the positive influence of risk management strategies on performance. 
Finally, extensive theoretical and empirical work has also focused on the link between 
innovation strategies and capital structure. O’Brien (2003) studies the role of financial slack 
during the implementation of an innovation strategy and finds that firms competing on the 
basis of innovation adopt lower levels of debt. David et al. (2008) further explore this point 
and analyze the implication of debt heterogeneity for R&D investment and firm 
performance. Overall, this body of research suggests that a conservative financing strategy 
helps firms to foster innovation in several ways: by avoiding jeopardizing R&D investments, 
by optimizing pipeline management and new product development, and by undertaking 
M&As and other knowledge expansion strategies in a timely fashion. Accordingly, 
innovative firms failing to acknowledge the importance of maintaining financial slack 
experience a decline in financial performance (O’Brien, 2003). 
 
Stakeholder theory of capital structure 
While the above studies linked strategic and finance arguments to study the dynamic relation 
between financing policies and strategic behavior, they have done so by looking at the 
consequences of capital structure exclusively within firm’s boundaries and at the 
expectations of traditional financial investors. An important literature strand develops a more 
general framework, where firm boundaries include implicit contracts with non-financial 
stakeholders as well as explicit contracts with traditional investors. Non-financial 
stakeholders can be defined as “parties that have either a direct or indirect interest in the 
firm’s long-term viability” (Parsons and Titman, 2007). These works draw from stakeholder 
theory and analyze the impact of firm financing strategy on its dealings in the input/product 
markets. Relevant papers discuss the impact of capital structure on the relationship between 
the firm and its customers, suppliers, employees and competitors (Titman, 1984; 
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Banerjee et a., 2008; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996; 
Sharpe, 1994; Hanka, 1998) and argue for a stakeholder theory of capital structure (Grinblatt 
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and Titman, 1998)8. 
Seminal works in this area include Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) who 
explore the implications of capital structure and expected liquidation costs with respect to 
the characteristic of a firm’s products and its customers. Titman (1984) is the first to suggest 
that firms with unique products that require firm-specific investments from customers should 
be less levered, since such stakeholders may be concerned about the costs they would bear in 
case of bankruptcy. Customers buying unique products (e.g. durable goods) usually require 
subsequent after-sales interactions with the firm for example for the provision of spare parts, 
maintenance services, and so forth. If the firm declared bankruptcy or was liquidated 
following financial difficulties, these services would not be provided with subsequent costs 
imposed on customers who had to resort to alternative service providers at extra costs. As the 
risk of liquidation is directly influenced by the amount of debt financing, then it follows that 
customers should care about a firm’s capital structure decisions and how they impact the 
firm’s long-term survival. If customers rationally assess the firm’s probability of liquidation, 
they will anticipate these costs and require compensation by reducing the price they are 
willing to pay for the products of a highly levered firm, or, alternatively, they could even 
turn to alternative suppliers. Accordingly, firms should reduce leverage ex-ante in order to 
induce R-S investments and to extract better terms from their customers.   
Several studies further propose that high levels of leverage can give rise to costs even when 
bankruptcy risks are not immediate, and more specifically, by influencing a firm’s incentives 
to meet implicit claims sold to external stakeholders. While after-sales services usually 
represent explicit claims specified in a contract, implicit claims are too state-contingent to be 
reduced to a written form. As a result, it is possible for a firm to default on those claims 
without necessarily going bankrupt. Leverage influences the value of such implicit claims 
for at least two reasons. First, debt levels determine the future ability of a firm to raise 
external funds and, thus, the opportunity cost of meeting implicit claims when cash flows are 
reduced (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Second, more debt reduces the share of future cash 
flows diverted to shareholders, which in turn could incentivize a firm to take actions that 
increase shorter-term gains at the expense of longer-term profits (Maksimovic and Titman, 
1991). For example, scholars have demonstrated that highly levered firms tend to provide 
                                                
8  For a complete review of this literature see Parsons and Titman (2007). 
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their customers lower quality inputs, or to skimp on follow-up services for existing products 
(Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Maksimovic, 1995)9. 
The above arguments suggest that a firm capital structure decision represents a relevant 
concern for external stakeholders and that firms should be financed conservatively whenever 
inducing transactions with such external partners is important.  Empirical research provides 
support for these predictions. In particular, various scholars have extended this reasoning to 
other kinds of external stakeholders relationship involving R-S investments (not only 
customers, but also suppliers and employees). These works suggest that proxies related to 
external stakeholders concerns about the value of their implicit and explicit claims should be 
important determinant of capital structure decisions. For instance, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) find that firms producing specialized product, that is firms characterized by higher 
intensity of investments in R&D, anticipate customers concerns and adopt lower leverage. 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) focus on customer-supplier relationships and point out that firms 
can use capital structure as a tool to induce relation-specific (R-S) investments from these 
stakeholders. Consistently with this prediction, their results document a negative impact of 
R&D expenditures from the firm’s main customers and suppliers on the level of debt carried. 
Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2008) further show that firms buying most of their inputs from 
dependent suppliers or selling most of their outputs to dependent customers 10 tend to use 
less debt, arguably to induce investments from these partners. Franck et al. (2010) focus on 
young start-ups and their distinctive characteristic with respect to their relationships with 
external stakeholders. Unlike mature firms, start-ups are young innovative firms that have to 
establish these relationships from the scratch and that suffer from a lack of operating history 
in the marketplace. Empirical evidence from their survey demonstrates that young firms 
imposing higher costs on their partners in case of liquidation significantly reduce their 
leverage. In addition, their results suggest that the presence of partners with more bargaining 
power, who are arguably better able to transfer eventual distress costs to the focal firm, 
further strengthens this effect. 
                                                
9 The basic logic is that the short-term gains from such strategies would immediately benefit a firm’s 
shareholders. On the other hand, customers may later detect opportunistic behavior and react by 
punishing the firm, in which case debt holders would be especially damaged since they bear most of 
the downside risks of the firm. 
 
10 Authors define dependent customers as customers that accounts for at least 10% of firm total 
revenues. Similarly, purchases from dependent supplier must represent at least 10% of firm’s total 
purchased inputs. 
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While these works show that external relations shape a firm’s capital structure, another 
stream of literature investigates the inverse causal effect. More specifically, these studies 
analyze the implications of capital structure on the relation between the firm and its 
competitors. For instance, Opler and Titman (1994) find that highly leveraged firms lose 
market shares to their less leveraged competitors during industry downturns. They interpret 
such result as an evidence of financial distress costs arising from the relationships between 
the firm and its customers. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that conservatively financed 
competitors may have incentives to compete more aggressively in order to drive financially 
distressed firms out of business. Increased competition reduces rivals cash flows and 
profitability, which in turn may disrupt the firm relationships with its investors (recall 
agency-based model of capital structure) and cause market exit. Chevalier (1995) analyzes 
the impact of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in grocery store chains but finds mixed evidence on 
the effect of increased leverage on prices. LBOs significantly influence subsequent price 
changes, but the direction of the changes depends on the financial condition of rival firms. 
When a firm faces conservatively financed competitors, LBOs lead to lower prices, 
consistently with the view that financial distress induces aggressive competition from rivals. 
When bankruptcy is a concrete possibility also for competitors, LBOs lead to higher prices 
and tend to soften competitive pressures, consistently with the view that financial distress 
induces firms to behave less aggressively in order to improve short-term performance. 
Finally, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) present further evidence that financially distressed 
(high levered) firms have less incentive to build market shares and tend to increase prices 
during industry downturns. Managers that take on excessive debt may have a short-term 
orientation since firm liquidation is a concrete scenario, and thus they prefer to boost 
immediate profits at the expenses of long-run performance. 
 
2.3. Strategic alliances and capital structure 
The above sections provided a general overview of prominent research on both strategic 
alliances and capital structure. This review clearly reveals that the two fields have, buy and 
large, developed independently and with little cross-fertilization even in topics that received 
much attention from both of them. For this reason, in this section I make the first effort 
towards integrating the two literature streams by focusing on those areas of research that I 
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believe represent common ground for both fields, yet that have been analyzed from different 
points of view by finance and strategy scholars. 
First, I believe that although strategy scholars certainly acknowledge the importance of 
financial aspects involved in strategic alliances, they have paid only limited attention to the 
topic. Generally speaking, alliance research has approached financial issues by adopting a 
resource-based perspective and looked at alliances as a valuable means to access financial 
resources critical for firm development. For example, many studies on alliance formation 
usually control for firm capital structure or other proxies for the availability of financial 
resources, based on the underlying assumption that financially constrained firms should form 
alliances more because they lack the necessary financial resources to prosper independently 
(Stuart, 2000; Patzelt et al., 2008). In a related vein, Lerner et al. (1998, 2003) show that 
biotech firms tend to turn to alliances with pharmaceutical companies as an alternative 
mechanism to raise new funds when equity markets are less liquid. Moreover, they also 
show that the relative importance of firms’ financial and technical contributions determines 
the optimal allocation of control rights over the joint project and its success rate. Similarly, 
Dunne et al, (2009) suggest that the extent of financial resources possessed by biotech firms 
impact the level of control they are able to retain over joint projects with big pharmaceutical 
companies. Hitt et al. (2000) analyze the drivers of partner selection in emerging and 
developed economies and suggest that the availability of proper financial resources is a 
critical dimension according to which firm select alliance partners. Finally, Lavie (2007) 
suggests that building extensive alliance portfolios helps firms tapping into other partners’ 
financial resources and enhancing their financial performance. 
While these studies certainly provide valuable insights on the importance of financial 
resources in many aspects of alliances, they overlook to analyze the risk implications of a 
firm’s financial condition during the overall alliance making process. Das and Teng (1998a) 
propose that resource and risk represent the two main strategic dimensions to consider in the 
study of alliances. The resource dimension represents what a firm contributes or gain to/from 
an alliance, while the risk dimension indicates what the firm fears the most. Accordingly, the 
goal of every firm should be to obtain the maximum returns from the resources committed to 
the alliance, while minimizing the related risks. By integrating both dimensions scholars can 
achieve a better understanding of several aspects of the alliance making decision process, 
such as partner opportunistic behavior, trust, diversity and structural arrangements (Das and 
Teng, 1998a). Consistently with this approach, I contend that the attention of extant alliance 
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literature to firm financing policies (and thus capital structure) has been limited, because 
these studies have focused exclusively on their implications in terms of resources, while the 
risks involved in the alliance have been completely neglected. In particular, capital structure 
decisions determine not only a firm’s need for additional financial resources and thus its 
incentives to enter into a strategic alliance, but also its overall risk profile and ability to 
undertake and maintain specific kinds of strategic investments. The level of financial 
leverage directly influences a firm’s risk of bankruptcy and thus its commitment towards 
investing properly in order to honor external stakeholders implicit as well explicit claims 
(Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Banerjee et al. 2008; Kale and Sharhur, 
2007). Capital structure decisions also impact the ability of a firm to undertake critical 
investments, such as those in innovation, necessary to compete more boldly in highly 
dynamic environments (O’Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Simerly and Li, 2000). Both 
a firm’s risk profile and its ability to undertake strategic investments represent key 
considerations during an alliance, and thus alliance scholars should also devote more 
attention to how a firm’s capital structure influence these factors.  
On the other hand, the importance of strategic alliances has also been overlooked by most of 
capital structure research. Indeed, although several studies suggest that a firm’s capital 
structure has critical repercussions on its ability to deal with external stakeholders (such as 
customers, suppliers, employees, labor unions, etc.), the ramifications of this argument have 
not been fully developed with respect to the relationships established with alliance partners. 
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that addresses this topic is Kale and Shahrur 
(2007), who consider the existence of alliances between the firm and its key customers and 
suppliers and document a negative impact on the level of leverage. However, these authors 
focus exclusively on outsourcing contracts and did not consider other important typologies 
of alliance relationships, such as those with partners in innovation or industry competitors. 
Moreover, their analysis does not consider that alliances differ substantially across various 
dimensions, which in turn could be relevant in terms of capital structure determination. For 
instance, alliance partners may differ in their bargaining power and thus in their ability to 
transfer to the focal firm the anticipated costs of financial distress (Franck et al., 2010). 
Similarly, the nature of the activities involved in the collaboration is also likely to influence 
the extent to which alliance partners are exposed to the risks implied by the focal firm’s 
capital structure. Finally, the importance of a firm’s capital structure in inducing investments 
from external partners could be contingent on the presence of other transaction-level 
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mechanisms that could be used by alliance partners to safeguard their investments in the 
relationship (such as equity-based governance structures) (Pisano et al., 1989).  
Overall, the above observations suggest that the role of capital structure decisions during the 
strategic alliance making process is far from been completely understood and that our 
knowledge on both alliances and capital structure could be greatly enhanced by a consistent 
effort to explicitly integrate the two fields. In particular, two main gaps can be identified in 
extant literature: 
(i) first, we have only limited knowledge on the risks implied by a firm’s capital 
structure for its alliance partner, and whether these risks are significant enough to 
impact its choice between debt and equity financing; 
(ii) second, once a firm has adopted a given capital structure, little is know about 
whether and how the implied risks impact the strategic alliance making process in 
terms of partner selection, governance choice, or contribution of the alliance 
strategy to firm performance. 
This research explicitly aims at filling these two gaps by integrating the insights provided by 
alliance and capital structure research.  In particular, in Chapter 3 I address the first gap and 
contribute to the lack of knowledge in finance research by providing a thorough analysis of 
the impact that strategic alliances exert on a firm’s capital structure decision. In Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 I deal with the second gap and contribute to alliance research by investigating 
the implications of capital structure policies on firms’ alliance activity at the level of the 
individual dyad and of the overall alliance portfolio, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES ON 
FIRM’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Capital structure decisions entail important consequences for the relations a firm establishes 
with its external stakeholders. In particular, extant research suggests that these stakeholders 
care about a firm’s capital structure especially when they make R-S investments (Parsons 
and Titman, 2007). If financial distress resulted in the firm’s liquidation, these relationships 
would terminate and the value of the assets involved would decrease substantially. As 
liquidation risks increase with the amount of debt in a firm capital structure, these 
stakeholders are either reluctant to deal with highly leveraged firms, or they require risk-
adjusted prices in order to do so (Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Accordingly, as 
extensively discussed in Chapter 2, empirical evidence finds that firms tend to reduce 
leverage whenever inducing R-S investments from external stakeholders is important 
(Banerjee et al., 2008; Kale and Shahrur, 2007, Parsons and Titman, 2007).  
While this body of literature provides valuable insights by showing the potentially profound 
consequences that capital structure holds for a firm’s external relationships with customers, 
suppliers, and employees, it neglects to consider the ramifications of above arguments with 
respect to another very important group of stakeholders, namely alliance partners. Indeed, 
although many of the arguments developed by finance research could clearly apply also to 
alliance partners, there exist substantial differences that make alliances unique with respect 
to the other kinds of relationships. First, the aforementioned studies concentrate on 
relationships that essentially take the form of an outsourcing contract between customers and 
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suppliers. However, firms may form alliances not only with their customers and suppliers, 
but also with other stakeholders such as competitors or partners in innovation. Thus far, the 
literature has been silent on the impact that these other classes of external stakeholders may 
have on firm financing policies. Second, the fact that a customer decided to “buy” a 
particular product from a supplier indicates that asset specificity was not so serious as to 
prevent the outsourcing of that product (Banerjee et al., 2008). In contrast, firms often turn 
to more complex governance forms (such as strategic alliances) when the hazards related to 
asset-specificity are more salient (Lo Nigro et al., 2012). Hence, alliances represent a novel 
context to study the implications of R-S investments for capital structure. 
The need to pool resources together and undertake relation-specific (R-S) investments 
exposes partners in an alliance to various hazards (Williamson, 1985). First, if the 
relationship terminates unexpectedly a firm may find it difficult to redeploy assets devoted to 
the collaboration and hence termination may entail significant costs. Second, asset 
specificity also exposes the firm to the risk of opportunism, as partners may try to extract 
wealth under the threat of unilaterally withdrawing from the alliance (Klein et al., 1978). 
Given the costs, firms will resist making R-S investments unless the long-run stability of the 
alliance can be safeguarded. In this respect, alliance research has shown that appropriate 
governance structures can help mitigate exchange hazards while preserving partner 
incentives to devote resources to the alliance, thereby inducing R-S investments in inter-firm 
relationships (Williamson, 1985, 1991a; Dyer and Singh, 1998, Hansen, Hoskisson, and 
Barney, 2008). These studies imply that a partner’s incentive to invest depends on the 
governance form, which in turn is affected by characteristics of the transactions such as the 
degree of assets co-specialization, task uncertainty, technological uncertainty, technological 
distance, prior cooperation, partners’ resource contributions and bargaining power (Pisano, 
1989; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Bosse and Alvarez, 2010; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
However, as this view mainly focuses on the dyad as the unit of analysis, it overlooks the 
fact that incentives to invest in alliances may also depend on critical firm-level policies, such 
as capital structure.  
The lack of clear knowledge about the relationship between a firm’s capital structure and its 
strategic alliance activity suggests that this remains a relevant, yet under-researched topic 
both in finance and strategy literature. In order to fill these gaps I start off my analysis by 
extending the argument regarding the risks of dealing with highly leveraged firms to the 
context of strategic alliances, and propose that in light of these risks another stakeholders 
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group, namely alliance partners, should care about a firm capital structure. Accordingly, in 
this chapter I develop and empirically test the basic theoretical arguments exploring the 
importance of strategic alliance in capital structure determination. Moreover, as extant 
alliance research suggests that transaction level characteristics influence incentives to invest 
in inter-firm relationships, I also investigate whether the impact of alliance relationships on 
capital structure choices is most pronounced for particular typologies of alliances.  As a 
result, in the present chapter I seek answer to the following research questions: 
(i) To what extent do strategic alliances affect a firm’s capital structure decision? 
(ii) Does the impact of strategic alliances depend on transaction-level characteristics? 
I contend that the capital structure of potential alliance partners will be a critical factor that 
firms consider forming alliances. If the resources devoted to an alliance often entail R-S 
investments, then partner liquidation can impose substantial costs on a firm. In support of 
this point, Boone and Ivanov (2012) found that firms experience negative abnormal stock 
returns when their alliance partners file for bankruptcy. Similarly, these firms also face 
significant drops in profit margins and investment levels. If managers rationally anticipate 
the risks of partnering with highly leveraged firms, or even simply learn from previous 
negative experiences (Ulset, 2008), then firms will have to maintain low leverage in order to 
attract desirable partners. Accordingly, I argue that firms that make alliances a strategic 
priority will generally adopt less debt in order to reduce financial risks and encourage R-S 
investments from their partners. Furthermore, I also argue that the importance of maintaining 
low leverage is most pronounced in the presence of other alliance attributes – namely, the 
typology of partners and activities involved – that magnify the costs of early termination. 
I test the above hypotheses by conducting two empirical analyses. In the first analysis I 
consider a sample of 166 publicly traded biotech firms over the period 2000- 2010. In the 
biopharmaceutical industry, factors such as patent expiration, increasing costs of discovery, 
and shorter product lifecycle have pushed firms towards an increasing reliance on external 
expertise. The vertically integrated approach to drug development has given way to a new 
collaborative model of innovation characterized by the allocation of discovery, development, 
and commercialization activities to specialized firms (Gupta et al., 2007). In this context, 
biotechnology innovations have been pursued mostly through strategic alliances between 
biotech firms that possess new technological expertise, and pharmaceutical incumbents 
providing financial resources and experience in late-stage development, marketing and 
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distribution (Witthaker and Bower, 1994). These alliances require firms to pool together 
complementary resources whose value is tailored to partners’ specificity and make the 
biotech industry a relevant research context to test our theory. Results from this first analysis 
show that biotech firms that place greater strategic emphasis on the use of alliances tend to 
reduce leverage more than firms that do not prioritize strategic alliances. Furthermore, this 
tendency is most pronounced when firms form collaborations in uncertain activities such as 
R&D, where pay offs are distant in time and it is important to mitigate liquidation concerns 
in the long term. Finally, I also find that leverage tends to be reduced when alliance 
partnerships are established downstream firm, such as biopharmaceutical and chemical 
companies, who usually undertake the bulk of the investments and have presumably greater 
bargaining power. 
In the second empirical study I extend the previous analysis to a larger sample comprising all 
non-financial firms included in Compustat, but with some important differences. On the one 
hand, by extending the analysis to a broad range of industries I am able to test the external 
validity of my previous results and whether alliances represent an important determinant of 
capital structure also for other typologies of firms other than biotech companies. Moreover, I 
also test whether the above findings are affected by endogeneity concerns, which naturally 
arise when studying the relationship between capital structure and strategy-related variables 
(Parson and Titman, 2007). On the other hand, while extending the sample certainly 
improves the statistical analysis, it also makes it difficult to perfectly replicate the fine-
grained analysis conducted for biotechnology firms. In particular, since some of my 
arguments regarding the impact of specific typologies of alliances (R&D-based/ non-R&D-
based, upstream or downstream alliances) were developed by considering the specific 
characteristics of collaborations typically formed by biotech firms they may not necessarily 
hold in other industry contexts. Accordingly, in this second analysis I only test (and 
empirically find) that firms forming alliances indeed adopt lower leverage. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 I develop the hypotheses linking 
the characteristics of a firm alliance strategy to its capital structure choice. Next, in section 
3.3 I describe the two empirical analyses adopted to test the proposed theoretical arguments. 
Finally, section 3.4 includes a discussion of the main findings, contributions and avenues for 
future research. 
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3.2. Hypotheses development 
I contend that the contingent value of resources devoted to an alliance makes a firm’s 
financial health relevant to its partners. In case of firm liquidation, the alliance would be 
interrupted and most of the value of these investments would be lost because of their limited 
re-deployability (Boone and Ivanov, 2012). Thus, if the firm is financially weak, partners 
may be reluctant to form an alliance or they may require contractual safeguards to protect 
their investments. Alternatively, they could require compensation in the form of risk-
adjusted prices and extract more wealth from the firm. In contrast, if a firm is conservatively 
financed the implied risks of unplanned termination are lower and less-costly safeguards can 
be employed in order to facilitate R-S investments. Thus, leverage can impact alliance 
partners in two ways. First, it determines ex post costs if a partner’s financial distress causes 
unplanned termination of the alliance. Second, it increases ex ante transaction costs by 
requiring firms to adopt additional safeguards to deal with the risks posed by leverage. 
Therefore, firms seeking to form alliances should adopt lower leverage in order to reduce 
transaction costs and induce R-S investments from external partners.  
I further argue that the impact of leverage on alliances will depend on their strategic 
importance to the firm. In the biotechnology industry, most agreements are formed to foster 
the development of novel drugs, a process that can require a long time to be completed. R-S 
investments from both partners are not limited to the year of alliance’s formation and are 
generally contingent upon the achievement of certain developmental milestones. 
Consequently, the financing policy of a biotech firm in a given year may be influenced by 
older alliances and by its long-term propensity towards collaboration. However, despite the 
benefits of low leverage for firms seeking strategic alliances, adopting a particular capital 
structure is not without costs as debt can have numerous benefits for firms (Cambini and 
Rondi, 2011; Castaneda, 2007). Furthermore, target-adjustments models of capital structure 
show that issuing or retiring financial securities is costly and that firms will adjust their 
capital structures only when the associated benefits exceed these adjustments costs 
(Faulkender et al., 2012). Thus, a firm seeking to establish alliances will reduce leverage 
only when the benefit in terms of inducing investments from its partners is high enough to 
offset the related costs.  
Firms involved in multiple alliances are likely to consider R-S investments from their 
partners a key element of their competitive strategy, as opposed to firms that do not make 
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such an extensive use of inter-firm linkages. As a result, they may enjoy greater benefits 
from keeping their leverage low. Accordingly, I argue that the impact of strategic alliances 
on capital structure will be especially strong for firms that place a greater strategic emphasis 
on alliances. In other words, firms that possess an extensive portfolio of alliances (Lavie, 
2007) and that maintain their propensity towards collaboration in the long-term should tend 
to adopt lower levels of leverage. Conversely, firms that rarely form alliances may find it 
more efficient to craft ad hoc contractual solutions to induce investments from external 
partners, since altering their capital structure would be too costly. Therefore, I predict the 
following:  
H1: Firms that place a greater strategic emphasis on alliances will have lower 
leverage. 
While a desire to engage in strategic alliances will generally give firms incentives to 
maintain lower leverage, this effect will likely vary in accordance to the type of activities 
that are involved in the alliance. Specifically, I contend that partners collaborating in R&D 
are more exposed to the risk (and implied costs) of firm liquidation because of the long-term 
and uncertain nature of these relationships. R&D alliances in the biotech industry are formed 
to foster the creation of innovative compounds, a process that is complex, extremely costly, 
and time-consuming (Kim, 2011; Lo Nigro et al., 2012; Gupta et al. 2007; DiMasi and 
Grabowski, 2007).  For instance, in 2002 developing a new compound took on average over 
12 years with an average capitalized cost of US$900 million, and only one out of nine 
molecules makes it through the development process and eventually wins regulatory 
approval (Kola and Landis, 2004). 
 The nature of the drug development process has two main implications. First, given the 
huge costs, the level of R-S investments undertaken by partners entering into these 
relationships is presumably very high. Second, given the length and the high failure rate of 
the process, they also involve higher levels of uncertainty relative to other late-stage 
agreements. In this context, capital structure becomes even more relevant because it 
influences long-term financial health. The longer the span of time considered, the higher the 
risk of liquidation induced by high levels of leverage because over longer time intervals, 
there is greater risk that at some point the firm will not be able to generate steady streams of 
revenue sufficient to cover its debt obligations.  Thus, higher levels of firm leverage will 
especially threaten the continuity of alliances that are supposed to be prolonged in time. As a 
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result, the negative impact of alliances on leverage should be more pronounced when the 
firm has a greater propensity towards engaging in R&D collaborations. Accordingly, I 
predict the following:  
H2: The negative impact of alliances on leverage will be stronger when 
collaborations involve R&D activities. 
Finally, I investigate whether the impact of alliances on capital structure is contingent on the 
characteristics of the partners involved. Partners who are expected to undertake the bulk of 
investments in the alliance should be particularly concerned about the firm’s capital structure 
decisions, because they would bear most of the losses associated with an interruption due to 
partner liquidation. In the biopharmaceutical industry this is likely to occur when a biotech 
firm forms an alliance with incumbents that operate in later stage activities of the value 
chain. In vertical alliances with downstream partners (e.g. established pharmaceutical, 
biopharmaceutical, agri-food, and chemical firms) the biotech firm usually provides 
technical knowledge while most of the resources and competencies required to complete the 
development of innovations are likely to be provided by the partner. The alliance literature 
suggests that in such circumstances, biotech firms negotiate at a bargaining disadvantage and 
are at risk of being under compensated for disclosing their valuable knowledge (Deeds and 
Hill; 1996; Bosse and Alvarez, 2010).  
I argue that biotech firms will take into account potential liquidation costs when dealing with 
downstream firms. As the downstream firms usually incur most of the investment costs 
involved in the alliance, they would suffer severe losses in case of partner liquidation. 
Moreover, since these partners have presumably greater bargaining power, it would be easy 
for them to transfer these costs to the biotech firm by requiring risk-adjusted contractual 
terms. Hence, biotech firms wishing to negotiate more favorable terms with downstream 
partners should maintain lower leverage. I also expect that alliances will be less 
consequential for financing policies when biotech firms deal with upstream firms. Indeed, 
neither of these partners is likely to be the primary investor in the alliance, nor would they 
have the bargaining power to transfer these costs to the other firm in case of high liquidation 
risk. Hence, I predict that the impact of alliances on capital structure will be most 
pronounced when a biotech firm collaborates with downstream partners. These 
considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
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H3: The negative impact of alliances on leverage will be stronger when collaborations 
involve downstream partners. 
 
3.3. Empirical analysis 
In order to test the above hypotheses I conduct two different empirical analyses. In the first 
study I narrow my focus to the capital structure choice of firms operating in the biotech 
industry, as most of my previous arguments were developed considering the characteristics 
of alliances in this sector. The focus on a single industry helps providing a fine-grained 
analysis of the impact of different typologies of alliances, which would not be possible in a 
multi-industry study. Since different industries operate under very different business models 
and environmental conditions, it would be difficult to consistently distinguish between 
different typologies of alliance partners or activities involved, and to organize them across 
meaningful categories. For example, while it is reasonable to think that pharmaceutical 
companies have presumably greater bargaining power in alliances with biotech firms, this is 
not necessarily true when they deal with partners in other sectors, such as chemical 
companies or other pharmaceutical firms. Similarly, categorizing alliances according to the 
typologies of activities involved may also be misleading, because the underlying goal of the 
collaboration could be very different from developing a new drug candidate. Nonetheless, 
findings from a single industry may not necessarily hold in other industrial contexts and 
could raise concerns of external validity. Accordingly, I conduct a second empirical analysis 
in order to test the robustness of my previous results. In particular, I consider a larger sample 
of firms operating in different industries (not only biotech companies) and test exclusively 
the general argument that firm forming alliances should adopt lower leverage. 
 
STUDY 1: An empirical investigation of the biotech industry 
 
Data and Sample Selection 
The initial sample included all publicly traded biotechnology firms listed in the Orbis 
database, a global extensive database containing accounting, market and business 
information covering over 60 million companies. This database was used as the source for 
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the accounting data needed to construct the financial variables used in this study. I then 
restricted the focus to companies that could be considered as independent firms. In order to 
test the latter condition, I used the Orbis BvD Independence Indicator and selected only 
those firms that scored a value of A (i.e., companies with known recorded shareholders, none 
of which having more than 25% of direct or total ownership). I also excluded firms having a 
group ultimate owner. These conditions were required in order to prevent the sample from 
including both parent firms and their subsidiaries, a condition that could skew the proxies 
employed since I may consider the same data both at the parent firm level and at the 
subsidiary firm level. Following these criteria, I collected a sample of 223 biotech firms and 
an unbalanced panel of 1645 firm-year observations spanning from 2000 to 2010. This data 
was combined with data on strategic alliances derived from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) Platinum database. For each firm in the final sample, I considered all the alliances 
formed from 1997 to 2010 and for each alliance I retrieved data on transaction-level and 
partner-level characteristics, such as partners’ names, year the alliance was formed and the 
typology of activities involved in the collaboration. This second dataset includes information 
on 353 strategic alliances. Finally, during the analysis I excluded firms with empty records in 
the Orbis database and firm-year observations with occasionally missing accounting data. 
After merging the two datasets, the final sample includes 172 firms and 803 firm-year 
observations. 
 
Variables 
Following extant studies that analyzed the determinants of capital structure firm’s financial 
leverage is considered as the main dependent variable of the analysis. I compute Leverage by 
dividing the total book value of debt (long term debt plus bank loans listed under current 
liabilities) by the total market value of the firm (total book value of debt plus the market 
value of equity) (O’Brien, 2003). Studies in the capital structure literature also consider a 
book-based formulation of leverage computed as the ratio of total debt to the total book 
value of assets. Although I employ the market-based formulation of leverage, results remain 
qualitatively unchanged when the alternative book-based formulation is employed.  
In order to test hypothesis 1, I build a proxy for the strategic emphasis placed by the firm on 
the use of alliances by considering both the number of alliances in a firm’s alliance portfolio 
and its propensity to establish collaborations in the long-term. I build the variable SAs4, 
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computed as the number of alliances formed during the previous four years, as a proxy for 
the strategic emphasis placed on alliances. I consider the number of alliances formed during 
the previous four years because the average expected duration of R&D alliances for biotech 
firms is of about four years (Robinson et al., 2007).  
In order to test hypothesis 2 I distinguish between R&D-based alliances and other alliances. 
The first category includes both “pure” R&D collaborations, where partners collaborate 
exclusively in R&D activities, and “mixed” agreements where the collaboration is not 
confined to R&D but includes also other value chain activities. The second category includes 
alliances involving activities such as licensing, marketing, production, retail and distribution, 
but where R&D is not included in the collaboration. This classification is consistent with 
other studies in the alliance literature (e.g. Oxley, 1997). Accordingly, I construct the 
variable RD4, computed as the number of R&D-based alliances formed by the firm during 
the previous four years. Similarly, I computed No-RD4 as the number collaborations falling 
into the second category. 
To test hypothesis 3, I considered the characteristics of the partners involved in the alliance. 
Biotechnology firms generally sit at the ‘upstream pole’ of other broader industries, such as 
the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries (Stuart et al., 2007). Accordingly, I divide 
partner firms into downstream and upstream based upon their 4-digits SIC codes. The 
category downstream partners includes established players operating in the pharmaceutical, 
biopharmaceutical, chemical, agricultural, food and beverage and medical equipment 
industries. Usually, these partners have already brought several products to the market, and 
biotech firms forming agreements with these players generally seek to obtain financial 
resources and experience in later-stage activities of the value chain. As a result, in alliances 
between biotech firms and downstream players the latter are likely to provide the bulk of 
investments required. In contrast, I classify as upstream partners “pure” biotech firms, 
hospitals, laboratories, universities, and other kinds of non-profit research organizations. 
These partners usually do not have experience in later phases of the value chain, but they 
provide technical knowledge and promising new compounds that need further development. 
Since my focus in this analysis is on established biotech firms, I expect them to provide 
higher levels of investments when dealing with upstream partners. To reflect this distinction, 
I compute the variable DOWNSTREAM4 as the number of alliances formed with 
downstream partners during the last four year. Similarly, I computed the variables 
UPSTREAM4. 
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Finally, although I control for inter-industry variance by focusing on a single industry, I also 
include a number of control variables that previous researches linked to financial leverage 
(O’Brien, 2003; Simerly and Li, 2000; Fama and French, 2002; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
I control for the effect of Size by including the natural logarithm of total book assets. Bigger 
firms possess established and more diversified businesses and thus they are expected to have 
easier access to equity markets and may carry lower levels of debt. Return on assets 
(Profitability) is employed as a measure for firm’s profitability. According to the trade-off 
model, firms with higher profits are able to take advantage of the higher interest tax shields 
associated with debt and should adopt higher levels of leverage. Conversely, the pecking 
order model suggests that profitability is a proxy for the availability of internal funds and 
predicts an opposite effect on leverage. The variable Growth is a proxy for firm expected 
investment opportunities and is computed as the annual growth rate in total book assets. 
Firms with higher growth opportunities possess more intangible assets and as a result, debt 
financing is more costly for them. The variable Tangibles is used to control for the level of 
collaterals that may enhance a firm’s ability to borrow. It is computed as the ratio of all 
tangible assets (e.g. buildings, machinery, equipment, etc) to total book assets. Finally, the 
variable R&D Intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures to firm’s total assets and is a proxy 
for the uniqueness of the firm’s products and the level of intangible assets. Both factors limit 
the ability of a firm to borrow and should be associated with lower levels of leverage.  
 
 Hypotheses Tests 
Since the identified sample is an unbalanced panel of firm-year observations, my dataset has 
both cross-sectional and time series dimensions. The application of regression models to 
panel data is a more complex task than for simple cross-section datasets. Indeed, the 
unobserved heterogeneity effect, due to unobserved characteristics of firms, will cause 
standard OLS to yield inefficient estimates and invalid standard errors. Following other 
empirical studies in capital structure literature (Degryse et al., 2010; Vicente-Lorente, 2001), 
I address this issue by adopting a fixed-effects model. This approach was deemed superior to 
other possible solutions such as random-effect models because such models are appropriate 
when the sample can be viewed as a random draw from a given population. Clearly, this is 
not the case in the present study since I analyze all independent and publicly traded biotech 
firms in the Orbis Database. Moreover, random-effects models are likely to be biased if the 
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model fails to include all variables that influence the dependent variable. Again, this 
assumption is not supported in this analysis because, although I include a set of control 
variables identified by prior studies, I do not include all potential determinants of capital 
structure. When the underlying assumptions of random effects model cannot be justified, 
fixed-effects estimators are preferable (O’Brien, 2003). Thus, the following standard fixed-
effects model was estimated: 
!!" = !! + !!!!"#!!! + !!" ((1) 
whereby !!" is the level of leverage of firm i at time t and !!!!"#!!!  represents the impact 
of the main independent variables and controls. Consistently with previous studies in capital 
structure literature, control variables are lagged one year in order to take into account slow 
adjustments towards target capital structures (O’Brien, 2003). I tested the appropriateness of 
the fixed-effects model with an F-test, which rejected the null hypothesis that the intercept 
term is constant across firms. All models also include year dummies to control for the effect 
of factors related to time. 
Table 1 reports the absolute and relative frequencies of the different types of alliances 
observed in our sample. R&D-based and late-stage alliances are both quite common among 
biotech firms, representing 43.6% and 40.5% of total alliances, respectively. Somewhat less 
diffuse are agreements involving both R&D and later-stage activities (15.9%). This data 
confirm that sharing costs and risks associated with early research programs and acquiring 
complementary assets in later-phases of the value chain are both important reasons for 
biotech firms to form alliances. Moreover, biotech firms tend to collaborate predominantly 
with downstream partners, as approximately 83% of alliances are with downstream partners. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables considered. The variables related 
to alliances are not highly correlated with the control variables, but they are strongly 
correlated with each other. However, these high correlations derive from the way the 
variables were computed and do not represent a serious concern for the estimated models 
since most of them are tested separately. For instance, SAs4 is more strongly correlated with 
RD4 and DOWNSTREAM4 than it is with No-RD4 and UPSTREAM4. This is probably 
related to the fact that R&D-based alliances and alliances with downstream partners are 
more common in my sample.  
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Table 1. Alliances Activities and Partner Characteristics. 
 
Number Percentage 
R&D 154 43,6% 
No_R&D 143 40,5% 
Mixed 56 15,9% 
Total: 353 
 
Upstream 60 17,0% 
Downstream 293 83,0% 
Total: 353 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
  
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Size 10 2,39 1 
         
(2) Profitability -0,79 1,20 0,63 1,00 
        
(3) R&D Intensity 0,28 0,49 -0,27 -0,53 1,00 
       
(4) Tangibles 0,13 0,18 -0,05 0,00 -0,05 1,00 
      
(5) Growth 0,33 1,01 0,07 0,16 -0,18 -0,10 1,00 
     
(6) SAs4 0,66 1,39 0,28 0,06 0,03 -0,09 -0,08 1,00 
    
(7) RD4 0,41 0,99 0,28 0,10 -0,02 -0,07 -0,06 0,90 1,00 
   
(8) No-RD4 0,25 0,66 0,17 -0,02 0,10 -0,09 -0,07 0,75 0,38 1,00 
  
(9) UPSTREAM4 0,11 0,38 0,11 0,03 0,07 -0,06 -0,04 0,51 0,50 0,33 1,00 
 
(10) DOWNSTREAM4 0,51 1,13 0,29 0,06 0,01 -0,09 -0,08 0,95 0,86 0,71 0,26 1,00 
N=803 
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Results  
The results of the fixed-effects models are reported in Table 3. In Model 1 I test hypothesis 
1, which predicts that biotech firms that place more strategic importance on the use of 
alliances should adopt less leverage. Consistently with this prediction, the coefficient on the 
variable SAs4 is negative and significant (p<0.05). Hypothesis 2 extends this argument by 
predicting that the impact of alliances on capital structure will be stronger especially when 
alliances involve highly uncertain and long-term activities such as R&D. In Model 2 I test 
this by analyzing the impact of R&D based alliances separately. I find that while the variable 
No-RD4 has no significant effect on leverage, the coefficient on the variable RD4 is negative 
and highly significant (p<0.05), thus corroborating the idea that firms tend to reduce 
leverage especially when alliances involve risky activities and partners care about the firm 
long-term viability. On the opposite, collaborations involving later-stage activities seem not 
to have a relevant influence on capital structure. 
Finally, the importance of the type of partners involved in the alliance is tested in Model 3. I 
find a negative and significant (p<0.05) coefficient on DOWNSTREAM4, while the variable 
UPSTREAM4 shows no significant impact. These results are consistent with hypothesis 3, 
which predicts that biotech firms tend to adopt lower levels of leverage particularly when its 
alliance partners undertake the bulk of investments involved in the alliance, thus making 
alliance premature termination especially costly to these partners.  
In terms of the control variables, the coefficient on the variable Size is negative and 
significant in all models. This result is in line with the prediction of the pecking order model 
and it suggests that larger firms have easier access to external equity markets and tend to 
adopt less debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The coefficient on the variable Growth has the 
expected negative sign and is significant in all model specifications. The other control 
variables were insignificant, which I attribute to the relatively small size of the considered 
sample, in comparison to most research that has employed samples constructed from a much 
broader array of industries.  
Finally, in order to provide a further test of hypothesis 3, I focus on the impact of the sub-
sample of R&D-based alliances and distinguish among the types of partners involved 
exclusively in those alliances. The result that firms tend to reduce leverage most when they 
deal with downstream partners could be related to correlations between the types of activities 
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engaged in and the types of partners involved in an alliance. That is, if downstream partners 
were more likely to establish R&D-based alliances with biotech firms, then the results from 
Model 3 could be driven by the typology of activities involved in the alliance and not by the 
typology of partners, which is my proxy for counter-parts level of investments in the 
alliance. Thus, in Models 4 I analyze only R&D-based alliances and distinguish between the 
number of R&D-based alliances formed with downstream partners (111 alliances) and the 
number of R&D-based alliances with upstream partners (43 alliances). Consistently with 
previous models, results suggest that the negative impact of R&D-based alliances on 
leverage comes especially from those relationships involving downstream partners.  
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Table 3. Statistical Models. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Size -0.0203* -0.0206* -0.0202* -0.0207* 
 (0.0101) (0.00992) (0.0102) (0.0101) 
Profitability 0.0206 0.0211 0.0207 0.0217 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0137) 
R&D Intensity 0.00164 0.00110 0.00157 0.000251 
 (0.0101) (0.00989) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Tangibles -0.0246 -0.0237 -0.0259 -0.0231 
 (0.0544) (0.0545) (0.0547) (0.0549) 
Growth -0.0109* -0.0110* -0.0110* -0.0111* 
 (0.00498) (0.00501) (0.00499) (0.00503) 
SAs4 -0.0137*    
 (0.00577)    
RD4  -0.0162
*   
  (0.00707)   
No-RD4  -0.00782   
  (0.0131)   
UPSTREAM4   -0.0238 -0.0275 
   (0.0180) (0.0220) 
DOWNSTREAM4   -0.0119
* -0.0145* 
   (0.00604) (0.00723) 
cons 0.295** 0.301** 0.294** 0.305** 
  (0.107) (0.103) (0.107) (0.107) 
N 803 803 803 803 
R2 0.072 0.073 0.072 0.073 
adj. R2 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 
F 1.506 1.436 1.389 1.439 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Note: All variables were winsorized at the 1% or 5% level in order to mitigate the influence 
of outliers. Coefficients’ standard errors are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
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STUDY 2: An empirical investigation of the Compustat population of firms 
Data and sample 
In order to test the external validity of the main finding regarding the impact of alliances on 
capital structure I needed a suitable sample of firms operating in a reasonable number of 
industries. Accordingly, for my second analysis I use the entire Compustat population of 
firms during the period 1988-2006 as sample, and build a panel data set where the unit of 
analysis is the firm-year. Firms operating in financial sectors (SIC codes 6000-6999) were 
excluded as in other studies of capital structure (O’Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente. 2001; 
Simerly and Li 2000). Financial and accounting data necessary to compute financial leverage 
and its standard determinants were collected from Compustat. Data on alliances were 
gathered from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database on mergers, acquisitions, and 
alliances. For each firm with available financial records in Compustat information was 
retrieved on the number of alliances formed in a given year. After merging the two datasets 
and dropping observations with occasionally missing values I were left with a sample of 
9034 firms and a total of 70095 firm-year observations.   
 
Variables 
Since in this empirical analysis the focus is still on the determinants of capital structure, I 
consider variables similar to those that were used in the previous analysis, but with some 
minor differences due the multi-industry nature of the sample. As before, the main 
dependent variable is leverage, computed as total debt divided by total market value of the 
firm, and the total market value of the firm is the sum of total book debt plus total market 
value of outstanding shares11. However, in order to test my first hypothesis – which predicts 
that firm forming alliances will also adopt lower leverage – this time I employ a slightly 
different independent variable. Specifically, I consider the variable SAs defined as the 
number of alliances formed by a given firm in a given year. This variable differs from the 
main independent variables used in Study 1 in that it does not take into account older 
alliances formed in previous years. This choice was motivated by the fact that, unlike for 
alliances involving biotech firms, it was difficult to establish the average duration of 
                                                
11 Results are qualitatively unchanged if I use the book value of total assets in the denominator. 
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collaborations in different industries. Thus, I was not able to define the correct time-window 
for the computation of active alliances in a given year. For this reason, I decided to consider 
only alliances formed in a single year to make sure the main independent variable was not 
affected by the specific time window adopted.  
Control variables include standard determinants identified by previous capital structure 
research and also used in the previous analysis (O’Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001; 
Banerjee et al., 2008; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). To control for firm profitability I include the 
variable Profitability, defined as operating income divided by total assets. I include firms’ 
Tobin’s Q in order to control for differences in firms’ growth opportunities. This variable is 
computed as: (market value of equity + total assets - common equity) / (total assets). I also 
control for the intensity of investments in R&D, defined as the ratio of R&D expenses to 
total assets (R&D Intensity). The variable Size control for the effects of firm size and it is 
computed as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. I also include the variable 
Tangibles to control for the level of assets that can be used as collateral. This variable is 
computed as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to the total book value of assets. 
Similarly, I also controlled for the firm capital intensity (Capital Intensity), computed as the 
ratio of the firm’s total book assets over total sales. In order to account for the effect of 
dividend policies I included the binary variable Dividend, which takes the value of 1 when a 
firm distributes dividends, and zero otherwise. Finally, to minimize the effect of outliers, all 
variables that were not binary or logged were winsorized at the 1% level. 
Table 4 reports main summary statistics and correlation matrix for the variables considered. 
Compared to my previous sample of biotech firms, firms in the multi-industry sample have 
on average higher leverage (0,23), lower R&D intensity (0,08), greater tangible assets (0,47) 
and higher profitability (-0,02) thus suggesting that the analysis is now capturing also more 
traditional non-high-tech sectors. Also, this time firms appear to be smaller in size (average 
logarithm of firm’s assets is 4,5). This last difference probably reflects the choice to focus 
only on established biotech players in the first analysis, while here I am not imposing such 
restriction. Furthermore, correlations are generally low, thus suggesting that multi-
collinearity is not a concern for the analysis.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the overall Compustat population of firms. 
 
Mean SD Leverage SAs R&D Int. Tobin's Q Tangibles Profitability Size Cap. Int. Div. 
Leverage 0,214 0,239 1 
        
SAs 0,221 0,641 -0,096 1,000 
       
R&D Intensity 0,081 0,129 -0,262 0,098 1,000 
      
Tobin's Q 2,335 2,245 -0,323 0,111 0,380 1,000 
     
Tangibles 0,475 0,335 0,236 -0,031 -0,115 -0,175 1,000 
    
Profitability -0,024 0,284 0,054 0,003 -0,620 -0,324 0,047 1,000 
   
Size 4,542 2,290 0,122 0,261 -0,280 -0,208 0,161 0,391 1,000 
  
Capital Intensity 2,673 7,842 -0,112 0,025 0,238 0,201 -0,152 -0,325 -0,122 1,000 
 
Dividend 0,289 0,453 0,052 0,042 -0,251 -0,181 0,246 0,304 0,506 -0,137 1 
N=70095
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Hypotheses test and results 
Besides external validity, probably the major concern about the analysis conducted in Study 
1 is the potential existence of reverse causality between capital structure and alliance-related 
variables (Parson and Titman, 2007). Indeed, while the existence of relationships with 
external alliance partners could affect capital structure decisions, it could also be the 
opposite, that is, a firm’s capital structure may impact its need or ability to enter strategic 
alliances. For instance, firms with lower leverage may form alliances more because they 
possess the financial resources needed in order to invest effectively and acquire external 
capabilities (Patzelt et al., 2008). If this were the case, then a negative relation between 
leverage and alliance-related variables would emerge but not for the reasons proposed. 
Accordingly, as capital structure and alliance activity are jointly determined, the main 
independent variable could be endogenous leading to biased coefficient estimates. In this 
second analysis I address this concern by taking advantage of inter-industry variation in the 
rate of alliance formation and by identifying a proper instrumental variable for my main 
alliance-related variable in order to ensure that the previous results are not driven by reverse 
causality. Accordingly, I employ fixed effects instrumental variables regression in order to 
estimate the following equation: 
(5) !"#"$%&"!" = !!! + !! + !!!"!!"#$"%&#'!" + !!!"#$!!!_!!" + !!!"#$%&'()!" +!!!"#$%&'(%)%&*!" + !!!"#$!" + !!!"#$%"&!!"#$"%&#'!" + !!!"#"$%&$!" + !!!"#!" +!!!"  
 
In this specification, the variable SAs is treated as endogenous and is instrumented in the first 
stage by the overall number of alliances formed by firms in that industry each year 
(AVGINDALL). The underlying assumption is that, since the instrument is at the industry 
level, then it should be exogenous with respect to firm leverage. Explorative regressions as 
well as simple bivariate correlations suggests that this is indeed the case and that industry-
level alliancing activity and firm-level leverage are not significantly related. Table 5 reports 
results from the estimated model. Consistently with the results obtained from Study 1, the 
variable SAs reports a negative and significant coefficient (p<0.001). This result provides 
further support for my main argument that firms making alliances a strategic priority should 
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also reduce leverage in order to induce R-S investments from alliance partners. Thus, this 
prediction seems to be valid not only for biotech firms but also for firms operating in other 
industries and it is not driven by reverse causality, at least in this second analysis.  
 
Table 5. Fixed effects instrumental variable regression on firm leverage 
Dependent Variable Leverage 
Independent Variable:  
SAs -0.0318*** 
 (0.00842) 
R&D Intensity -0.138*** 
 (0.00971) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0108*** 
 (0.000392) 
Tangibles 0.0976*** 
 (0.00385) 
Profitability -0.137*** 
 (0.00398) 
Size 0.0431*** 
 (0.00134) 
Capital Intensity -0.000631*** 
 (0.000109) 
Dividend -0.0289*** 
 (0.00273) 
_cons -0.0454*** 
 (0.00823) 
N 70095 
R2 0.1386 
F (9033,61028) 10.07 
Prob>F 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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3.4. Discussion and conclusions 
External stakeholders often invest in assets whose value is relationship-specific. If the 
partner firm is liquidated, these relationships are interrupted and the owners of these 
resources bear significant costs. As the risk of liquidation increases with a firm’s level of 
debt, firms should try to reduce leverage if they want to induce R-S investments. In this 
chapter, this idea is extended to the context of strategic alliances, where pooling resources 
together with other firms is crucial.  
Strategic alliances can play a valuable role in helping firms acquire new knowledge, adapt to 
a changing environment, and build a competitive advantage. I have argued that partnering 
firms have good reasons to care about each other’s financial health, especially when R-S 
investments are significant. Results from the above empirical analyses indicate that 
managers generally recognize the pitfalls of forming alliances with highly leveraged 
partners, and hence maintain lower leverage when the firm places a greater strategic 
emphasis on inter-firm collaborations.  The findings of this first chapter suggest that in order 
to preserve their partner’s incentive to invest, firms need to carefully adjust their capital 
structure. Due to the implied risk of liquidation, highly leveraged firms threaten the 
continuity of an alliance, potentially despite their best intentions. Since the unexpected 
termination of the alliance would be costly, these stakeholders are reluctant to invest if their 
counter-part is financially weak. I also argue that this effect should be contingent upon other 
alliance level factors that magnify hazards related to R-S investments. In this regard, I 
propose that the nature of the activities and also the types of partners involved in the alliance 
represent relevant considerations. Alliances involving riskier activities with distant pay-offs 
(such as R&D collaborations) magnify the risks associated with leverage, as they require the 
firm to stay solvent for the long-term. Similarly, partners with greater bargaining power that 
undertake the bulk of capital investments may require ex ante compensation for the risks 
introduced by leverage, thereby shifting most of the associated costs to the focal firm. Both 
circumstances increase the need to safeguard the stability of the alliance and push alliance 
aspirants to reduce their leverage. 
In order to support these arguments, I conduct two empirical analyses where I study alliances 
as one of the determinants of firms’ capital structure decisions. In the first analysis, I analyze 
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a sample of established biotech firms and provide several pieces of evidence consistent with 
these ideas. The findings show that biotech firms that have a greater propensity for forming 
alliances generally adopt lower leverage. In addition, biotech firms tend to reduce leverage 
more when they form R&D-based alliances, while other collaborations seem not to play an 
important role. Finally, I find that leverage is reduced in the presence of partners who are 
likely to undertake the bulk of the investments in the collaboration, such as pharmaceutical 
companies. In order to test the external validity of these findings I also conduct a second 
empirical analysis and extend the focus to the overall Compustat population of firms. Results 
from this multi-industry sample confirm that a negative relationship exists between financial 
leverage and the number of alliances formed by a given firm, even after controlling for 
potential endogeneity due to the fact that capital structure and alliance activities may be 
jointly determined. Overall, these findings are consistent with the main argument of this 
thesis that firms should reduce leverage in order to boost investment from alliance partners 
and that this impact ultimately depends on alliance characteristics. 
The findings of this chapter have important implications for the extant research. First, the 
results add to finance research by clarifying the role played by alliances in the capital 
structure decision. Extant literature provides evidence that firms tend to reduce leverage 
whenever inducing R-S investments from external stakeholders is important. These studies 
focus on the role of customers, suppliers and employees in shaping a firm’s capital structure. 
I contribute to this stream of research by showing that another stakeholders group cares 
about the firm’s financing policy, namely alliance partners. I show that firms take into 
account costs imposed on alliance partners when setting their leverage and that these costs 
depend on alliance characteristics and the characteristics of the alliance partners. These 
results are noteworthy as they suggest that in a world where inter-firm collaborations are 
increasingly popular, alliances and their characteristics should be considered when 
establishing corporate financing policies. 
This study also contributes to alliance literature. Extant research in this area suggests that 
firms adopt contractual solutions to mitigate hazards and to induce investments involved in 
alliances. Accordingly, the main take-away from this body of works is that attributes of the 
transaction besides firm-level policies influence the hazards implied by R-S assets (Billitteri 
et al., 2013). My analysis advances this perspective by showing that capital structure 
decisions are critical in preserving partner incentive to invest in alliances. This finding is 
interesting as it shows that incentives to undertake R-S investments at the alliance level can 
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be important in determining corporate financing policies at the firm level. Consistent with 
this idea, I show that firms maintain conservative financing when they place greater strategic 
emphasis on the use of alliance. This result is important as it suggests that capital structure 
may also have an impact on the firm’s perceived attractiveness as an alliance partner and, 
ultimately, on its alliancing activity. For instance, higher firm leverage could imply greater 
uncertainty/instability at the alliance level and impact the choice of the governance form or 
other structural preferences of partnering firms. Similarly, the risks implied by firm financial 
conditions could also constrain its ability to attract valuable partners and thus have important 
repercussions in terms of partner selection.  
Finally, I note some limitations of the analysis conducted in this chapter. First, I tested the 
robustness of the main finding about the link between alliances and leverage by checking for 
external validity and the impact of endogeneity in a multi industry sample. Unfortunately, I 
was not able to do the same for the other predictions on the impact of particular typology of 
alliances because consistent and meaningful categorizations of alliances should be defined 
ad-hoc by considering each industry’s specificities. In addition, proper instruments for all 
these variables should be defined accordingly.  Future research could address these points by 
analyzing with more rigorous empirical methods the importance of alliance heterogeneity in 
specific industries. Second, while my analysis showed that firms forming alliances tend to 
reduce leverage arguably to induce investments from their external partners this result should 
be further integrated with insights from models of capital structure determination. Indeed, 
the target adjustments models of capital structure suggest that firm possess target debt ratios 
that depend on the anticipated benefits and costs of debt financing. However, due to the 
existence of transaction costs and other market frictions firms do not always operate at target 
levels of leverage, but instead they gradually adjust toward it with a given speed of 
adjustment (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). As a result, the analysis conducted in this 
chapter does not discriminate for alternative financial explanation for why firm that have 
alliances are also low levered. In particular, it is still not clear whether firms with alliances 
indeed possess lower target debt ratios or the need to induce investments from alliance 
partners just bump them away from their presumably higher target levels of debt. Future 
research could address this limitations by investigating whether strategic alliances influence 
target capital structure or rather the “speed” with which firms are able to tend to their targets.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS 
ON FIRM’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The findings of the previous chapter provide support for the main argument that a firm’s 
capital structure represents a relevant concern for alliance partners, and that a firm should 
reduce leverage whenever inducing R-S investments from these stakeholders is important. 
Accordingly, I analyzed the formation of strategic alliances as one of the determinants of 
capital structure and found that managers take into account alliance partners concerns when 
defining firm’s financing policies. However, also the opposite may be true, that is, many 
aspects of a firm’s alliance activity could well reflect its capital structure policies. Finance 
research suggests that firms’ capital structure tend to be stable over time, as managers appear 
to use net securities issuance to maintain their leverage in relatively confined regions 
(Lemmon et al., 2008). Moreover, since issuing or retiring financial securities is costly, firms 
tend to gradually adjust their capital structure only when the associated benefits exceeds the 
implied costs. In my research context this suggests that, although managers could anticipate 
alliance partners concerns and reduce leverage ex-ante, there may be circumstances under 
which the firm is not able to operate at optimal levels of leverage. Thus, part of the risks of 
instability implied by a firm capital structure may persist and constrain its subsequent 
alliance activity. Accordingly, considering the capital structure policies of partnering firms 
and their risk implications could also be important in order to better understand several 
issues involved in the alliance making process. In this chapter I further explore the 
ramifications of this intuition by seeking answer to the following general research question: 
(i) To what extent does a firm’s capital structure influence its ability to deal in the 
market for inter-firm collaboration? 
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In order to analyze how capital structure policies influence a firm’s alliancing activity I 
extend the theoretical arguments developed in the previous section and discuss in details 
further risks implied by capital structure decisions during the process of alliances formation. 
Then, I derive the implications of the proposed theoretical framework for two key alliance 
decisions, namely partner selection and the choice of the governance form, and test these 
predictions empirically. 
Factors that impact partner selection have been a central concern in the literature on strategic 
alliances. One stream of literature focuses on the types of resources possessed by a partner in 
relation to the focal firm (e.g. upstream/downstream, supplementary/complementary, 
technical/marketing) as a determinant of alliancing activity (Lavie 2007; Rothaermael and 
Deeds, 2004; Rothaermael and Boeker, 2008; Wang and Zajac, 2007; Lin, Yang and Arya, 
2009). Another stream emphasizes the importance of relational capital, cultural fit and the 
compatibility of routines between the partnering firms (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000; 
Lavie Haunschild and Khanna, 2012; Das and Teng 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998, Zaheer, 
McEvily and Perrone, 1998). A third stream argues that firms select partners based on their 
status because high status partners act as an endorsement to external constituents (Stuart, 
Hoang, Hybel 1999; Hoehn-Weiss and Karim, forthcoming) and provide access to valuable 
networks (Ahuja, 2000; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). While these studies certainly 
provide valuable insights on many of the relevant aspects firm consider when looking for an 
alliance partner, they do not take into consideration prospective partners’ capital structure 
and the implied risk of instability in the alliance. In this chapter, I try to explicitly fill this 
gap by arguing that another important factor that influences alliance partner selection is their 
financial health. In particular, it is proposed that in the inter firm market for collaboration12, 
firms select partners after taking into account not only their resources, but also their leverage 
and the associated potential for bankruptcy and financial distress.  
The hypotheses developed are based on two central arguments. First, I begin by recalling 
that an important concern in alliances is the risk of unplanned termination (Sadowski and 
Duysters 2008, Reuer and Arino 2002, Reuer and Zollo 2005). If one partner encounters 
financial difficulties and is facing growing bankruptcy concerns, out of either desperation or 
necessity it may unilaterally withdraw from the relationship before the objectives have been 
                                                
12 Similar to the market for marriage (Becker 1974), this market can be viewed as one where firms 
scan the environment for potential partners with whom they can collaborate and develop new 
capabilities.    
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achieved. Indeed, the costs associated with such unanticipated termination can be substantial, 
because the efforts devoted to the alliance and the resources developed within it (such as 
joint technologies or marketing knowhow) are often sunk and cannot be fully recovered if 
the relationship is terminated. Accordingly, when a firm is financially distressed it can 
impose substantial costs on its alliance partners (Boone and Ivanov, 2012)13.  The second 
argument I develop is that leverage is an important determinant of partner attractiveness in 
various transactions, including in alliances. As already explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
stakeholders theories propose that as leverage increases, customers, suppliers and employees 
impose various costs on the firm (e.g. paying lower prices or demanding higher 
compensation) due to the increased probability of bankruptcy and financial distress (Cornell 
and Shapiro, 1987). Thus, because of these costs higher leverage makes a firm a less 
attractive transaction partner (Titman, 1984) and creates disincentives for stakeholders to 
make relationship specific investments. In this chapter I extend this reasoning to the context 
of alliances and argue that leverage and capital structure matter in partner selection because 
alliances are particularly prone to unplanned termination, which could lead to substantial 
loss in value of relationship specific assets.  
Based on the central argument that leverage and financial health impact alliance partnering 
choices, I develop several hypotheses and provide empirical support using a large multi-
industry sample of inter-firm alliances formed during the period 1988-2006. First, I show 
that firms tend to form alliances with partners characterized by relatively similar levels of 
leverage. This ‘double sided matching’ of leverage occurs in the market for collaboration 
because low leverage firms prefer other low leverage firms as partners, while high leverage 
firms are constrained to partner with other high leverage firms due to the implied risk of 
bankruptcy and alliance instability. Second, I also hypothesize and find that partner Tobin’s 
Q is negatively associated with firm leverage, which further suggests that because of the 
risks they bring about in the alliance, highly levered firms are also constrained to partner 
with lower quality firms. 
Nonetheless, partner selection is not the only aspect that is likely to be affected by a firm’s 
capital structure. Indeed, it reasonable to think that some firms will still form alliances with 
high levered partners despite the implied instability, because the latters possess unique 
                                                
13 As an example, in 2005 the shares of brake manufacturer Pacifica fell by nearly 10 percent when its 
customer and joint venture partner, Delphi, filed for bankruptcy. A key part of Pacifica’s operations 
was a plant that it operated jointly with Delphi to supply brakes to GM.  
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resources that cannot be found elsewhere. Accordingly, I also explore whether firms can 
adopt ex post contractual solutions to mitigate the risks implied by their partners leverage 
once a dyad has been formed. In this respect, I interestingly find that the propensity to use 
equity-based agreements in alliances increases both as a firm’s leverage increases and as the 
difference in leverage across the alliance partners increases. Prior literature argues that 
equity is effective in aligning incentives, and in containing appropriability hazards in the 
alliance relationship (Pisano, 1989). The results of this chapter add to these studies by 
suggesting that equity is also important because it provides an enforceable mechanism and a 
safeguard through which specific investments can be salvaged by an unlevered partner in the 
event of premature termination by a relatively levered firm14. Overall, these findings have 
important implications for extant alliance research as they suggest that firm-level financing 
decisions, such as capital structure, can have profound consequences on many aspects of the 
alliance making process, and that both practitioners as well as strategy scholars should be 
aware of them. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 I develop my research 
hypotheses. I start with a discussion of the various risks implied by high partner leverage in 
an alliance. Then, I derive the implications of the proposed theoretical arguments for the 
process of partner selection and for the choice of alliance governance. In section 4.3 I 
describe the sample and methods used to test the hypotheses. Section 4.4 discusses the 
results of the empirical analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 4.5. 
                                                
14 Firms sometimes sell their stakes in a JV to their partner and use the proceeds to pay down debt. For 
example, in 1997 Eli Lilly sold its 40% stake in its JV with Dow Chemical, named Dow Elanco, and 
used the proceeds of USD 900 million to pay down debt from a recent acquisition. Similarly, General 
Mills sold its stake in its European JV with Pepsico for USD 750 million as part of its debt reduction 
efforts. 
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4.2. Hypotheses development 
 
Capital structure and risks involved in strategic alliances 
Research has shown that a firm’s liquidation decision can be costly for external stakeholders 
such as employees, customers buying long-lived assets, dependent suppliers (Titman, 1984; 
Kale and Sharur, 2007, Banerjee et al., 2008), or any other stakeholders exchanging unique 
products and services with the firm in general. These relationships typically involve 
investments that are relation-specific (R-S) in the sense that they are tailored to contractual 
parties’ specific needs. In the event of a firm’s liquidation the relation would terminate and 
these investments would lose most of their value, with subsequent costs imposed on these 
stakeholders. Because liquidation is more likely if a company has high leverage, external 
stakeholders are reluctant to deal with highly levered firms or, alternatively, they require 
compensation to do so in the form of risk-adjusted prices ex-ante.  
Investments involved in alliances expose partners to similar costs and risks. Firms turn to 
alliances when the interactions involved with a particular transacting partner are repeated 
and intense over time, such as for example in innovation. Such interactions call for close 
coordination mechanisms, both formal and informal, that enable information flow, which are 
typically facilitated in an alliance structure. The consequence of these intense interactions 
and coordination mechanisms is that they inevitably build relationship specific assets over 
time, such as shared knowledge or technologies. In the event of one partner terminating the 
venture in the face of bankruptcy risks, the value of such resources and shared knowledge is 
irremediably lost. As a result, despite its best intentions, a highly levered partner puts at 
threat the continuity of an alliance and the value of the investments undertaken by both sides.  
High levels of leverage can also give rise to costs even when bankruptcy risks are remote, by 
influencing a firm’s incentives to meet implicit claims sold to stakeholders. Implicit claims 
are too state-contingent to be reduced to a written form. As a result, it is possible for a firm 
to default onto those claims without going bankrupt. Leverage influences the value of 
implicit claims for at least two reasons. First, debt levels determine the future ability of a 
firm to raise external funds, which in turn determines the opportunity cost of meeting 
implicit claims when cash flows are reduced (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Second, more debt 
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reduces the share of future cash flows diverted to shareholders, and it could incentivize a 
firm to take actions that increase shorter-term gains at the expense of longer-term profits 
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991)15. Consequently, scholars have demonstrated that highly 
levered firms tend to provide their customers lower quality inputs, to harvest an existing 
reputation of being a high quality producer, or to skimp on follow-up services for existing 
products (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Maksimovic, 1995)16.  
One important implicit claim in an alliance is the commitment of both partners to provide 
consistent efforts over the course of the collaboration. Indeed, due to contract 
incompleteness and bounded rationality it is difficult to exactly specify ex-ante how partners 
should contribute to an alliance under all future states of nature. For this reason, given their 
reduced incentives to meet external stakeholders implicit claims, levered firms could pursue 
short-term goals at the expense of their partners by reducing resource contributions (such as 
financial, tangible or managerial resources) to the alliance, while trying to gain as much as 
possible from the partner. Under these circumstances, the partner is either faced with the 
prospect of terminating the alliance and losing its relationship specific assets, or continuing 
the alliance despite the half-hearted efforts of the levered partner in an attempt to preserve 
the value of these assets. Regardless of its choice, this situation certainly imposes costs on 
the counter-part. 
In addition to reduced effort, a lower levered firm is exposed to another form of ex post 
opportunism when partnering with a levered counterpart. A levered firm experiencing 
financial distress could try to extract concessions from a more financially healthy partner by 
threatening termination of the alliance and requesting either financial support or 
renegotiation for more favorable terms. In such a case, the lower levered firm is once again 
faced with the choice between terminating the alliance and losing the value of its relation-
specific investments or perpetuating the alliance despite such ex post opportunistic behavior 
                                                
15 These costs are similar to the agency costs arising from the relationship between bondholders and 
shareholders discussed in Chapter 2. The difference is that this time the cost of inefficient investments 
would be borne not only by bondholders but also by external stakeholders. 
 
16 The basic logic is that the short-term gains from such strategies would immediately benefit a firm’s 
shareholders. On the other hand, customers may later detect opportunistic behavior and react by 
punishing the firm, in which case debtholders would be especially damaged since they bear most of 
the downside risks of the firm. 
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(Reuer and Arino, 2002, Arino et al., 2008) by subsidizing the levered partner in some 
manner17.  
In summary, alliances inevitably involve the presence of relationship specific assets, which 
raises the costs of premature termination. Partnering with highly leveraged firms not only 
increases the risk of such premature termination, but also exposes the unlevered firm to 
various forms of ex post opportunism such as a lack of effort or bargaining for financial 
support and more favorable terms.  
In the next section, I further extend the above arguments and develop specific predictions on 
how the risks implied by partners’ leverage impact a firm’s alliancing activity in terms of 
partner selection and governance choice. 
 
Impact of capital structure on partner selection 
The first set of hypotheses developed in this chapter build on the underlying assumption that 
rational firms should anticipate the risks discussed in the previous section and take ex ante 
actions by carefully selecting potential partners based on their leverage. Indeed, as risk and 
resources represent the two most relevant strategic dimensions in an alliance (Das and Teng, 
1998a), it is reasonable to think that firms will select potential partners by trading off not 
only resource considerations but also the implied potential for bankruptcy and financial 
distress. Accordingly, I suggest that because of the risks of alliance instability implied by 
leverage, ceteris paribus, low leverage firms are generally more attractive partners and 
should have greater opportunities to find collaborators. At the same time, they are also likely 
to face additional opportunism when dealing with highly levered counterparts, and hence 
they would tend to avoid partnering with such firms. Conversely, highly levered firms will 
generally be constrained to partner with other highly levered firms because these firms are 
unable to attract low leveraged firms. In equilibrium, this should result in a relatively stable 
pattern of alliance formation wherein firms tend to find partners characterized by similar 
levels of financial leverage. Thus, I predict the following: 
                                                
17For example, in 2009 the financially constrained De Beers asked its joint venture partner, Mountain 
Province Diamond, for a renegotiation of their existing agreement. The new terms were less 
financially onerous for De Beers and required Mountain Province to reimburse De Beers a significant 
portion of historic sunk costs in exchange for increased control rights in the venture. Similarly, in 
October 2001, Telstra rescued its debt-laden joint venture partner Austar by providing additional 
funding for the venture, causing shares in Austar  to soar 69 percent. 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FIRM’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
 77 
H1. Firms will tend to form alliances with partners characterized by similar levels of 
leverage. 
The influence of a firm’s leverage on the risk of unplanned termination is also likely impact 
the quality of the alliance partners that a firm can attract. One of the primary reasons for 
engaging in alliances is to combine complementary assets and stimulate innovation. Firms 
possessing high quality resources are the most valuable partners because they should be able 
to generate the most valuable synergies. Consequently, high quality firms have more 
bargaining power in the market for collaboration, which they can use in order to partner with 
the most desirable associates (Rodhes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008). I contend that, due to 
their superior resources endowments, high quality firms will have the bargaining power to 
avoid the risks entailed by partnering with highly levered firms. Indeed, during cash flow 
fluctuations, the lack of incentives to devote consistent efforts by a highly leveraged firm 
could undermine the realization of synergies. Furthermore despite best intentions to devote 
effort, synergies would also not be realized if the alliance terminates prematurely because of 
a partner’s financial difficulties. Thus, higher quality firms face a greater opportunity cost by 
partnering with highly leveraged counter-parts, as compared to firms with poorer resources 
and opportunities to find alternative partners.  As a result, high quality firms will thus tend to 
select lower levered counterparts. Accordingly, I formulate the following hypothesis on the 
relationship between the focal firm’s leverage and the quality of resources possessed by its 
partners: 
H2. There is a negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and the quality of its 
partners. 
 
Impact of capital structure on alliance governance choice 
Thus far, I have argued that highly leveraged firms are unattractive partners due to greater 
risks of financial distress and unplanned termination, which dissuade low levered and high 
quality firms from forming alliances with them. However, highly leveraged firms can ex ante 
offer various forms of protection and safeguards in order to attract desirable partners. One 
particular form of protection that is likely to be effective in this regard is structuring the 
alliance as an equity joint venture (JV). As Pisano (1989) observes, allocating equity in an 
alliance requires putting a value on the expected contributions of each firm prior to the 
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commencement of the partnership. Typically, it entails negotiations and explicitly drawing 
out agreements regarding such relative contributions. Once drawn out, these agreements can 
be legally enforced by the partner (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), which may prevent any 
subsequent reneging or scaling back of effort on the part of a levered firm. Moreover, any 
shirking by the leveraged firm reduces the value of the JV, which in turn would lower the 
proceeds it could obtain should it attempt to raise funds by selling its stake in the JV to the 
partner or to a third party, which are common methods of JV termination (Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005; Cuypers and Martin, 2007).  
Equity participation and a JV structure also provide other advantages besides ensuring 
continuity of effort. Typically a JV has a board with members drawn from the constituent 
partners. Through such a structure, a partner can safeguard its investments by exercising 
better control and monitoring of the efforts of a highly leveraged firm on a more continuous 
basis. Moreover, such ongoing control also allows the partner to understand the joint 
ventures operations more intimately. Accordingly, in the event of an unplanned termination, 
the partner may be better able to salvage its investments by taking over the venture entirely. 
The protection provided by equity and a JV structure is, however, also costly for both parties 
since it involves a greater commitment of resources from the outset (e.g., managerial 
resources in the form of human capital and employees specifically devoted to the alliance). 
For a highly leveraged firm, its willingness to devote such resources and human capital acts 
as a form of credible commitment to sustain the collaboration and devote consistent effort. 
Conversely, a JV structure should be desirable also from the counter-parts point of view 
(regardless of its leverage), since to the extent that there is value in collaborating with a 
leveraged partner, it may be willing to incur such costs upfront. Hence, I predict: 
H3. Alliances involving highly levered firms are more likely to be equity-based. 
As an extension of H3, I also posit that an alliance is more likely to take the form of a JV as 
the difference in leverage between the two partners grows. Although any alliance partner 
could potentially seek concessions or skimp on future resource commitments, the problem 
should be particularly acute when one firm is lowly levered and financially healthy while the 
other is highly levered. Under these conditions, the unlevered firm is particularly vulnerable 
to the threat that the levered firm may use its financially weak position as justification for 
renegotiation and extracting concessions. Consequently lower levered firms have greater 
incentives to require their highly levered counterparts to commit to the additional protections 
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afforded by an equity JV. Conversely, the additional costs of a JV structure (described 
above) are less likely to be regarded as warranted when both firms are low leveraged due to 
the lower threat of opportunistic renegotiation and extracting concessions, given that both 
partners are financially healthy. Similarly, a JV is also less likely to occur when both firms 
are highly levered as the weak financial positions of both partners reduce the risk of 
opportunism while making the additional costs of a JV difficult to afford. Hence, I argue the 
following: 
H4. The greater the difference between partners leverage, the greater the 
probability that an alliance will take the form of a JV. 
 
4.3. Research methods 
 
Data and sample 
In order to test the above hypotheses I drew data on all alliances announced between the 
years 1988 and 2006 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database on mergers, 
acquisitions, and alliances. I restricted the attention to two partners alliances to ease the 
comparison among partners’ characteristics. In addition, I also excluded from my final 
sample alliances involving financial firms, since leverage has a different interpretation in 
those industries. For alliances meeting these criteria information was retrieved on the 
partners’ names, SIC codes, state of incorporation, descriptions of activities involved in the 
alliance, geographical locations, and other governance-related data such as the presence of 
equity-exchanges.  
Accounting and financial data on the partnering firms were gathered from Compustat. After 
combining all data, I was left with 4220 alliances involving 2074 distinct firms. On average, 
each of these 2074 focal firms is associated with 4.1 alliances in my final sample. The final 
sample also includes alliances in a wide variety of sectors. Adopting Fama and French’s 
twelve industry classification, the distributions of the alliance activity across industrial codes 
is as follows: computer, software and electronic equipment (48.1 percent); healthcare, 
medical equipment and drugs (8.45 percent); chemical and allied products (1.37 percent); 
manufacturing (2.84 percent); consumer durables (1.59 percent); telephone and television 
transmission (2.06 percent); wholesale, retail and related services (11 percent); and finance 
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(8.65). All remaining industries account for minor percentages. Table 6 describes in more 
details the distribution of activities involved in the sample of alliances. Table 7 similarly 
shows the distribution of industrial SIC codes of partnering firms in the sample. Again, the 
reported figures confirm that most firms operate in the business equipment (59.22 percent), 
health care (18.56 percent), manufacturing (4.68 percent) and consumer durables industries 
(5.57 percent).  
 
Table 6. Frequencies and distribution of alliance level SIC codes in the sample 
Industry Description Freq. Percent Cum. 
Consumer Non Durables Food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, 
leather, toys 
27 0.64 0.64 
Consumer durables Cars, TV’s, Furniture, Household 
appliances 
67 1.59 2.23 
Manufacturing Machinery, trucks, planes, off furn, 
paper, com printing 
120 2.84 5.07 
Energy Oil, gas, and coal extraction and 
products 
19 0.45 5.52 
Chemicals Chemicals and allied products 58 1.37 6.89 
Business Equipment Computer, software, and electronic 
equipment 
2.030 48.09 54.99 
Telephone and television 
transmission 
Telephone and television 
transmission 
87 2.06 57.05 
Utilities Utilities 7 0.17 57.21 
Shops Wholesale, retail, and other services 466 11.04 68.25 
Healthcare Healthcare, medical equipment, and 
drugs 
357 8.46 76.71 
Money Finance 365 8.65 85.36 
Others Mines, construction, hotels, bus 
services, entertainment, etc. 
618 14.64 100.00 
 
Total 4.221 100.00 
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Table 7. Frequencies and distribution of partner level SIC codes in the sample. 
Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Consumer Non Durables 77 0.91 0.91 
Consumer durables 470 5.57 6.48 
Manufacturing 395 4.68 11.16 
Energy 69 0.82 11.98 
Chemicals 233 2.76 14.74 
Business Equipment 4.999 59.22 73.95 
Telephone and television transmission 208 2.46 76.42 
Utilities 3 0.04 76.45 
Shops 204 2.42 78.87 
Healthcare 1.567 18.56 97.43 
Others 217 2.57 100.00 
    
Total 8.442 100.00 
 
 
Dependent variables 
In order to test hypothesis 1, which posits that firms with similar levels of leverage will 
partner with each other, I adopt two approaches. First, as I discuss in greater detail in the 
results section, I compared differences in leverage among allied firms with the difference in 
leverage of random matched pairs of firms picked from the entire Compustat database. 
Second, and more formally, I tested the hypothesis by constructing a hierarchical linear 
regression model to regress partner leverage on alliance level variables and focal firm 
leverage. Since firms formed multiple alliances in my sample, I constructed the data set so 
that each alliance with its corresponding partner and alliance characteristics was nested 
within the firm. Thus, for the 2074 firms in the final sample, a focal firm’s alliance appears 
as a nested observation within the partner’s observations, and correspondingly the same 
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alliance appears as a nested observation within the focal firm’s observations. Accordingly, to 
test this relationship, I measured the partners’ market leverage (PLEV), where market 
leverage is computed as total debt divided by total market value of the firm, and the total 
market value of the firm is the sum of the book value of debt plus total market value of 
outstanding shares18. I similarly constructed a measure of the partners’ Tobin’s Q (PQ) to 
proxy for partner quality and test hypothesis 2, which posits that leveraged firms will attract 
lower quality partners. The variable PQ is computed as: (market value of equity + total 
assets - common equity) / (total assets). 
Finally, my third and fourth hypotheses relate partners’ leverage to the choice of the 
governance form of the alliance. I used a hierarchical model for this analysis as well, and I 
constructed a dummy variable (JV), which takes the value of one when the alliance is a joint 
venture and zero otherwise19.  
 
Key Independent Variables 
Hypotheses 1-2 suggest that a firm’s level of leverage will impact the characteristics of the 
partners it is able to attract. To test these predictions I consider the focal firm’s leverage as 
my main independent variable (LEV), defined, as before, as total debt over total market 
value of the firm. To test hypotheses 3, which predicts that alliances with high leverage firms 
will be structured as JV, I use both the focal firm’s and its partner’s leverage as main 
independent variables (LEV and PLEV). Finally, to test hypothesis 4, which pertains to the 
impact of differences in partner leverage on the choice of governance, I also construct the 
variable DELTA, which is the absolute difference in market leverage between the two 
partners. In order to test these hypotheses I employ different econometric models and 
consider multiple dependent variables (that is, partner leverage, partner Tobin’s q, alliance 
governance). Accordingly, for the sake of clarity the control variables are discussed in the 
next section after each empirical model is introduced. 
 
                                                
18 Results are qualitatively unchanged if I use the book value of total assets in the denominator. 
 
19 Following previous works on alliance governance, I exclude minority equity positions and define 
equity alliances as joint ventures only (Casciaro, 2003). However, results are virtually unchanged 
when I also considered these arrangements as equity alliances. 
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Empirical models 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a double sided matching in the market for collaboration, whereby a 
highly levered firm is more likely to form alliances with other highly levered firms, while a 
lower levered firm is more likely to ally with other conservatively financed partners. To test 
this prediction, the following equation is estimated: 
   (1) !"#$!" = !!! + !!! + !!!"#$!" + !!!"!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + +!!!!"#!" + !!!"#!" + !!!!" + !!!"!" + !!!"##$%!" + !!" 
As groups of alliances formed by the same focal firm are likely to possess common 
characteristics and observations related to the same focal firm are likely to be correlated I 
employ hierarchical models wherein alliances are nested within firms. Accordingly in (1) the 
variables denoted by P are partner characteristics and are at the alliance level, which are 
modeled as nested within the firm. Hence, for alliance j formed by focal firm i a random 
intercept term is included in order to capture these dependencies. Similarly, hypothesis 2 
examines the impact of leverage on the quality of alliance partners a focal firm is able to 
attract. To test this hypothesis, I test the following hierarchical model where, as before, 
alliances are nested within firms: 
(2) !"!" = !!! + !!! + !!!"#!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#$!" + +!!!"#$!" + +!!!!"!" + !!!!"##$%!" + !!!"#!" + !!!!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"     
For both models above, I include several control variables that could impact either a firm’s 
leverage or the quality of the alliance partners it attracts. ROA and PROA are the focal and 
partner firms return on assets, respectively, where return on assets is defined as operating 
income divided by total assets. The partners Tobin’s q (PQ) is also used as a control in (1) 
and is constructed as described above. I similarly construct a measure of the focal firms 
Tobin’s q (Q) and include it as a control. I also control for the R&D intensity of both the 
partner firm (PRD) and the focal firm (RD), defined as the ratio of R&D expenses to total 
assets. Finally, I control for the size of both the partner firm (PLASSETS) and the focal firm 
(LASSETS) with the natural logarithm of each firm’s total assets. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 focus on the impact of leverage on the governance form of an alliance. 
In order to test these hypotheses I employ logit models where, as before, alliances are nested 
within focal firms. The following equations are estimated:  
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3 !!"#$ !!" = 1 = !!!!! + !!!"#"$!%&!" + !!!"#$%"&'!" + !!!"#$%&!" + +!!!"##$%!" + !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$%&%'()&!" + !!!"#$!%"%$!" + +!!!"#!"#$!"+!!!"#$"%&&!" + !!"!"#!$$%&!" + !!!!"##$%!" + +!!"!"#$%!" + !!"!"#$%!!" + !!"!"#!" + !!"!"#$!" 
 4 !!"#$ !!" = 1 = !!!!! + !!!"#"$!"#!" + !!!"#$%"&'!" + !!!"#$%&!" + +!!!"##$%!" + !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$%&%'()&!" + !!!"#$!%"%$!" + +!!!"#$%&'!"+!!!"#$"%&&!" + !!!!"#!$$%&!" + !!!!"##$%!" + +!!"!"#$%!" + !!"!"#$%!!" + !!"!"#$%!" 
 
In these models, !! is the random intercept term, which takes into account dependencies 
among alliances pertaining to the same focal firm. To test hypothesis 3, I estimate a nested 
specification (equation 3) where I include both the focal firms and its partners’ level of 
leverage as  main independent variables (LEV and PLEV, respectively). Hypothesis 3 implies 
that both coefficients on these variables will be positive, so that whenever one of the two 
firms is highly levered chances of a joint venture increase. Hypothesis 4 extends the previous 
argument by suggesting that equity governance will also be preferred when the difference in 
leverage between partners is high, since under these conditions the lower levered firm would 
once again seek the protection that equity provides in terms of sustained commitment and 
protection of the value of alliance assets. To test this hypothesis I include the absolute 
difference among partners leverage (DELTA) as main independent variable. 
In these specifications, I also use other controls typically employed in studies of alliance 
governance form. Five dummy variables were constructed in order to indicate whether an 
alliance included research, marketing, manufacturing, supply and licensing activities 
(RESEARCH, MANUFACT, MARKET, SUPPLY, LICENS, respectively). Three dummy 
variables were employed to denote if partners operated in the same industry, same 
geographical areas, or if the geographical scope of the alliance was supranational 
(SAMEIND, SAMESTATE, SUPRANATION). I also control for the level of partner 
uncertainty by computing the number of alliances between the two firms during the previous 
five years (PRIORALL). To control for the effect of firm size and profitability I include the 
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variables AVGASSET and AVGROA, computed as the average of partners total book assets 
and return on assets, respectively. Similarly, RASSET represents the partners relative assets, 
computed as the ratio of the smaller firm’s total assets over the larger firm’s total assets. In 
order to control for potential costs arising from capability gaps among partners, I include the 
variable RDGAP, computed as the absolute difference between firms R&D intensity. A 
series of dummy variables are also included to account for the SIC code of the alliance, with 
industrial codes being reclassified according to Fama and French’s twelve industries 
classification. Finally, yearly dummies capture any time effects in the choice of particular 
governance forms. 
In the interest of space and clarity, I do not report correlation matrices for the variables in the 
models presented above, because my data is structured into several distinct datasets and 
hence doing so would require multiple tables. Overall, correlations were relatively low, thus 
suggesting that multicollinearity was not a concern with the data. Nonetheless, some 
interesting correlations exist among the independent variables. For example, the focal firm’s 
leverage (LEV) is positively correlated (r = 0.199) with partner’s leverage (PLEV), while it 
shows a negative correlation (r = -0.113) with partner quality (PQ). Moreover, both partners’ 
leverage is positively associated with the presence of a JV (r= 0.195 and 0.180 for LEV and 
PLEV, respectively). These coefficients provide some preliminary support for my arguments 
as they suggest that the main variables considered in the present analysis are significantly 
related in a way consistent with the direction proposed by my hypotheses. 
 
4.4. Results 
 
Preliminary analysis  
Before discussing the results of my formal hypothesis tests, I present some preliminary 
analyses in Table 8, which highlight noteworthy patterns in the data that are consistent with 
the proposed hypotheses. My primary argument is that high leverage makes a firm a less 
attractive alliance partner. An ideal test of this argument would involve analyzing not only 
the leverage levels of partners among alliances that were actually formed, but also among 
pairs of firms which did not enter into alliances, potentially because leverage levels or high 
differences in levels of leverage made the alliance unattractive. If this hypothesis is correct, 
then firms with high levels of leverage as well as potential alliance pairings with high 
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differences in leverage will systematically fall out of my sample of allied firms. This 
introduces a form of truncation, since the distribution of both observed partners’ leverage 
and differences in leverage is truncated from above and is predominantly observed below a 
certain threshold. As such, for some of my dependent variables (for example partner 
leverage in equation 1), my estimates are likely to be understated, and thus the results of the 
hypotheses tests from the related models are likely to be conservatively biased due to the 
truncation20. That is, if alliances among firms characterized by high levels of leverage were 
more common, then the inclusion of those observations in my sample would strengthen my 
estimates of the impact of firm leverage on partner leverage. 
To address the possibility that observed alliances are biased towards firms with lower 
leverage, I compare the absolute differences in partners leverage among observed alliance 
pairs with absolute differences from a sample of matched random pairs of firms drawn from 
Compustat. For each observed alliance in the sample, I construct a random pair of firms from 
the same Fama-French industries in that year. This matched sample controls for industry and 
year effects and is representative of a population of alliances that might have potentially 
occurred if counterpart leverage did not matter. If leverage did not affect alliance formation, 
then there should be no significant difference in leverage between observed alliances and 
random pairings. Panel A of Table 1 reports the difference in leverage between allied pairs 
of firms and matched random pairings. Consistent with my arguments, in the sample of 
observed alliances the average difference in partners leverage is 15.9 percent, while the 
difference in the sample of random pairings is 22.1 percent, and a t-test confirms that the 
difference between the sample means is highly significant (p<0.001). Unreported Wilcoxon 
and binomial sign tests confirm that results are not driven by outliers. Aside from addressing 
self-selection bias, this preliminary evidence also tentatively corroborates the argument that 
when a firm looks for alliance partners, it tends to match with counter-parts possessing 
similar levels of leverage. Thus it appears lower levered firms systematically partner with 
each other, while high leverage firms are possibly constrained to partner with other high 
levered firms. 
In Panel B of Table 8 I show a similar pattern within the observed sample of alliances. I 
divide all 11,112 firms in my sample into three groups according to observed percentiles of 
leverage, and then for each group I compute the mean and median value of the partners 
                                                
20 Hausman and Wise (1977) emphasize that OLS applied to a sample truncated from above generally 
produces estimators biased toward zero. 
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Tobin’s q and leverage. For firms with the lower observed leverage (0-33 percentiles) the 
median level of partners Tobin’s q and leverage are 2.44 and 4.1 percent, respectively. 
Conversely, for firms with the highest observed leverage (66-99 percentiles) the median 
partners Tobin’s q drops to 1.73, while average level of partner leverage rises to 12.5 
percent. These statistics are again consistent with my first argument that highly levered firms 
are less attractive partners and that they tend to form alliances with partners characterized by 
higher leverage as well as lower quality, thus supporting hypotheses 1-2. 
Finally, Panels C and D provide insight into the extent to which a firm’s leverage determines 
the choice of governance form in an alliance. For Panel C, I first compute the median 
leverage for all firms in the Compustat population, and then compared the number of 
alliances formed by firms above and below the median. I divide the sample according to the 
level of leverage of the first partner listed in the alliance, as it appears on SDC21. Results 
show that more highly leveraged firms are substantially less likely to form alliances, even 
though some research has suggested they may have a greater need to form alliances under 
some circumstances (Patzelt et al. 2008). Furthermore, 24.6% of alliances involving a highly 
leveraged firm were structured as a JV, whereas only 9.2% of alliances involving a low 
leveraged firm were structured as JVs. This difference of 15.4% is also highly statistically 
significant (p<0.001). 
Panel D examines how the difference in leverage across the two alliance partners relates to 
the likelihood that an alliance will be structured as a JV. I divide alliances into three groups 
according to observed percentiles of the absolute differences in leverage. JVs appear to be 
more likely for alliances characterized by relatively higher differences in leverage, 
increasing from 8.5% when the difference is relatively small to 18.1% when the difference is 
relatively large. The results of Panels C and D are consistent with the argument that when a 
firm has high leverage, an alliance is more likely to involve equity as a form of protection 
and safeguard for lower levered firms. The overall patterns of Table 8 are also consistent 
with the general argument that firms pay attention to the financial health of alliance partners, 
and that they structure their transactions in the market for collaboration accordingly. 
                                                
21 Results are qualitatively unchanged when the second partner is considered. 
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Table 8. Preliminary analysis 
Panel A: Comparison of differences in leverage 
 Mean Value     
Variable Alliances Non-
alliances 
t(diff.) p-value   
|Δ Leverage| 0.15927 0.22190 -14.6268 <0.001   
n = 4030 
Panel B: Focal firm leverage and characteristics of partners 
            Mean          Median   
Percentiles of 
leverage 
Partner 
Leverage 
Partner Q Partner 
Leverage 
Partner 
Q 
  
0-33 0.110 4.36 0.041 2.44   
33-66 0.131 3.85 0.058 2.31   
66-99 0.195 2.80 0.125 1.73   
n = 11,112 
Panel C: Joint ventures activity across levels of focal firm’s leverage 
Focal Firm leverage Total 
alliances 
JVs Percent of 
JVs 
   
Below the median 4167  385 9.24    
Above the median 1389  342 24.62    
All observations 5556  727 13.08    
 
Panel D: Joint venture activity across levels of |Δ  Leverage| 
Percentiles of |Δ 
Leverage| 
Perc. of JVs      
0-33 8.53      
33-66 12.76      
66-99 18.10      
 
Before presenting my regression results, I discuss some alternative explanations that may 
motivate patterns of leverage among allying firms. Perhaps, the underlying issue could be 
not whether leverage matters, but what factors influence leverage which in turn also impact 
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partner attractiveness and alliance deals. For instance, prior research suggests leverage is 
negatively related to innovation as the latter produces mostly intangible assets with low 
collateral value (Simerly and Li, 2000; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Hence, one potential 
alternative explanation could simply be that my results are reflecting highly innovative firms 
partnering with other highly innovative firms, rather than matching due to leverage. 
However, high-innovation/high-leverage firms are not unusual. To examine these issues, I 
divide the sample of firms into 4 cells according to two dimensions: firms with high/low 
R&D and firms with high/low leverage. High (low) R&D firms are defined as firms that 
have R&D intensity greater (lower) than the overall Compustat population median. 
Similarly, I define categories for high/low leverage based on Compustat median values.  
After defining the 4 categories, next I randomly chose one partner (the first listed partner in 
SDC) and examined the leverage/R&D distribution of these firms. When considering the 
first listed partner in the alliance, it appears that 81 percent of my sample of alliances 
involves high R&D firms. It is noteworthy that amongst these firms, almost 19 percent have 
above median leverage. Moreover, if innovation explained my results, leverage should make 
no difference to the alliances of R&D intensive firms, and the chances of an equity JV 
should be roughly the same irrespective of whether a high R&D firm has low leverage or 
high leverage. However, while high R&D-low leverage firms form JVs in only 5.3 percent 
of the cases, this fraction increases to 12.1 percent for high R&D-high leverage firms. This 
pattern cannot be explained by R&D intensity and it is consistent with the idea that high 
leverage also introduces further hazards in the alliance22.  
Alternatively, it could also be argued that highly levered firms tend partner with lowly 
levered ones quite often as a result of resource considerations, thus violating my proposed 
matching among partners characterized by similar leverage. For instance, in biotech-pharma 
alliances, while the biotech firm’s intangible assets may prevent it from adopting higher 
leverage, the pharma partner can usually take on significant amounts of debt due to its 
greater tangible assets and cash flows (Gopalakrishnan et al. 2008). Accordingly, most 
alliances should occur between firms possessing very different levels of leverage (due to 
their different underlying assets), while alliances between firms with similar leverage (high-
high or low-low) should be less common. Again, the results in Panel A of Table 8 are 
                                                
22 Chances of a JV also increase after taking into account alliance partner level of innovativeness. For 
example, when considering only alliances involving two high R&D firms, chances of a JV increase 
from 4.5 percent for low leverage firms to 10.5 percent for high leverage firms. 
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inconsistent with this explanation, as observed differences in partners leverage are 
systematically smaller (and not greater) than differences computed for random pairs. 
 
Regression results 
Table 9 presents the results from the hierarchical regression models that were used to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2. Note that while Table 8 is based on all 5556 observed alliances for 
which both partners leverage and Tobin’s q figures are available, the results in Tables 9 and 
10 are based on a reduced sample of 4220 alliances due to a loss in observations because of 
missing data for other controls and independent variables. In column 1 of Table 9 the 
dependent variable is partner leverage (PLEV), and in column 2 the dependent variable is 
partner quality (PQ). The likelihood ratio tests confirm that in both models the inclusion of a 
random intercept for each focal firm offers significant improvement over a linear regression 
model with fixed effects (p<0.001). Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms will tend to form 
alliances with partners possessing similar levels of leverage. Consistent with hypothesis 1, 
column 1 reveals that firm leverage (LEV) is positively related to partner leverage 
(p<0.001). Thus, the higher (lower) a focal firms leverage, the higher (lower) the levels of 
leverage of its counter-parts. 
The second column of Table 9 tests hypothesis 2, which argued that alliances with highly 
levered firms entail significant risks for good quality firms looking to derive valuable 
synergies. Thus, good quality firms tend to avoid high leverage partners and, all else being 
equal, the latter are constrained to partner with firms of relatively lower quality. Consistent 
with this argument, the coefficient on the variable LEV is negative and significant at the 
p<0.05 level, implying that higher leverage for a firm generally translates into lower quality 
alliance partners. In terms of controls in model (1), at the focal firm level the variable 
LASSETS showed a significant and negative impact on partner leverage, suggesting that 
bigger firms tend to avoid high leverage firms, possibly by virtue of their wider choice of 
alliance partners. Conversely, the positive and significant coefficient on ROA indicates that 
high leverage partners in the sample also tend to match with more profitable firms, possibly 
because of the latter’s readily available financial resources. Results in model (2) indicate that 
at the focal firm level, higher Q firms tend to partner with other high quality partners. 
Similarly, bigger firms also tend to partner with high Q firms, possibly in order to access the 
latter’s growth opportunities. In addition, R&D intensive firm (which may possess higher 
THE ROLE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FIRM’S ALLIANCE STRATEGY 
 91 
growth opportunities) appear to look for partners characterized by lower levels of Q in order 
to access their tangible assets in place. Similarly, after controlling for the effect of Q, more 
profitable firms also tend to partner with lower quality firms, potentially for access to assets 
in place. 
 
Table 9. Hierarchical Models for Partner’s Leverage and Partner’s Quality 
  
  (1) (2) 
Dependent 
Variable: PLEV PQ 
Partner variables   
 PLEV _ -6.443
*** 
   (0.282) 
 PQ* -0.00875
*** – 
  (0.000395)  
 PRD* -0.384
*** 3.052*** 
  (0.0175) (0.475) 
 PLASSETS 0.0239
*** -0.147*** 
  (0.000697) (0.0197) 
 PROA* -0.240
*** 0.338 
  (0.00793) (0.222) 
Focal firm variables   
 LEV 0.158
*** -0.684* 
  (0.0130) (0.314) 
 Q* -0.000189 0.233
*** 
  (0.000457) (0.0112) 
 RD* 0.00899 -2.179
*** 
  (0.0201) (0.351) 
 LASSETS -0.00547
*** 0.129*** 
  (0.00107) (0.0230) 
 ROA* 0.0458
*** -1.194*** 
  (0.00930) (0.229) 
 Intercept 0.0469
*** 3.773*** 
  (0.00961) (0.225) 
 N 8440 8440 
 Groups 2074 2074 
  Avg. n. of obs per group 4.1 4.1 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10 reports results from the hierarchical logit models used to test the impact of leverage 
on the choice of governance form. In hypothesis 3 I argued that alliance partners are more 
likely to opt for the added protections afforded by a JV when the partners are highly levered. 
The positive and significant (p<0.001) coefficients on the variables LEV and PLEV in model 
1 of Table 10 support this hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 further argues that the costs of allying 
with a high leverage firm can be especially high for low leverage counter-parts, and thus 
alliances characterized by greater difference among partners’ leverage are more likely to take 
the form of a JV. In model 2 I test this prediction by including the absolute difference 
between partners’ leverage (DELTA). As expected, the coefficient on this variable is 
positive and significant (p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 4. As a robustness check, I also 
estimate this model with a standard (i.e. non-hierarchical) logit model computed for the 
sample of 4220 alliances and results are qualitatively unchanged. In terms of the controls, 
most of the coefficients on the dummies accounting for the activities involved in the 
collaboration (RESEARCH, AMNUFACT, SUPPLY, LICENS) and the coefficients on the 
variable SUPRANATION and SAMEIND mirror previous studies on alliance governance 
(Casciaro, 2003; Pisano et al., 1988; Oxley, 1997; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). However, the 
variable MARKET was found to have a negative impact in my study, while extant literature 
finds no significant effect. Similarly, the variables SAMESTATE had no significant effect in 
my analysis, while extant literature documents a significant negative relationship (Oxley and 
Sampson, 2004). The coefficient on the variable PRIORALL is consistent with studies 
showing that partner with repeated ties tend to adopt more complex contractual forms of 
governance (Van de Vrande et al., 2009; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Casciaro, 2003). The 
negative impact of RDGAP mirrors Kogut and Chang (1991) and suggests firms with similar 
levels of sophisticated technological capabilities adopt equity JVs, potentially to share 
surplus related to the knowledge generated. Both AVGASSET and RASSET appear to have 
a significant positive influence, while previous studies report conflicting findings (Oxley, 
1997). 
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Table 10. Hierarchical Logit Models for Governance Choice (JV) 
 (1) (2) 
RESEARCH -0.155 -0.224+ 
 (0.120) (0.119) 
MANUFACTUR 1.472*** 1.520*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) 
MARKET -0.283* -0.341** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
SUPPLY -1.962*** -1.842*** 
 (0.396) (0.395) 
LICENSING -2.266*** -2.335*** 
 (0.204) (0.203) 
SUPRANATION -1.366*** -1.394*** 
 (0.227) (0.228) 
SAMESTATE 0.131 0.137 
 (0.127) (0.126) 
SAMEIND -0.235+ -0.195 
 (0.133) (0.131) 
PRIORALL 0.484*** 0.512*** 
 (0.138) (0.137) 
AVGASSET 6.64e-08 6.30e-06** 
 (2.07e-06) (1.95e-06) 
RASSET 0.747*** 0.805*** 
 (0.186) (0.185) 
RDGAP -0.920+ -1.422** 
 (0.482) (0.502) 
AVGROA 0.415 -0.0156 
 (0.493) (0.472) 
LEV 1.946***  
 (0.276)  
PLEV 1.722***  
 (0.283)  
DELTA  1.044*** 
  (0.298) 
Intercept -4.099*** -3.890*** 
 (0.423) (0.428) 
N 8440 8440 
Groups 2074 2074 
Avg. n. of obs per group 4.1 4.1 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 
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4.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have shown that financial health and leverage are important considerations 
in selecting alliance partners. In particular, it has been argued that highly levered partners are 
less attractive in the context of an alliance for multiple reasons. First, highly leveraged 
partners are more prone to liquidation and bankruptcy risks, and thus they expose the 
alliance (and all investments involved) to the threat of unplanned termination, potentially 
even despite the firm’s best intentions. Second, I have also argued that even when liquidation 
is not imminent, highly levered firms have incentives to ‘default’ on their implicit claims and 
reduce their efforts towards the alliance. Finally a high leverage firm facing financial distress 
may threaten to prematurely terminate an alliance in order to obtain more favorable terms. 
Rational firms will anticipate these risks and hence will evaluate each other’s level of 
leverage when structuring transactions in the market for collaboration. 
Using a large sample of strategic alliances, I found several empirical patterns consistent with 
this theoretical framework. The first part of the analysis clearly suggests that counter-parts’ 
leverage is critical during the process of partner selection. A ‘double sided matching’ of 
leverage levels emerges, whereby low leverage firms partner with other low leverage firms 
and high leverage firms seem to be constrained to partner with other high leverage firms. 
Similarly, I also find that after controlling for partner resources, highly levered firms tend to 
ally with relatively lower quality counter-parts. These findings provide additional insight to 
recent works applying the ‘theory of marriage’ to the context of the market for collaboration 
(Rodhes-Kropf and Robinson 2008). This literature shows that firms tend to acquire targets 
possessing similar levels of resource quality, and that this matching occurs in order to 
minimize the costs of ex post integration while maximizing value. My results show that in 
the context of alliances, partner attractiveness is not determined exclusively by its resource 
endowments but also by its financial health, as firms appear to take into account both aspects 
when scanning for potential partners.  
The second part of the analysis reveals an important link between firm leverage and the 
choice of governance form in alliances. The findings show that leverage increases the 
probability of an alliance being structured as a JV. Equally interestingly, JVs appear to be 
more likely in the presence of greater difference among partners’ leverage. Stakeholder 
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theories of capital structure point out that high leverage makes firms less attractive 
transacting partners without suggesting any ex post mechanisms to mitigate concerns related 
to capital structure decisions. In this respect, the evidence provided has important 
implications because it highlights the importance of governance structures as an ex post 
contractual solution to such a situation. Leveraged firms can adopt equity in order to support 
their exchanges in the face of termination risks. Thus, equity-based governance induces 
relation specific investments not only by aligning incentives through shared surplus, but also 
by providing an enforceable mechanism to mitigate the hazards posed by high leverage 
partners. 
The findings of this chapter also have interesting implications for research analyzing alliance 
governance from a transaction cost perspective and from a real option perspective. From a 
transaction cost view, the analysis shows that leverage is a critical source of relational 
uncertainty at the transaction level. Thus, in contrast to work that has explained governance 
choices by looking only at appropriability hazards (e.g. Pisano, 1989), my analysis calls for a 
broader view by showing that some exchange hazards may also arise from firm-level 
characteristics such as leverage which may lead to the adoption of equity governance. From 
a real options perspective, the results provide additional insight into the ‘dueling options’ 
often inherent in the tradeoff between flexibility and commitment (Folta and O’Brien, 2004). 
According to real options logic, firms value flexibility when faced with high uncertainty 
(Steensma and Corley 2001, Santoro and McGill 2005, Cuypers and Martin, 2007; Tong 
Reuer and Peng 2008). Thus, they prefer less hierarchical governance modes in order to 
avoid the opportunity costs of irreversible investments in a shared venture. However, my 
analysis suggests that firms may be willing to commit to a more hierarchical form when 
faced with uncertainty arising from a partner’s bankruptcy risks. By increasing barriers to 
exit with a JV structure, a firm mitigates the uncertainty associated with a leveraged partner 
as any potential scaling back of commitment from the relationship becomes more expensive. 
Although this sacrifices the deferment option, it also provides the low leverage firm with the 
option to take on the venture in the event of unplanned termination by the partner. As a 
result, although it comes with an ex ante cost, this lack of flexibility reduces ex post sunk 
costs much more effectively as compared to a non-equity agreement in the presence of a 
high leverage firm. 
Finally, the analysis conducted in this chapter also opens some avenues for future research. 
First, an important limitation of the study is that I only analyzed the negative aspects of 
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partner leverage. To a certain extent, I overcome this limitation when I show that high 
leverage firms offer equity participations as a form of commitment towards the alliance in 
order to attract better partners. However, there may be also other benefits associated with 
highly levered partners. Extant literature suggests that financially constrained (i.e., highly 
levered) firms are more prone to form alliances in order to develop projects that they would 
not be able to pursue independently (Patzelt et al. 2008, Lerner et al. 2003). Thus, while 
bringing instability, leverage could also force firms to externalize valuable projects that 
would be otherwise lost, and non-levered firms may be able to capitalize upon these 
opportunities. Future work could study the circumstances under which this may happen, such 
as how the liquidity of the market impacts alliancing behavior. Second, in this chapter I 
focused on the implications of firm’s leverage in terms of partner selection and alliance 
governance choice. Another interesting avenue for future research could be to analyze 
whether bankruptcy risks influence other contractual characteristics of alliances as well. For 
example, firms allying with highly levered counterparts may prefer agreements with a 
predetermined duration or with a limited scope in order to limit the dependence on the 
counterpart. While lack of detailed data on my sample of alliances prevented the study of 
these issues, future research on these topics could prove highly insightful. 
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CHAPTER 5  
FINANCIAL SLACK, ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO 
DIVERSITY, AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 clearly suggests that a firm’s capital structure decisions 
are critical during the alliance making process, as they can be a source of risks and costs for 
alliance partners. Accordingly, I documented a strong empirical relationship between a 
firm’s leverage and its choices in terms of alliance partner selection and alliance governance. 
In this chapter I further extend this theoretical framework and consider the implications of a 
firm’s financing decisions during the implementation and coordination of alliances. More 
specifically, in line with other studies focusing on this phase of the alliance making process, 
I analyze whether capital structure decisions hinder or facilitate a firm’s ability to implement 
its overall alliance strategy. Therefore, the focus of this last part of the thesis is to study 
whether a consistent matching between financing policies and alliance strategies represents a 
source of competitive advantage, which helps firms improving their overall financial 
performance. 
In order to pursue this general goal I build on two additional streams of literature that have 
not been reviewed in previous chapters. First, I build on prior research that has extensively 
noted that a firm’s capital structure is a key determinant of its financial slack, (Bourgeois, 
1981; Bromiley, 1991). Generally speaking, slack comprises those resources in excess of 
what is strictly necessary to maintain the regular operations of a firm (Bourgeois, 1981). 
Financial slack in particular refers to the existence of financial resources potentially 
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available to the firm in the form of unused borrowing capacity. These resources significantly 
influence both the ability of managers to make or maintain discretionary strategic 
investments (Jensen, 1986; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993), as well as the governance of those 
investments (David, O’Brien and Yoshikawa, 2008). Hence, according to this view capital 
structure decisions are “among the most important decisions that managers make” (Mizruchi 
& Stearns, 1994: 118). In this chapter I build on this stream and explore the consequences of 
financial slack availability (and thus of capital structure) in the context of strategic alliances 
management. In doing so, I also consider other forms of slack not directly linked to capital 
structure decision, such as cash reserves and liquid short-term assets. 
 Second, to study the performance implications of alliances I also follow previous research 
that concentrated on alliance portfolios, rather than on individual alliances. Indeed, today 
many firms get involved into multiple ongoing alliances and face the challenge of managing 
these relationships simultaneously (Hoffman, 2005). Previous literature traditionally adopted 
a dyadic view while analyzing the formation, implementation and performance of individual 
alliances (Kale et al. 2002). However, due to the existence of synergies and 
interdependencies between ongoing relationships, managing multiple alliances goes beyond 
the mere realization of each alliance’s individual goals (Hoffman, 2005; Vasudeva and 
Anand, 2011). Accordingly, in this part of the analysis I study the performance consequences 
of alliance portfolios – defined as a firm’s collection of direct alliances with other partners 
(Lavie, 2007). This choice is also in line with my focus on capital structure. Indeed, 
financing choices represent a firm-level policy, and, as such, the risks they imply are likely 
to influence not only individual dyads, but also the overall set of alliances formed by a firm. 
Accordingly, in order to analyze the interplay between capital structure decisions and 
alliance strategies in determining firm performance a firm-level unit of analysis is warranted. 
Research on alliance portfolios focuses on the structural properties of alliance portfolios and 
analyzes their impact on firm performance (Hoffman 2005; Lavie and Miller, 2008; Jiang et 
al. 2010; Mouri et al. 2011; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2006). In 
this research context, alliance portfolio diversity has been proposed as one of the most 
important aspects to consider. The notion of diversity refers to the degree of variance in the 
characteristics of a firm’s alliance partners (Jiang et al., 2010). On the one hand, a more 
diverse portfolio is certainly beneficial, as it provides the firm with access to non-redundant 
information and a wider array of complementary resources and capabilities. On the other 
hand, greater diversity has also drawbacks, because it increases costs by making 
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coordination of production activities more difficult. Accordingly, extant research 
investigated the performance consequences of diversity and found a non-monotonic 
relationship between alliance portfolio partner diversity and firm financial performance 
(Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Jiang et al. 2010; Lavie and Miller, 2008). Nonetheless, some 
important aspects of partner diversity still remain unaddressed.   
While extant research shows that partner diversity can be either beneficial as well as value 
destroying, it pays relatively little attention to the question of how a firm should govern this 
aspect of alliances in order to maximize value. This is an important question as empirical 
evidence shows that most firms seem to face mainly the costs of partner diversity, while not 
being able to fully realize the synergies between different alliances (Goerzen and Beamish, 
2005; Jiang et al. 2010). Moreover, research also lends support for the idea that the ability to 
manage a portfolio of alliances critically depends on the existence of cognitive limits within 
the firm and the availability of proper resources and tools (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; 
Oerlemans et al., 2013). Accordingly, not all firms should benefit to the same extent from a 
given level of portfolio diversity. For these reasons, it has been suggested that in order to 
better understand the performance implications of alliance portfolios a contingency 
perspective is needed, wherein firms have to consider how portfolio characteristics fit their 
internal and external environment (Oerlemans et al., 2013; Yamakawa et al. 2011; Cui and 
O’Connor, 2012; Heimeriks et al., 2009). The research presented in this chapter answers to 
this call and analyzes how firms can leverage their internal organizational resources in order 
to face the various challenges posed by growing diversity in their alliances portfolio. More 
specifically, I focus on one trait of alliance portfolio – its degree of partner diversity  – and I 
show (and find) that its final impact on financial performance is critically moderated by the 
presence of financial slack. Therefore, the analysis seeks answers to the following research 
question: 
(i) Does financial slack (and thus, capital structure decisions) influence a firm’s ability to 
manage diversity within a portfolio of alliances? 
Extant research suggests that the presence of slack buffers the firm from internal pressures as 
well as from changes in the external environment, thus impacting firm’s strategic behavior in 
various ways (Cyert and March, 1963; Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). However, 
while the role of slack has been shown in a variety of contexts  – such as innovation, 
managers’ risk taking, internationalization, and diversification (Huan and Chen, 2010; Chen 
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et al., 2013; George, 2005; Lin, Cheng, and Lie, 2009; Bromiley, 1991) – it has never been 
explored in the context of alliance portfolio management. This gap is particularly relevant, 
given that internal resources availability should be critical during the implementation of such 
a strategy. For instance, Gary (2005) shows that the presence of slack within the firm is 
important not only to motivate but also to implement any strategy based on the realization of 
synergies, such diversification.  
In this chapter I aim at filing this vacuum and explicitly analyze the role of slack resources 
during the implementation of an alliance portfolio strategy. In particular, I analyze how the 
availability of slack influences the relationship between alliance partner diversity and firm 
financial performance. In this respect, the main argument proposed is that slack can act as a 
double-edged sword when managing a portfolio of alliances. On the one hand, slack can be 
beneficial because it acts as a buffer against the heavy coordination costs related to partner 
diversity and provides the firm with greater flexibility to invest across different alliances and 
realize synergies.  On the other hand, slack entails costs that could be exacerbated in the 
context of a diversified alliance portfolio, as activities become difficult to monitor and 
managers may have incentives to divert part of these resources to unproductive uses. 
Accordingly, I propose that the impact of slack shall depend on the level of discretion over 
its use by managers, and, ultimately, on the type of slack considered. I suggest that, while 
low-discretion financial slack in the form of unused borrowing capacity provides additional 
resources that facilitate the management of diversity within the portfolio, high discretion 
available slack (in the form of cash reserves) has the opposite effect, because it is more 
prone to inefficient allocation by managers. Nonetheless, I further argue that available slack 
still has some potential benefits with respect to portfolio management that could be 
unleashed in the presence of appropriate corporate governance tools to curb managers’ self-
interest. Thus, I also focus on financial leverage (which is the inverse of low discretion 
financial slack) as one of such mechanisms, given its ability to discipline managers (Jensen, 
1986). Accordingly, it is further argued that when available slack is combined with the 
discipline brought about by higher leverage the former’s negative effects will be mitigated. 
Empirical analysis on a sample of firms operating in the automobile industry provides large 
support for the proposed hypotheses. The findings confirm that financial slack significantly 
moderates the relationship between alliance partner diversity and firm financial performance. 
I also find that this impact differs across different slack types. In particular, while low 
discretion financial slack positively moderates the relation between portfolio diversity and 
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financial performance, high discretion slack, in the form of cash reserves, has a negative 
moderating effect. Moreover, when high discretion slack is combined with the discipline and 
corporate governance associated with financial leverage this negative tendency is curbed, as 
there is a positive three-way interaction between diversity, leverage and high discretion 
slack. These results generally support the view that the availability of financial slack within 
the firm is a critical dimension to understand how its alliance portfolio strategy contributes to 
financial performance. 
The findings of this chapter make several important contributions. First, they contribute to 
alliance portfolio research by showing that a firm policies related to slack retention or 
absorption critically impact its ability to extract value from a diverse pool of alliance 
partners. Previous studies have shown the moderating effect of factors such as alliance 
experience (Duysters et al., 2012), the existence of a dedicated alliance function (Cui and 
O’Connor, 2012) or the adoption of technology management tools (Oerlemans et al., 2013). I 
add to this stream of literature by proposing financial slack as another important contingent 
factor that needs to be considered when analyzing the performance implications of alliance 
portfolios. Second, the analysis conducted also contributes to the literature on slack. Extant 
perspectives have looked at the consequences of slack within firm boundaries, for instance 
by analyzing its importance during the implementation of strategies such as 
internationalization or internal technological diversification (Lin, Cheng, and Liu, 2009; 
Huang and Chen, 2010). In this chapter, I extend this stream of literature by looking at the 
role of slack outside firm boundaries and by demonstrating it holds important consequences 
also when the firm alliancing activity with external partners is considered. In a related vein, I 
also add to the contingency perspective on slack (Tan and Peng, 2003) by analyzing the 
different mechanisms through which low and high discretion slack influence a firm’s ability 
to manage partner diversity in its alliance portfolio. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the theoretical background of the 
study by reviewing relevant organizational slack research and alliance portfolio research. 
Research hypotheses are developed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the research 
methodology employed to test the proposed theoretical arguments, while section 5.5 
summarizes the empirical findings of the study. Finally, conclusions and directions for future 
research are discussed in section 5.6. 
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5.2. Theoretical background 
 
Partner diversity and financial performance 
Partner diversity generally refers to the heterogeneity in the resources possessed by alliance 
partners (Jiang et al., 2010). Consistently with this definition, extant research has generally 
referred to this aspect of diversity by looking at the extent to which a firm forms alliances 
with partners from different industries (Jiang et al., 2010; Cui and O’Connor, 2012). As 
accessing complementary resources held by other firms is a major driver of alliance 
formation, research has shown that greater variety in partner resources provides the firm with 
several benefits. A broader reach in available external resources helps the firm access to less 
redundant information on current technologies, best practices and market trends, as well as 
to a broader set of complementary assets from which to draw upon. This helps the firm to 
leverage its internal resources more effectively while enhancing strategic flexibility, as it can 
maintain multiple options open and postpone the decision to invest organically (Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2005). Greater partner diversity also helps tapping into multiple sources of 
knowledge and learning opportunities. In this regard, several studies have suggested that by 
combining heterogeneous knowledge gained from different alliances firms stimulate learning 
and creativity, which in turn positively affects innovation (Cui and O’Connor, 2012).  
These benefits notwithstanding, partner diversity also has costs.  Partners from different 
industries could have very different albeit conflicting goals, while competing for the same 
scarce organizational resources within the firm (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). Moreover, as 
a result of their different industrial contexts and competitive environments, partners could 
possess very different routines and managerial practices that need to be aligned with those of 
the focal firm (Jiang et al, 2010). Thus, as the firm starts forming alliances with partners in 
related and unrelated industries more complexity is brought into the organization, which 
makes it more difficult to coordinate alliance activities with the firm internal operations. For 
these reasons, partner diversity entails substantial transaction costs and may result in 
unwieldy managerial structures that breed inefficiency (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). 
Extant research provides support for the idea that the costs of partner diversity arise 
immediately as the firm starts collaborating with different partners and may initially offset 
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the associated benefits (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Jiang et al. 2010). However, as the firm 
becomes more experienced in dealing with such costs and learning and knowledge sharing 
across alliances accumulate within the firm, a minimum threshold of diversity is reached, 
after which the marginal benefits of further diversity increase. In support of these points 
many studies report a U-shaped relation between partner diversity and firm financial 
performance (Jiang et al., 2010; Goerzaen and Beamish, 2005). These results imply that only 
very few firms are able to enjoy the benefits of a resource-diversified portfolio of alliances 
(i.e. those at the far end of diversity), while firms “stuck” at low or moderate levels of 
diversity experience declines in financial performance. This evidence also corroborates 
previous findings on alliance experience and alliance management capability that found that 
firms “learn” how to manage alliances by repeatedly engaging in multiple relationships over 
time (Duysters et al., 2012; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006).  
While these studies find compelling support for the benefits and costs associated with 
partner diversity, extant research is relatively silent as to whether and how managerial 
policies and decision-making can influence such a relationship. This is an important gap 
because many firms start diversifying their alliance portfolio but fail to reap economic 
benefits from such a strategic move (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Cui et al., 2012; Jiang et 
al. 2010). Moreover, as a result of their different capabilities and internal resources, firms 
may systematically differ in their ability to deal with partner diversity (Kale et al. 2002). 
Following these arguments, recent studies call for a contingency perspective and argue that 
in order to better understand the performance implications of alliance portfolios, research 
needs also to consider how portfolio characteristics fit the firm’s internal and external 
environment (Oerlemans et al., 2013; Yamakawa et al. 2011; Cui and O’Connor, 2012). For 
instance, Oerlemans et al. (2013) analyze how the adoption of technology management tools 
moderates the relation between alliance portfolio diversity and firm innovation. Their 
findings show that by using such tools, which are a form of alliance management capability, 
firms mitigate the negative side of higher diversity in their alliances. Similarly, Cui and 
O’Connor (2012) suggest that firms with more alliance experience are better able to facilitate 
information and knowledge sharing across alliances in different functional domains and they 
find that alliance experience positively moderates the relation between functional diversity 
and innovation performance. Taken together, these insights suggest that firm level 
characteristics significantly influence the extent to which a firm is able to extract value from 
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its alliance portfolio, and that untangling these mechanisms represents a major gap in extant 
literature.  
 
Organizational slack and firm performance 
Organizational slack is defined as that cushion of resources in excess of what is required to 
maintain an organization’s normal operations (Bourgeois, 1981). As these resources are not 
strictly necessary to sustain firm activities, research scholars have long questioned their 
existence and different theories have been applied to understand the impact of slack 
resources on firm outcomes. Organizational theories study the effect of slack adopting either 
a resource-based view or the behavioral theory of the firm. Economic theories include 
resource constraint theory and agency theory. 
Generally speaking, organization theory proposes that slack has a positive influence on 
organizations. Resource-based theorists suggest that firms need resources to obtain a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Firms deploy their resource endowments to respond to 
new opportunities as well as to environmental threats, and their ability to do so varies with 
each firm’s availability of resources. As resources are unevenly distributed across firms, this 
view would predict that firms characterized by abundant resources should have greater 
opportunities to build a competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
In a related fashion, the behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 1963) considers firm managers 
as sitting at a nexus of relationships with coalitions bargaining with each other for the 
realization of their own agendas and the allocation of scarce resources. Accordingly, this 
stream of research has shown that slack buffers a firm’s operations from internal pressures, 
as it helps retaining key internal stakeholders while mitigating conflicts among different 
stakeholders groups within the firm (Cyert and March, 1963). At the same time, slack has 
been shown to insulate the firm from hostile changes in the external environments and to 
allow commitment on risky investments, which would not be approved in the face of scarcity 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Bourgeois, 1981). In support of this point several studies find that 
slack is positively associated with investments in innovation (Norhia and Gulati, 1996) and 
risk taking (Singh, 1986). Similarly, Lin, Cheng and Liu (2009) show that managers of firms 
possessing a cushion of excess resources are more prone to pursue internationalization 
strategies, which require investments in less familiar foreign markets.  
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On the other hand, economic theory challenges this notion by pointing out that the existence 
of slack may breed inefficiencies. Resource constraints theory points out that the availability 
of resources alters the behavior of managers and the way firm resources are deployed 
(George, 2005; Lin, Cheng and Liu, 2009). Managers facing constraints may perceive a 
higher opportunity cost for their stock of available resources and they have incentives to use 
them more cautiously as compered to managers of firms with abundant resource endowment. 
Cyert and March (1963) suggested a similar argument by proposing that – due to the 
existence of cognitive limits and bounded rationality – search is likely to be more intense 
where slack is scarce, while where it is abundant managers are more likely to satisficing. 
Agency theory further support these arguments by suggesting that, since managers and firm 
owners typically possess divergent goals, managers may divert slack resources away from 
productive uses in order to pursue self-aggrandizing and private benefits (Jensen, 1986). 
Taken together, studies grounded on economic theories suggest that firm should keep slack 
as low as possible, as managers with fewer resources at their disposal are more likely to use 
them effectively. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of slack on firm performance is mixed (Daniel et al., 
2004). Consistently with organization theories, some studies find a positive impact of slack 
on firm financial performance (Bromiley, 1991). On the other hand, other scholars provide 
support for the economic view and show that slack has negative consequences for the firm 
(Tan and Peng, 2003). Empirical research tried to reconcile these contrasting evidences in 
several ways. Some scholars noted that slack can be found in various forms within the firm, 
and argued that each slack type may have different implication for firm outcomes. These 
scholars have characterized slack according to the level of managerial discretion over its use 
and differentiated between high discretion (HD) and low discretion (LD) slack (Bourgeois, 
1981; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983). Examples of high discretion slack include cash reserves 
and receivables, which can be easily allocated to alternative purposes, while low-discretion 
slack refers to resources not so easy to deploy at a glance such as debt financing, fixed assets 
and excess capacity (George, 2005). For instance, Tan and Peng (2003) show that while 
organization theory is more suited to explain the effect of high discretion slack on financial 
performance, economic arguments are better able to predict the impact of low discretion 
slack. In contrast, Lin. Cheng and Liu (2009) study slack in the context of firm 
internationalization and find that high discretion slack engenders managerial self-interest and 
hinders firm’s internationalization strategies while low discretion slack has a positive effect. 
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On the other hand, other scholars combine both behavioral and economic arguments and find 
support for a curvilinear relationship between slack and firm performance (Tan and Peng, 
2003). Finally, more recent studies  analyze the role of external factors,  such as the presence 
of venture capitalists or angel investors, in moderating the slack-performance relationship 
(Vanacker et al., 2013) Overall, this body of research clearly suggests that there may be an 
optimal amount of slack for each firm and, more importantly, that it is critical to differentiate 
between various forms of slack when analyzing its impact on firm performance.  
 
5.3. Hypotheses development 
Academic literatures on organizational slack and alliance portfolio management have largely 
developed independently, leaving room for additional insights resulting from their 
integration. In this chapter I add to the contingency literature on alliance portfolios and 
propose organizational slack as an important strategic factor to consider when analyzing the 
performance implications of partner diversity. Exploring the strategic consequences of slack 
for alliance portfolios is particularly relevant in light of recent studies showing the 
importance of internal resources during the implementation of strategies motivated by the 
realization of synergies, such as diversification moves. For instance, Goerzaen and Beamish 
(2005) argue that, since building a diversified portfolio of alliance partners consumes 
managers’ time and efforts, the ability of a firm to profit from such a strategy is bounded by 
its cognitive limits and resource constraints. Similarly, Gary (2005) shows that diversifying 
into new business increases complexity and results in steeply rising work demands that could 
easily outstrip the initial available internal resources of a firm. Accordingly, firms pursuing a 
strategy based on diversification should maintain adequate slack in order to buffer the 
implied coordination costs and avoid negative performance consequences.  
In this chapter, I extend this intuition and propose that slack can play a similar role in the 
context of an alliance portfolio strategy. Specifically, I suggest slack resources act as a 
cushion that helps firms buffering the pressures posed by alliance partner diversity, while 
facilitating the realization of synergies and the pursuit of new growth opportunities. 
However, I also acknowledge that, when slack is not disposed properly, it generates costs 
that could be exacerbated in the context of a diversified alliance portfolio. Accordingly, I 
propose that the ultimate impact of slack should depend on the types of slack considered and 
the existence of appropriate corporate governance tools. The proposed theoretical arguments 
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are grounded on organizational theory and economic theory of organizational slack. In an 
attempt to reconcile and integrate the opposite predictions of these two theoretical strains, I 
first outline my general arguments on the interaction between slack resources and alliance 
portfolio diversity. Then, I develop testable hypotheses by distinguishing between two types 
of slack, namely high discretion and low discretion financial slack. This choice seemed 
reasonable for several reasons. First, the extent of discretion over slack resources captures 
more precisely the permanent dimension of slack (George, 2005). Second, extant research 
suggests that considering the discretionary nature of slack – that is distinguishing between 
high discretion and low discretion slack – is critical to reconcile the opposing predictions 
about its impact on firm outcomes (Tan and Peng, 2003). Third, the availability of financial 
resources has been shown to influence a firm’s motivation to seek alliances, as well as its 
ability to effectively acquire new capabilities through them (Patzelt et al., 2008). Finally, 
financial slack is a generic and less “sticky” resource, as compared to other forms of slack 
which are absorbed into the firm’s current routines and operations, such as human capital. 
For this reason they can be more easily allocated throughout the alliance portfolio, while 
absorbed resources do not provide such a flexibility. As a result, low discretion and high 
discretion financial slack seemed the most relevant typologies of slack to consider in the 
context of alliance portfolio management. 
 
Slack resources and alliance portfolio diversity 
Organization theory posits that slack is beneficial to the firm. Indeed, as a cushion of excess 
resources, slack helps smoothing firm’s activities by acting as buffer against unexpected 
turbulences in the firm internal and external environment. Building on this logic, a few 
studies have recently suggested a link between slack and technological diversity within the 
firm. Greater diversification creates coordination problems among different projects 
competing for the same scarce organizational resources. In the absence of a cushion of 
excess resources to buffer these pressures, shared resources could become overextended and 
the costs of diversity may soon offset the benefits (Gary, 2005). The existence of slack 
within a firm acts as an internal ‘shock absorber’ that helps smoothing internal workflow, 
while reducing conflicts for internal resources. For example, in support of this function of 
slack Huang and Chen (2010) find that slack positively moderates the relation between 
technological diversification and innovation performance. Chen et al. (2013) show similar 
patterns but when firm financial performance is considered.  
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Extending this reasoning to the context of alliances I argue that slack can play a similar role 
when a firm simultaneously collaborates with a diverse pool of alliance partners. Greater 
portfolio diversity increases managerial complexity and may result in steeply rising work 
demands that overextend firm’s internal resources. Managers must devote more time, effort 
and investments to resolve conflicts among partners and coordinate their activities, while 
internal resources could be insufficient to put up with these escalating demands. Slack can be 
easily employed as a buffer to reduce these pressures. Indeed, from a behavioral perspective 
alliance partners bargain with each other and with other political coalitions inside the firm 
for internal scarce resources. A cushion of extra resources helps to appease these conflicts, 
by allowing each alliance to receive adequate resources and progress smoothly towards its 
own goals. Similarly, holding slack ensures greater resources are allocated to individual 
projects, which in turn reduces interdependencies (at least general interdependencies) and 
makes the portfolio less complex to manage (Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1974). Finally, 
firms with more internal resources at their disposal can invest more flexibly across the 
alliance portfolio and take advantage of new opportunities as they arise. 
These benefits notwithstanding, it is also important to acknowledge that portfolio diversity 
may exacerbate the dark side of slack if the employment of such resources is not disciplined 
properly. As slack increases, control systems could become lax and self-interested managers 
may grab a share of the uncommitted spoils to pursue their private goals (Jensen, 1986; Tan 
and Peng, 2003). The problem of loose control over slack resources is further exacerbated in 
a diversified portfolio of alliances because partner diversity makes portfolio activities 
difficult to understand and monitor. Thus, when the firm’s strategy involves collaborating 
with a highly diverse pool of partners managers should have even more room and incentives 
to divert slack (if present) away from productive uses within the portfolio and allocate it 
according to their private interests.  
Since slack could have opposing effects on a firm’s ability to manage partner diversity 
within the portfolio, I argue that its ultimate impact depends on the extent to which these 
resources are subject to misallocation by managers, and thus on the typology of slack 
considered. Low discretional financial slack in the form of unused borrowing capacity 
represents a potential source of new financial resources that could be easily allocated in 
order to enhance the alliance portfolio. At the same time this form of slack is less prone to 
being allocated inefficiently. When funds are raised through debt the firm comes under 
greater scrutiny by prospective investors. Moreover, since using low-discretion slack may 
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significantly impact a firm’s interest expense, performance, and stock price, managers will 
carefully scrutinize its allocation (Martinez & Artz, 2006). In support of these points several 
studies show that maintaining low discretion financial slack in the form of unused debt 
capacity helps firms sustaining their strategy. For instance, O’Brien (2003) finds that firms 
with more financial slack have higher R&D intensity and they are more successful in 
profiting from a strategy based on innovation. In a related vein, Simerly and Li (2000) find 
that firms operating in highly dynamic environment are more successful when they also keep 
a cushion of unused debt capacity. Arguably, these studies suggest that low discretion 
financial slack is beneficial as it can be carefully deployed even when the firm’ strategy 
makes managers resource allocation difficult to monitor (such as in the case of firms 
competing on the base of innovation or in rapidly changing environments). Therefore, in line 
with these studies, I argue that low discretion financial slack is more likely to be deployed 
effectively across the alliance portfolio, and that its overall effect is to magnify the positive 
effects of partner diversity while minimizing its costs. 
H1. Low discretion financial slack positively moderates the relationship between 
partner diversity and firm financial performance. 
While low discretion financial slack represents a more disciplined form of slack that can be 
effectively allocated across the alliance portfolio, this is not necessarily true also for high 
discretion financial slack. High discretion slack is easy to redeploy and thus more prone to 
inefficient allocation by self-interest managers well positioned within the firm to “grab a 
share of the uncommitted spoils” (Bourgeois, 1981). Moreover, the existence of abundant 
and readily available resources within the firm makes internal control systems more lax, 
while engendering managerial complacency (Tan and Peng, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986). For these reasons, the allocation of high discretion slack within the 
alliance portfolio may reflect managerial private preferences rather than economic and 
efficiency considerations. For instance, pet projects may not be discontinued or even attract 
more investments simply because there are enough resources and it is more difficult to 
justify termination (Bromiley, 1991; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Similarly, managers could 
divert slack toward alliances that build on their own competencies or reinforce their prestige 
and power within the corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These negative effects may 
be further exacerbated in an alliance portfolio as partner diversity could make alliance 
activities difficult to monitor and internal control systems could be less effective. Indeed, if 
portfolio activities are diversified across a variety of partners, each with very different 
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routines and processes, it is more difficult for the firm to monitor them and prevent 
managers’ inefficient investments. For these reasons, I argue that when partner diversity is 
high the escalating costs of high discretion slack may offset the potential benefits obtainable 
from its flexible allocation across the portfolio. Thus, although it may provide some benefits, 
I argue that the overall effect of high discretionary slack is to add to and magnify the costs of 
alliance portfolio diversity. 
H2. High discretion financial slack negatively moderates the relationship between 
partner diversity and firm financial performance. 
Thus far, it has been argued that the overall negative effect of high discretion financial slack 
is the result of the lax control over its allocation and the lower incentives managers have to 
use it to improve efficiency and firm value. However, if the firm put in place adequate 
mechanisms to control and discipline managers the negative effects of high discretion slack 
could be mitigated and potential benefits may emerge. I propose leverage (i.e. the opposite 
of low discretion slack availability) as one of such mechanisms.  
Debt financing introduces stricter rules within the firm because it forces managers to divert a 
larger portion of high discretion slack (such as cash reserves) in order to service debt 
payments. If the firm fails to meet its payment schedule, creditors step in and put the firm 
into bankruptcy with serious consequences also for managers who risk loosing their jobs. 
Hence, higher leverage implies more pressure on managers to improve efficiency in the 
allocation of resources and to enhance firm’s short-term viability. It is important to note that 
leverage and low discretional financial slack refer to the same construct. When a firm has 
higher leverage it has already used its borrowing capacity and has less low discretion slack at 
disposal to invest in the alliance portfolio. However, quite paradoxically, by reducing this 
form of slack the firm can bring about more discipline and enhance the allocation of high 
discretion slack for the same purpose. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that firms with 
higher debt burdens may carefully scrutinize the employment of high discretion slack, 
because the related agency costs may rapidly escalate in the presence of higher partner 
diversity and threaten firm’s survival. As a result, by combing high discretion slack with 
higher leverage (less low discretion slack) firms may find a reasonable trade-off between 
flexibility and control in the allocation of slack resources across the alliance portfolio, which 
in turns enhances their ability to manage partner diversity or, at least, mitigate the negative 
effect of high discretion slack that motivated my second hypothesis. In other words, because 
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of the discipline associated with debt financing, firms with limited low discretion financial 
slack should be better able to deploy high discretion slack effectively across the alliance 
portfolio in the presence of higher partner diversity. Therefore, I formulate the following: 
H3. A three-way interaction between partner diversity, HD slack, financial Leverage 
will positively affect firm financial performance. 
 
5.4. Research methods 
 
Data and sample 
In order to test the above hypotheses I focused on a sample of firms operating in the global 
automobile industry  (Jiang et al., 2010). In this sector, both the oil crisis of the seventies and 
the following advances in manufacturing processes by Japanese firms created industry-wide 
uncertainty that triggered the formation of alliances between US and European firms, and 
between Western and Japanese firms. As a result, since the eighties these firms have been 
characterized by extensive alliance activity and alliances have become a major driver of their 
financial performance (Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002). Also, the availability of financial 
resources is crucial in this industry, as recently exemplified by the effect of the global 
financial crisis on US automakers. For instance, in 2008 companies such as GM, Ford, and 
Chrysler were overwhelmed by substantial debt burdens and risked bankruptcy filing. The 
lack of immediate liquidity stimulated these firms to consider merging with other industry 
competitors to combine cash reserves and cut costs (New York Times, 2008), and prompted 
the government to approve a bail out program involving a loan of over $50 billions 
(Bloomberg, 2009). As a result, both the growing diffusion of alliances and the importance 
of financial health make the automobile industry an ideal context to test my theoretical 
arguments. 
I follow previous research and use standard industry classification in order to identify my 
sample. The starting population includes all firms with available records in Compustat and 
operating in industries with the following SIC codes that have been related to the automobile 
industry: 3711, 3713, 3714, 3715 and 3751 (Jiang et al., 2010). Following prior studies on 
the impact of alliance portfolios, I consider the firm-year as the unit of analysis and employ a 
five-years moving window to define a firm’s portfolio of active alliances (Lavie and Miller, 
2008; Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000). Accordingly, the study’s time frame spans over the years 
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1990-2006, with historical alliances tracked back to 1985 to incorporate information on 
active alliances in 1990. In addition, since the focus of the research is on the synergies and 
interdependencies among alliances rather than on their individual effects, I narrow my 
attention only to firms that have at least one alliance in their portfolio during the time span 
considered (Cui and O’Connore, 2012).  
I draw alliance data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database on mergers, 
acquisitions, and alliances. For each alliance, information was retrieved on partners’ name, 
SIC code, state of incorporation, activities involved in the alliance, geographical locations, 
and equity participation. The remaining financial and accounting data that were necessary 
were gathered from Compustat. Overall, 62 firms were identified that formed 802 individual 
alliances over the time span considered. After removing observations with occasionally 
missing values, the final dataset comprises 52 individual firms and 363 firm-year 
observations. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable. In order to assess the impact of alliance portfolio diversity on firm 
financial performance I follow previous studies and consider Profitability (ROA) as the main 
dependent variable (Lavie, 2008; Yamakawa et al. 2011). Return on assets is computed as 
the ratio of operating income before depreciation to the book value of assets (Cho and Pucik, 
2005). 
Independent variables. The main independent variables considered are partner diversity and 
slack. To measure partner diversity I follow extant research and refer to both the firm and its 
partners’ SIC industry codes (Cui et al, 2012; Jiang et al 2010). I consider five alliance 
categories: alliances with partners in the same 4-digits SIC code, alliances with partners in 
the same 3-digits SIC code, alliances with partners in the same 2-digits SIC code, alliances 
with partners in the same 1-digit SIC code, and alliances with partners sharing no SIC code 
with the firm. Accordingly, for ease of categorization, I split multi-partner alliances into 
single alliances involving just one partner. Then, for each firm, I assigned each alliance in 
the portfolio to one category and obtained the Partner diversity measure by computing the 
Blau index of diversity based on these categories (Blau, 1977): ! = 1 − ! !!!! , where D is 
the degree of diversity and !! represents the fraction of alliances falling into category i. This 
variable is bounded between 0 (an entirely homogeneous group) and 1 (an entirely 
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heterogeneous group). Finally, since the extent of diversity in part depends on the number of 
alliances in the portfolio, this measure is divided by the maximum degree of potential 
diversity based on portfolio size (Jiang et al. 2010). The use of Blau index in order to 
measure diversity is a well-established approach in alliance portfolio research (Jiang et al., 
2010; Mouri et al, 2011). 
To test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 I distinguish between two forms of financial slack, 
namely low discretion and high discretion slack. For High discretion (HD) Slack, I measure 
the ratio of a firm’s cash reserves over total assets (George, 2005). This is a broadly accepted 
proxy for discretionary slack, as cash reserves provide the firm the greatest freedom in 
allocating them to alternative purposes. Low discretion slack includes financial resources 
potentially available to the firm in the form of unused borrowing capacity (George, 2005; 
Bromiley, 1991, Tan and Peng, 2003). I measure low-discretion slack (LD Slack) by 
computing the firm’s level of financial leverage, defined as total debt over total market value 
of the firm (that is, total debt + total market value of outstanding shares) and to avoid 
misunderstanding I call this variable Leverage. Indeed, it is important to note that leverage is 
a proxy for the lack of low discretion slack. With higher leverage the firm is less able to raise 
additional debt to meet unfolding demands and thus has less low discretion slack at disposal 
to allocate. For this reason, increasing values of leverage indicate reduced levels of low 
discretion slack. Accordingly, by adopting this measure support for my first hypothesis, 
which predicts a positive interaction between low discretion slack and partner diversity, 
implies the opposite, that is, a negative moderating effect between leverage (i.e. the lack of 
low discretion slack) and partner diversity. This proxy is slightly different from those 
employed by previous studies that measured low discretion financial slack by computing a 
firm’s equity to debt ratio (George, 2005; Bromiley, 1991). Nonetheless, Leverage was 
highly (and negatively) correlated with such alternative measure and my results remain 
unchanged when equity to debt ratio is used in order to test the hypotheses. Moreover, since 
financial leverage is usually also a proxy for the extent of discipline brought about by debt 
financing (Jensen, 1986), I can use the variable Leverage also to test H3. 
Besides the main variables of interest I also control for several firm-level and portfolio-level 
variables that previous research linked with firm performance. In order to control for firm 
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size I compute the variable Size defined as the total number of a firm’s employees23 
(Yamakawa et al., 2011). In order to capture differences in profitability between younger and 
older firms I include the variable Age, computed as the number of years since a firm first 
appeared in Compustat24 (Majumdar, 1997). I control for the intensity of a firm’s investment 
in research activities with the variable R&D Intensity, computed as the ratio of R&D 
expenses over total assets (O’Brien 2003; Lavie and Miller, 2008). The variable Tangibles 
controls for the ratio of firm tangible assets over total assets (O’Brien 2003). I also 
controlled for firm Capital intensity by including the ratio of firm total assets to total sales 
(O’Brien, 2003). Several studies suggest that the size of a firm’s alliance portfolio is a major 
determinant of its financial performance. Accordingly, I control for Portfolio Size, calculated 
as the number of alliances formed by the firm during the last five years (Cui et al. 2012). To 
control for alliance governance form I defined the variable Equity alliances, as the 
percentage of equity-based alliances in the portfolio (Lavie and Miller, 2008). I included the 
variable Foreign partners, computed as the percentage of alliance partners from foreign 
countries, to capture the extent to which a firm forms alliances with international partners 
(Lavie and Miller, 2008). Further, I controlled for the extent to which a firm forms alliances 
in unrelated activities, i.e. those in industries different from the focal firm’s primary 
business, as these alliances proxy its orientation towards exploration (Tong, Reuer and Peng 
2008). Accordingly, I computed the variable Unrelated Alliances as the ratio of a firm’s 
unrelated alliances over total portfolio alliances, based on available firm 4-digits SIC codes 
(Cui et al., 2012). The remaining firm-level heterogeneity is accounted for by including firm 
fixed effects, while time trends are controlled by a set of year dummies. 
 
Empirical model 
As a firm’s decision to form alliances derives from firm-specific and industry-specific 
attributes, portfolio diversity strategies are self-selected (Lavie, 2008; Yamakawa et al. 
2011). For this reason, models failing to account for such bias could lead to erroneous 
conclusions. In this vein, extant research suggests that the propensity to form alliances across 
different industries may depend not only on the industry in which a firm operates, but also 
                                                
23 Actually, these studies take the logarithm of the total number of employees to reduce skewness. 
However, undertaking such transformation of the data resulted in serious multicollinearity problems 
in my analysis. Accordingly, I addressed the problem by winsorizing the variable. 
24 This definition is in line with studies suggesting that the most meaningful measures of age is the 
number of years since listing, given the economic significance of this event (Shumway, 2001) 
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on the its technological, financial, and social resources (Lavie and Miller, 2008). For 
instance, Duysters et al. (2011) find that alliance portfolios of highly innovative firms tend to 
be broader in terms of partner types and international breadth, as compared to those of less 
innovative firms. Similarly, Lavie (2008) shows that overall alliance experience may 
facilitate the formation of alliances with partners from different industries or geographical 
contexts. In my research context this argument implies that firms falling in my final sample 
may differ from other firms in the industry based on unobservables, and that my results may 
simply reflect this bias. Accordingly, I follow previous research and adopt a two-stage 
approach in order to handle self-selection during the analysis (Lavie and Miller, 2008; 
Yamakawa, 2011).  
In the first stage I use a probit model to analyze the antecedents of alliance portfolio 
formation. In this stage the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether or not 
a firm has a portfolio of alliances at time t, and it is thus included in our final sample. This 
binary choice variable takes the value of one when a firm has formed at least one alliance 
during the last five years, and is equal to zero otherwise. Control variables include Firm size, 
R&D intensity, Leverage, and a measure of a firm experience in alliance formation defined 
as the total number of alliance formed by a firm up to a given year (Alliance Experience) 
(Lavie and Miller, 2008). Time and industry effects are controlled for by including a set of 
year and industry dummies defined by 4-digits SIC codes, while controlling for the panel 
structure of the dataset. In the second stage, I use firm financial performance as dependent 
variable and include the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first stage as a control, in order to 
account for the effects of self-selection (Heckman, 1979).  
Similarly to previous studies, I implement the second stage by using a fixed effect regression 
model (Lavie, 2007; Lavie 2008). Fixed effects were deemed superior to random effect, as 
indicated by a Hausman test, which rejected the null hypothesis that coefficient estimates do 
not differ significantly across the two models (p<0.001). Year fixed effects were included in 
all models to control for time trends. All independent variables were lagged one year, that is, 
I model a firm financial performance at time t as a function of independent time-varying 
covariates computed at time t-1 (Lavie and Miller, 2008). In order to test hypotheses 1-2 on 
the moderating effect of slack resources I add to the baseline model the interactions between 
the variable Partner diversity and the variables Leverage and HD Slack respectively, while a 
three-way interaction between all these variables is added to test hypothesis 3. The following 
regression equation representing the full model was estimated: 
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where !! indicates the intercept, !! is the firm fixed effect, !!!!"!!   represents the impact of 
all other control variables, and !!" is the error term. 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the main variables. Firms 
in the final sample have been profitable over the span of time considered with an average 
ROA of ten percent. The average firm formed roughly 8 alliances during the last five years 
with only 15 percent of these alliances including R&D activities. On the other hand, 38 
percent of alliances in firms’ portfolios involve foreign partners, and more than a half 
includes activities in unrelated industries or some form of equity investment (51 percent and 
54 percent, respectively). Finally, sample firms make extensive use of debt financing 
(average leverage is 0.4) and also retain significant reserve of HD slack (average HD slack is 
0.09 percent). Correlations are relatively low with a few exceptions. For instance, Portfolio 
size shows a strong positive correlation with firm’s Size (ρ=0.72), suggesting that larger 
firms are also those possessing extensive alliance portfolios. In addition, there is a positive 
correlation between the percentage of equity alliances and the percentage of foreign partners 
in the portfolio (ρ=-0.57), indicating that firms resort to the additional protection of equity-
based governance structures when their alliance portfolio is internationalized. Nonetheless, 
as indicated by multicollinearity statistics, such correlations do not impact my estimates 
significantly. In this regard, some of estimated empirical models reported VIFs beyond the 
maximum acceptable threshold, raising potential concerns about multicollinearity. However, 
this does not represent an issue in my analysis because these values can be ascribed to 
multiple occurrences of the main effects (Partner Diversity, Leverage and HD Slack) in the 
explanatory variables, and thus fall to acceptable levels once the interaction terms are 
dropped from the model. Moreover, both in the full and partial models, VIFs drop to 
acceptable levels (less than 10) once main effects and interactions are demeaned, leaving 
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estimated coefficients for the main variables of interest unchanged. Besides these variables, 
the remaining values of VIF suggest no further concerns about multicollinearity. 
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Table 11. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Profitability 0.10 0.17 1.00 
            
(2) Age 5.19 4.50 -0.01 1.00 
           
(3) Size 95.21 153.49 -0.03 0.24 1.00 
          
(4) Tangibles 0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.03 1.00 
         
(5) Capital Intensity 1.03 0.57 -0.49 0.26 0.35 -0.03 1.00 
        
(6) R&D Intensity 0.04 0.05 -0.74 -0.07 -0.07 0.18 0.25 1.00 
       
(7) Leverage 0.40 0.27 -0.06 0.17 0.55 -0.21 0.25 -0.26 1.00 
      
(8) HD Slack 0.09 0.10 -0.29 0.03 -0.11 0.08 0.46 0.34 -0.37 1.00 
     
(9) Portfolio Size 7.83 10.70 -0.03 0.41 0.72 0.02 0.32 0.02 0.38 -0.10 1.00 
    
(10) R&D Alliances 0.15 0.24 -0.21 -0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.33 0.03 -0.06 0.19 1.00 
   
(11) Foreign Alliances 0.38 0.35 -0.11 0.08 0.01 -0.10 0.06 0.11 -0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07 1.00 
  
(12) Unrelated Alliances 0.51 0.37 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.03 -0.20 0.27 1.00 
 
(13) Equity Alliances 0.54 0.35 0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.11 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.57 -0.36 1.00 
(14) Partner diversity 0.52 0.41 -0.03 0.27 0.38 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.26 -0.08 0.45 0.10 -0.16 0.01 0.14 
N=363
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5.5. Results 
In the sake of space I do not report results from the first stage probit model predicting 
whether a firm has an alliance portfolio in a given year or not. Nonetheless, results from this 
model mirror those of previous studies (Lavie, 2007) and show that firms with greater size 
and alliance experience are those more likely to have a portfolio of alliances. On the other 
hand, coefficients on industry dummies are not statistically significant, suggesting these 
factors do not play an important role as antecedents of alliance portfolio partner diversity for 
firms in my sample.  
Table 2 reports results from the second stage fixed effect regression model. Model 1 
represents the baseline model and includes control variables as well as the main effect of 
interest (i.e. Partner Diversity, Leverage, HD Slack). In this model leverage and profitability 
are negatively related, in line with most findings in capital structure literature (O’Brien, 
2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001), while high discretionary slack seems to have no effect. 
Similarly, in line with previous empirical studies, I find a negative impact of partner 
diversity on firm performance (Mouri et al. 2011, Goerzen and Beamish 2005; Jiang et al., 
2010), suggesting that firms appear to experience problems in managing this aspect of their 
alliance portfolio strategy.  
H1 and H2 propose that the relationship between partner diversity and financial performance 
will be moderated by the availability of financial slack. In particular, firms with lower 
leverage (higher low discretion slack at disposal) should be better positioned to buffer the 
costs of diversity while preventing managers from using these resources for inefficient 
investments. On the opposite, high discretion slack, although potentially beneficial, is more 
easily redeployable by self-interested mangers, who may invest it inefficiently across a 
diversified pool of alliance partners. Accordingly, while the availability of low discretion 
financial slack should positively moderate the impact of partner diversity on firm 
performance, high discretion slack should have the opposite effect. Results from Model 2-4 
provide support for these predictions. In Model 2 and Model 3 I enter the proposed two-way 
interactions separately, while in Model 3 I test their significance jointly. Results from Model 
3 confirm that there is a negative interaction between the variables Leverage and Partner 
diversity with respect to firm performance (β= -0.173, p-value<0.001), thus suggesting that 
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maintaining lower leverage helps firms preserving a cushion of potential resources to deal 
with alliance portfolio diversity. Conversely, the negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction between Partner diversity and HD Slack (β= -0.471, p-value<0.001) confirms 
that high discretionary resources tend to be invested inefficiently when higher partner 
diversity makes alliance activities difficult to monitor. 
Finally, in the full model (Model 5) I test hypothesis 3, which predicts a positive three-way 
interaction between the variables Partner diversity, HD Slack, and Leverage. Indeed, 
although HD slack may breed inefficiencies, firms could curb this tendency by adopting 
proper corporate governance tools, for example by increasing financial leverage, i.e. 
reducing low discretion slack (Jensen, 1986). In line with this prediction, the coefficient on 
the three-way interaction term is positive and highly significant (β= 1.133, p-value<0.05). 
Also, all the proposed interactions remain significant when tested jointly. In addition, while 
in Model 1 Partner diversity had a negative effect, this effect turns out to be positive after 
the moderating role of financial slack is considered in the full model (β= 0.09, p-
value<0.001). This suggests that for firms with no HD slack (i.e. when HD Slack is zero) and 
highest low discretion slack at their disposal (i.e. leverage equal to zero) partner diversity 
increases profitability, consistently with my predictions. Similarly, the variable HD slack has 
a positive and significant effect in Model 3-5, while having no significant effect in the other 
models, thus indicating that the flexibility provided by highly discretionary slack is valuable 
only when partner diversity is zero and alliance activities are easier to monitor. For ease of 
interpretation, figures 1-4 graph the estimated interactions on the basis of the results from the 
full model. In Figure 1 I represent the relationship between partner diversity and profitability 
for low leverage and high leverage firms, respectively. The y-axis reports predicted values of 
the dependent variable, while the x-axis reports observed values of partner diversity. High 
leverage firms are defined as those with leverage equal to 0.65, while for low leverage firms 
leverage equals to 0.11. All other controls are held constant at their mean. Similarly, in 
figure 2 I graph the relation between profitability and partner diversity for firms with high 
and low levels of HD Slack, respectively (HD slack equals to 0 and 0.3, respectively). Both 
figures support my previous findings and show that diversity enhances financial performance 
only for firms with low HD Slack or low leverage. In figure 3-4 I graph the three-way 
interaction between Partner diversity, HD slack and Leverage. Figure 3 shows the impact of 
diversity on performance for low leverage and high leverage firms respectively, but when 
HD slack is low. Figure 4 similarly shows the impact of diversity on performance for low 
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leverage and high leverage firms and when HD slack is high. These figures again suggest 
that increasing leverage does not help a firm managing diversity when HD Slack is equal to 
zero, as the associated discipline is not needed and financial resources at disposal would be 
insufficient (that is, the firm would have both little high discretion and low discretion slack 
at disposal). Conversely, increasing leverage enhances a firm’s ability to manage diversity 
when the firm has already accumulated substantial high discretion slack, providing support 
for the disciplining role of leverage with respect to the allocation of high discretion slack 
within the alliance portfolio. 
 As far as control variables are concerned, the variable Inverse Mill’s Ratio has a significant 
and positive effect in all models. This result suggests that selection bias could have affected 
the estimates if not properly controlled for, as firms possessing a portfolio of alliances also 
seem to be significantly more profitable than firms who do not. Most of the year dummies 
also show a significant effect, although these coefficients are not report for matters of space. 
All other controls report coefficients with the expected signs but that are not statistically 
significant. For instance, in line with other studies the variable Capital Intensity is negatively 
related to financial performance (O’Brien, 2003), but it is statistically significant only in 
model 1 and 2. Similarly, the variable Unrelated Alliances has a negative effect, but it is 
statistically significant only in models 3 and 4 (Cui and O’Connor, 2012). All other controls 
have insignificant coefficient in all estimated models. 
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Table 12. Second stage fixed effect regression model. The dependent variable is firm return 
on assets at time t (ROA). All independent variables are lagged by one year. 
  Controls: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.00128 0.00173 0.00127 0.00193 0.00176 
 (0.00176) (0.00175) (0.00172) (0.00169) (0.00170) 
Size -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00006 
 (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) 
Tangibles -0.0240 -0.0490 -0.0414 -0.0841 -0.0862 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.118) (0.115) (0.115) 
Capital Intensity -0.0226* -0.0220* -0.0159 -0.0129 -0.0170 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
R&D Intensity -0.270 -0.284 -0.0539 -0.00638 0.0281 
 (0.184) (0.182) (0.190) (0.186) (0.186) 
Portfolio Size -0.00083 -0.00091 -0.00065 -0.00073 -0.00058 
 (0.00091) (0.00090) (0.00089) (0.00087) (0.00089) 
R&D Alliances 0.00922 0.0128 0.0161 0.0236 0.0126 
 (0.0306) (0.0303) (0.0300) (0.0293) (0.0294) 
Foreign Alliances 0.0195 0.0254 0.0162 0.0239 0.0195 
 (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0177) 
Unrelated Alliances -0.0184 -0.0180 -0.0239+ -0.0252+ -0.0178 
 (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0141) 
Equity Alliances 0.00399 0.00672 -0.00387 -0.00228 -0.00405 
 (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0190) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.0391** 0.0431** 0.0319* 0.0355** 0.0280* 
 (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0132) 
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  Main independent variables:      
LD Slack -0.0759** -0.0305 -0.0768** -0.00950 0.0334 
 (0.0283) (0.0327) (0.0278) (0.0319) (0.0370) 
HD Slack 0.0462 0.0441 0.203* 0.249** 0.353*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0733) (0.0846) (0.0833) (0.0926) 
Partner diversity -0.0262* 0.0166 0.00834 0.0830*** 0.0924*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0204) (0.0158) (0.0243) (0.0250) 
Partner diversity x Leverage  -0.116**  -0.173*** -0.237*** 
  (0.0433)  (0.0435) (0.0518) 
Partner diversity x HD Slack   -0.358*** -0.471*** -0.606*** 
   (0.0997) (0.101) (0.121) 
HD Slack x LD Slack     -1.050* 
     (0.435) 
Partner diversity x HD Slack x 
LD Slack 
    1.133* 
     (0.445) 
Constant 0.123** 0.109** 0.108** 0.0829* 0.0977** 
 (0.0372) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0363) (0.0364) 
N 363 363 363 363 363 
R2 0.254 0.273 0.287 0.324 0.341 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Interaction between low discretion slack and partner diversity 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Interaction between high discretion slack and partner diversity 
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Figure 3. Interaction between diversity and leverage when HD Slack is low (0.0) 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between diversity and leverage when HD Slack is high (0.3) 
 
 
5.6. Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter analyzes how the presence of internal resources in the form of financial slack 
influences the relation between alliance portfolio partner diversity and firm financial 
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helps the firm to reach a broader pool of resources while accessing different sources of 
knowledge and information (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). On the other hand, coordinating a 
diverse pool of partners is a complex task and may result in steeply rising work demands that 
outstrip a firm’s available internal resources (Gary, 2005; Jiang et al., 2010; Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2005). Accordingly, in this chapter I propose that the availability of a cushion of 
excess resources in the form of financial slack is a critical factor to consider when studying 
the performance implications of partner diversity.  
Building on organization theory and economic theory, it has been argued that the presence of 
slack within a firm acts either to buffer or to exacerbate the issues related to partner 
diversity. Economic theory suggests that the availability of slack may relax resource 
constraints and engender managerial complacency, thus reducing managers’ incentives to 
allocate resources efficiently across the alliance portfolio. On the other hand, organization 
theory points out slack may hold various benefits in the context of a diversified alliance 
portfolio by acting as a buffer for conflicts resolution and for facilitating coordination 
between alliances. In order to reconcile these opposing views, I propose that the ultimate 
impact of financial slack will depend on the extent of discretion over its use by managers. 
Low-discretion financial slack in the form of unused borrowing capacity provides a stock of 
potential resources that facilitate the management of diversity within the portfolio, while 
being less subject to misallocation by managers because of tighter control from external 
investors. High discretion slack (in the form of cash reserves) has the opposite effect, 
because, while it may provide similar advantages, it is more prone to inefficient allocation 
especially when higher partner diversity makes alliance activities difficult to monitor. 
Nonetheless, I also propose that managers’ tendency to inefficiently invest high discretion 
slack across the alliance portfolio could be mitigated in the presence of appropriate 
governance mechanisms, such as higher financial leverage. Indeed, while higher leverage 
implies reduced low discretion slack at disposal, it also disciplines managers by curbing their 
tendency to over-invest readily available cash reserves. As a result, firms could combine 
higher reserves of discretionary slack with higher levels of leverage in order to obtain an 
optimal trade off between flexibility and discipline in the management of diversity within the 
alliance portfolio. 
Results from an empirical analysis conducted on a sample of firms operating in the 
automobile industry provide large support for the above predictions and show that slack 
resources critically moderate the relation between partner diversity and firm financial 
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performance. Consistently with the benefits associated with low discretion financial slack, I 
find that financial leverage (which is synonymous of reduced low discretion slack) 
negatively moderates the relationship between partner diversity and profitability. 
Conversely, I find that high discretion financial slack has a negative moderating effect, thus 
suggesting that in the context of a diversified alliance portfolio the agency costs associated 
with this form of slack outweigh the associated benefits. Finally, I also find evidence of a 
positive three-way-interaction between diversity, leverage and high discretion slack, which 
supports the view that the negative effects of high discretion slack are somewhat curbed in 
the presence of the discipline implied by debt financing. 
These findings have interesting implications for extant research. From the perspective of 
alliance literature, this chapter adds to research calling for a contingency perspective on the 
study of alliance portfolio characteristics (Oerlemans et al., 2013, Duysters et al., 2012). 
These studies suggest that, as a result of different resource endowments and capabilities, 
firms may differ in their ability to extract value from their alliance portfolios. Accordingly, 
they analyze how factors such as alliance experience, dedicated functional roles, technology 
management tool or environmental factors (such as market uncertainty) moderate the impact 
of portfolio characteristics on various firm outcomes (Cui and O’Connor, 2012; Oerlemans 
et al., 2013, Duysters et al., 2012). The analysis of this chapter adds to this stream by 
proposing another important moderating factor, namely financial slack, in the study of the 
relationship between alliance portfolio partner diversity and firm financial performance.  
The results also have some implications for slack literature. Extant research has analyzed 
slack by looking exclusively at the consequences it holds within firm boundaries. For 
instance, various studies find that slack significantly impacts a firm ability to make and 
sustain risky investments that would not be approved in the face of scarcity, such as 
investment in R&D (Norhia and Gulati, 1996), internationalization (Lin et al., 2009) and 
technological diversification (Huang and Chen, 2010).  I add to this stream of literature by 
showing that slack has critical consequences with respect to the firm relationship with 
important external stakeholders, such as alliance partners. The theoretical arguments 
developed also unravel important distinct mechanisms through which different forms of 
slack influence firm relations with alliance partners. My findings suggest that, while low 
discretionary financial slack provides a cushion of additional resources that helps firms 
managing partner diversity, high discretionary slack has the opposite effect, arguably 
because self-interested managers could more easily invest it inefficiently in the alliance 
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portfolio. Thus, these insights also contribute to recent studies calling for a contingency 
perspective on the role of different slack types, by proposing important differences between 
high discretion and low discretion slack in the context of alliance portfolio management (Tan 
and Peng, 2003; George, 2005). 
Finally, the research conducted in this chapter also has interesting managerial implications as 
it highlights the importance of managerial decision-making in the context of alliance 
portfolio management. While previous studies analyzed the direct effects of partner diversity 
and extensively outlined its various benefits and costs, they paid relatively little attention to 
the question of whether and how mangers could actively influence the implementation of 
such a strategy.  My analysis addresses this gap and suggests that financial decisions such as 
capital structure or cash policies can make the difference in the context of a diversified pool 
of alliance partners. 
In summary, the empirical evidence provided sheds light on the role of organizational slack 
in the context of alliance portfolio management. Nonetheless, the analysis conducted has 
some important limitations that also constitute potential avenues of future research. First, I 
concentrate on a sample of firms operating in the automobile industry, thus raising concerns 
about the external validity of the findings. Future research may empirically test the validity 
of the proposed arguments in other industry contexts characterized by extensive alliancing 
activity. Second, the analysis focuses only on financial slack and distinguishes slack types 
according to the extent of discretion over their use. However, also other forms of slack exist 
(such as slack absorbed in the form of human resources and skills) that have different 
characteristics and may differently impact the relationship between alliance portfolio partner 
diversity and firm financial performance. Similarly, while I focus on partner diversity, there 
are also other relevant characteristics of alliance portfolios whose impact on various firm 
outcomes may be critically moderated by the presence of slack resources (for instance 
portfolio internationalization or functional diversity). Future research could address these 
points and extend my approach by analyzing the contingent role of other forms of slack with 
respect to different dimensions of alliance portfolio and their impact on various firm’s 
outcomes not limited to financial performance. 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1. Summary and main findings 
Alliances provide the firm with access to valuable resources and capabilities possessed by 
others, yet which are fundamental to create a competitive advantage. However, these 
collaborations are also prone to the risk of unplanned termination, which is further magnified 
when the partner faces looming bankruptcy or just experiences financial difficulties. 
Accordingly, besides resources considerations another important aspect of alliances is 
partner’s financial condition, along with the implied risk for the stability of the alliance. In 
this thesis I explore this intuition by investigating the interplay between a firm’s capital 
structure and its alliance activity. Capital structure directly influences a firm’s exposure to 
the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress, and thus it should be a relevant concern for 
prospective partner willing to collaborate. Nonetheless, extant literatures on both alliances 
and capital structure have, buy and large, developed independently leaving a gap in our 
understanding about the risk implications of corporate financing policies in the context of 
alliances. This lack of knowledge motivated the attempt of the present research to 
consistently integrate the two fields in order to enhance our understanding of both alliances 
and capital structure decisions. 
The research is divided into four main phases. In the first phase, an in depth literature review 
of both alliance and capital structure research is conducted which suggests a lack of cross-
fertilization between the two fields. Alliance research has looked at the importance of partner 
financial condition, but only through the perspective of resources while ignoring the risk 
implications of financial policies. Conversely, although capital structure research extensively 
acknowledges the consequences that a firm’s capital structure holds for its relationships with 
external stakeholders, these arguments have never been extended to alliance partners. 
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Accordingly, in this first phase of the thesis I set the stage of the research by pointing out the 
need to consistently integrate these research streams. 
In the second phase, I analyze the impact that strategic alliance formation exerts on a firm 
capital structure. The main argument developed is that, since liquidation can impose 
substantial costs on alliance partners, these stakeholders will be reluctant to undertake R-S 
investments when their counter-parts is highly levered. Thus, as managers generally 
acknowledge the pitfalls of forming alliances with financially weak firms, they will reduce 
leverage ex-ante whenever inducing investments from alliance partners is important. The 
empirical analysis conducted corroborates this argument and shows that firms forming 
alliances indeed tend to adopt lower levels of leverage. Moreover, it shows that this impact 
depends on the characteristics of the alliances considered (such as the typology of activities 
and partners involved in the collaboration), as these factors can exacerbate the hazards 
related to partner’s leverage. 
In the third phase, I analyze the inverse causal link, that is, I investigate how capital structure 
decisions, once taken, impact on a firm’s alliance strategy. In Chapter 4 I show that financial 
health and leverage are important considerations in selecting alliance partners. More 
specifically, I argue that highly levered partners are less attractive in the context of an 
alliance for multiple reasons. First, highly leveraged partners are more prone to liquidation 
and bankruptcy risks, and thus they expose the alliance (and all investments involved) to the 
threat of unplanned termination, potentially even despite the firm’s best intentions. Second, I 
also argue that even when liquidation is not imminent, highly levered firms have incentives 
to ‘default’ on their partners’ implicit claims and reduce efforts towards the alliance. Finally, 
a high leverage firm facing financial distress may threaten to prematurely terminate an 
alliance in order to obtain more favorable terms. Rational firms will anticipate these risks 
and hence will evaluate each other’s level of leverage when structuring transactions in the 
market for collaboration. Empirical evidence from a large sample of alliances largely 
corroborates these arguments and confirms a strong link between a firm leverage and the 
characteristics of the alliances it forms. A ‘double sided matching’ of leverage levels 
emerges, whereby more attractive low leverage firms partner with other low leverage firms, 
and less attractive high leverage firms seem to be constrained to partner with other high 
leverage firms. Similarly, I also find that highly levered firms tend to ally with relatively 
lower quality counter-parts, again consistently with my argument that the formers are 
perceived as being less attractive. A second set of results in this chapter also supports the 
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existence of a link between capital structure and the choice of alliance governance. In this 
regard, I find that leverage increases the probability of an alliance being structured as a JV, 
and that JVs appear to be more likely also in the presence of greater difference among 
partners’ leverage. These findings suggest that JVs represent an ex post contractual solution 
to the hazards posed by high leverage firms. 
Finally, in fourth phase (Chapter 5) I explore the importance of capital structure during the 
implementation and coordination of an alliance portfolio strategy. Here, I suggest that capital 
structure is a critical determinant of a firm’s low discretion slack and, as such, it impacts its 
ability to invest properly in order to sustain its alliance portfolio strategy. More specifically, 
I argue that by keeping leverage low firms can preserve a cushion of potentially available 
financial resources to buffer the pressures and heavy coordination costs implied by higher 
partner diversity in their portfolio. Conversely, accumulating high discretion financial 
resources (in the form of cash or equivalents) does not provide the same benefits because 
these resources are more prone to misallocation by self interested managers, especially when 
higher partner diversity makes alliance activities more difficult to monitor. An empirical 
analysis conducted on a sample of firms in the automobile industry confirms these 
predictions and shows that financial slack moderates the relationship between alliance 
portfolio diversity and firm financial performance. More specifically, while low discretion 
slack (i.e. low leverage) positively moderates this relation, high discretion slack has the 
opposite effect. In addition, this negative tendency is curbed when higher levels of 
discretionary slack are combined with the discipline brought about by higher leverage. 
 
6.2. Theoretical contributions 
Generally speaking, the overall findings of this research document a strong interplay 
between corporate financing decisions and strategic alliance decisions. More specifically, 
they support the view that capital structure decisions represent a relevant aspect to consider 
during the entire strategic alliance making process, from the very first step of partner 
selection, to the planned coordination and management of the relationships formed. 
Accordingly, a reciprocal relation emerges wherein capital structure and alliance activity are 
jointly determined. On the one hand, the risk and resource implications of a firm’s capital 
structure influence its ability to deal with alliance partners. On the other hand, managers also 
have incentives to anticipate these considerations ex-ante and incorporate them in their 
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financing decisions. Thus, from this standpoint my thesis contributes to the growing and 
important stream of research pointing out a reciprocal link between corporate finance and 
corporate strategy (Parson and Titman, 2007). 
The research conducted in the previous chapters has focused on different aspects of the 
alliance making process across different unit of analyses (capital structure determination, 
partner selection, alliance governance choice, alliance portfolio management), thus 
integrating finance and alliance research from a variety of perspectives. Accordingly, I will 
discuss the major contributions of each chapter separately (except for chapter 1 and 2 that 
just set the research context and motivations for the research) in order to better highlight the 
new insights provided with respect to the different streams analyzed. 
The findings of chapter 3 support the view that firms forming alliances maintain lower 
leverage arguably in order to induce investments from their alliance partners. This result has 
important implications for finance research. While extant literature provides evidence that 
firms tend to reduce leverage whenever inducing R-S investments from external stakeholders 
is important, these studies have only focused on the role of customers, suppliers and 
employees in shaping a firm’s capital structure. I contribute to this stream of research by 
showing that another important stakeholders group cares about a firm’s financing policy, 
namely alliance partners. I show that firms take into account costs imposed on alliance 
partners when setting their leverage and that these costs depend on alliance characteristics 
and the characteristics of the alliance partners. These results are noteworthy as they suggest 
that in a world where inter-firm collaborations are increasingly popular, alliances and their 
characteristics should be considered when establishing corporate financing policies.  
The results of this chapter also contribute to alliance literature. Extant research in this area 
suggests that firms adopt contractual solutions to mitigate hazards and to induce investments 
involved in alliances. Accordingly, the main take-away from this body of works is that 
attributes of the transaction, rather than firm-level factors, influence the hazards implied by 
R-S assets (Billitteri et al., 2013). My analysis advances this perspective by showing that 
capital structure decisions are critical in preserving partners’ incentive to invest in alliances. 
This finding is interesting as it shows that incentives to undertake R-S investments at the 
alliance level can be important in determining corporate financing policies at the firm level. 
The analysis conducted in chapter 4 has shown that financial health and leverage are 
important considerations in selecting alliance partners as well as in choosing the appropriate 
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governance form for the alliance. These findings contribute to alliance research in many 
ways. First, extant literature on partner selection has suggested that firms select partners 
based on resource considerations. My results complement this view by showing that partner 
attractiveness is not determined exclusively by its resource endowments but also by its 
financial health (and the implied risks), as firms appear to take into account both aspects 
when scanning for potential partners.  
Second, the findings also contribute to research analyzing alliance governance. Scholars in 
this stream have usually built on TCE and explained governance choices by looking mainly 
at appropriability hazards arising from transaction characteristics (e.g. Pisano, 1989). My 
analysis calls for a broader view by showing that some exchange hazards may also arise 
from firm-level characteristics such as leverage, which may lead to the adoption of equity 
governance. In particular, from a transaction cost view, my findings suggest that leverage is 
a critical source of relational uncertainty at the transaction level. Also, from a real options 
perspective, the results provide additional insight into the ‘dueling options’ often inherent in 
the tradeoff between flexibility and commitment (Folta and O’Brien, 2004). According to 
real options logic, firms value flexibility when faced with high uncertainty and they prefer 
less hierarchical governance modes in order to avoid the opportunity costs of irreversible 
investments in a shared venture. In contrast with this view, my analysis suggests that firms 
may be willing to commit to a more hierarchical form when faced with uncertainty arising 
from a partner’s bankruptcy risks. Indeed, although this sacrifices the deferment option, it 
also provides the low leverage firm with the option to take on the venture in the event of 
unplanned termination by the partner. 
Third, the findings provided about the link between capital structure and alliance governance 
are also important to finance research. Stakeholder theories of capital structure point out that 
high leverage makes firms less attractive transacting partners without suggesting any ex post 
mechanisms to mitigate concerns related to capital structure decisions. In this respect, my 
study has important implications because it proposes governance structures as an ex post 
contractual solution to such a situation, as leveraged firms can adopt equity in order to 
support their exchanges in the face of termination risks. Thus, equity-based governance 
induces relation specific investments not only by aligning incentives through shared surplus, 
but also by providing an enforceable mechanism to mitigate the hazards posed by high 
leverage partners. 
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In chapter 5, I focus on the interplay between a firm’s level of financial slack and its alliance 
portfolio strategy in determining financial performance. Here, I suggest that: (i) by keeping 
leverage low firms preserve a cushion of potential resources (in the form of unused 
borrowing capacity) to buffer the costs of partner diversity and thus improve their ability to 
profit from their alliance portfolio strategy; and (ii) that easily redeployable financial 
resource (in the form of cash) do not provide such a benefit. These findings contribute to the 
recent contingency view on alliance portfolios, which suggests that, due to different resource 
endowments, not all firms should benefit to the same extent from portfolio diversity. The 
evidence provided adds to this stream by proposing another important moderating factor, 
namely financial slack, in the study of the relationship between alliance portfolio partner 
diversity and firm financial performance.  
The results also have some implications for slack literature. Extant research has analyzed 
slack by looking exclusively at the consequences it holds within firm boundaries, such as in 
the context of innovation. My research add to this stream by showing that slack has critical 
consequences also with respect to the firm relationship with important external stakeholders, 
such as alliance partners. Moreover, the theoretical arguments developed in the chapter also 
unravel important distinct mechanisms through which different forms of slack influence firm 
relations with alliance partners. From this standpoint, the insights provided contribute to 
recent studies calling for a contingency perspective on the role of slack and discuss 
important differences between high discretion and low discretion slack in the context of 
alliance portfolio management. 
 
6.3. Managerial implications 
The evidence provided in this research has further important implications for managers.  
Overall, the analyses conducted suggest that in a world where firm boundaries are becoming 
increasingly fuzzy managers should be aware of the profound consequences of firm financial 
health for its relations with external alliance partners and embody these considerations in 
their decision making process. First, the results suggest that CFOs should incorporate the 
concerns of prospective as well as present alliance partners when setting corporate financing 
policies. Indeed, by adopting conservative financing policies (such as by keeping leverage 
low) a firm can enhance the stability of its alliances, while inducing R-S investments and 
extracting better terms from alliance partners. Accordingly, a consistent matching between 
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the firm’s financial and its alliance strategy can represent a source of competitive advantage 
over competitors pursuing similar objectives. 
Second, the research also speaks to CEOs or other managers in charge of defining a firm’s 
alliance strategy. In this respect, my findings stress the importance of evaluating the 
attractiveness of prospective partners not only on the basis of the resources they possess, but 
also by gauging their financial health and the implied risks for the successful achievement of 
alliance goals. Equally interestingly, my research proposes that managers should consider 
partners’ financial condition also when negotiating and structuring an alliance in order to 
deal with the implied risks through proper contractual solutions (such as by resorting to an 
equity JV). 
Finally, my findings show the importance of managers’ active decision making in the 
context of alliance portfolio management. Extant research stresses the implications of partner 
diversity for firm financial performance, without discussing what managers could do in order 
to better handle this aspect of their alliance portfolio strategy. In this respect, my findings 
have important implications as they suggest that managers can play a critical role by setting 
adequate policies in terms of capital structure. Indeed, by keeping leverage low managers 
can make sure that a cushion of potential financial resources will be available to facilitate the 
coordination of alliances in the portfolio. In contrast, by increasing leverage managers 
reduce such buffer of resources, but enhance the discipline through which more liquid and 
easily redeployable financial resources (such as cash reserves) can be disposed across the 
alliance portfolio. Overall, these considerations suggest that CEOs, CFOs and alliance 
managers should closely coordinate their decisions in order to ensure a consistent alignment 
between the firm overall alliance strategy and its corporate financing policy.  
 
6.4. Future research directions 
Although it makes several important contributions to different research fields, this research 
has also some limitations, which represent also potential avenues for future research. First, 
from a methodological standpoint probably the most critical aspect of the analysis is the 
problem of reverse causality between capital structure and alliance activity. I propose that 
financing decisions may well reflect alliance partners concerns and thus a firm capital 
structure could be the result of its alliance strategy. However, also the opposite is arguably 
true, as I show that capital structure decisions similarly constrain several aspects of a firm’s 
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alliance activity (that is partner selection, governance choice, and alliance portfolio 
management). As a result, both capital structure decisions and alliance decisions could be 
jointly determined, raising the concern that endogeneity may bias my estimates. Although I 
took into account this problem by adopting an instrumental variable approach in chapter 3 or 
by analyzing the potential distortion of self-selection bias in chapter 4, still much could be 
done to test the robustness of my findings. For instance, in chapter 3 I was not able to apply 
the instrumental variables approach to test my predictions on the impact of particular 
typologies of alliances, because of the inherent difficulty of finding appropriate instruments 
for the related variables. Future research could address these points by analyzing with more 
rigorous empirical methods the importance of alliance heterogeneity in specific industries. 
Second, while I find that firms forming alliances tend to reduce leverage arguably to induce 
investments from their external partners, my analysis does not rule out alternative financial 
explanations for why this is indeed the case. Target adjustments models of capital structure 
suggest that firm possess target debt ratios that depend on the anticipated benefits and costs 
of debt financing. However, since issuing or retiring financial securities is costly, firms do 
not always operate at target levels of leverage, but instead they gradually adjust toward it 
with a given speed of adjustment (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). In this respect, my 
analysis is still not able to assess whether firms with alliances possess lower target debt 
ratios (that is alliances have a long-term effect on capital structure), or if the need to induce 
investments from alliance partners just temporarily bump them away from their targets. 
Future research could address this limitation by investigating whether strategic alliances 
influence target capital structure or rather the “speed” with which firms are able to tend to 
their targets.  
Third, from a theoretical point of view probably the major limitation of this work is that it 
mostly addresses the negative aspects implied by partners’ leverage. To a certain extent, I 
overcome this limitation when I show that high leverage firms offer equity participation as a 
form of commitment towards the alliance in order to attract better partners. Similarly, I also 
show that leverage has a positive side when it disciplines the way managers deploy high 
discretion financial slack across the firm’s alliance portfolio. However, there may be also 
other benefits associated with highly levered partners. For instance, extant literature suggests 
that financially constrained (i.e., highly levered) firms are more prone to form alliances in 
order to develop projects that they would not be able to pursue independently (Patzelt et al. 
2008, Lerner et al. 2003). Thus, while bringing instability, leverage could also force firms to 
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externalize valuable projects that would be otherwise lost, and non-levered firms may be 
able to capitalize upon these opportunities. Future work could study the circumstances under 
which this may happen, such as how the liquidity of the market impacts alliancing behavior. 
Forth and lastly, in this thesis I discuss the implications of firm’s capital structure in terms of 
partner selection, alliance governance choice and alliance portfolio management. 
Nonetheless, the proposed theoretical framework could be easily extended in order to 
include other important aspects of alliances that have not been addressed here. For instance, 
another interesting avenue for future research could be to analyze whether bankruptcy risks 
influence other contractual characteristics of alliances as well. For example, firms allying 
with highly levered counterparts may prefer agreements with a predetermined duration or 
with a limited scope in order to reduce their dependence on the counterpart. Similarly, they 
may prefer to include early termination clauses contingent upon the counter-part’s financial 
condition or adopt more complex and stringent contracts to prevent any scaling back of 
effort from the financially weak partner. While lack of detailed data prevented the study of 
these issues within this thesis, future research on these topics could prove highly insightful. 
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